Article Source: http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/e1782cc4-e95a-11e2-9f11-00144feabdc0.html#axzz2mjdayvNs
This article examines various reasons surrounding P&G’s declining global market share and how the decision in July 2013 to bring back former CEO, AG Lafley (served from 2000-2009) could serve to reinvigorate the company, returning it to the true consumer goods product giant it has been for the last 175 years.
According to the author, although P&G is still the world leader consumer goods products company, their sales revenue, profit, and overall market share have not been consistent in the last few years, particularly since the economic decline that began in 2008. The company’s inability to increase sales without also providing an increased return on income (ROI) is something that P&G has been struggling with as of the last few years – as costs have increased so has sales, but consequently a decline in ROI is also evident. The key for P&G and Lafley will be to figure out a way to reduce overhead costs while still maintaining high sales figures and amplify profitability.
To fully understand this issue, one must understand the values that P&G as a company considers to be important and how those values may no loner necessarily be in-line with the needs of the consumer, thereby negatively affecting P&G revenue and profit growth.
As discussed during the case presentation this week, P&G grew from a small family business that specialized in soap and candle making into a multinational packaged consumer goods company operating in over 80 countries through innovative product advances. For example, P&G, in launching Crest, made it the first company to develop and market a fluoride toothpaste, allowing it to dominate the United States toothpaste market for over 10 years (due to patent protection preventing any other company from marketing and launching a competing fluoride toothpaste product) or the development of the Swiffer Sweeper which has dominated the market since 2000. With this penchant for innovation, P&G was able to market many of their goods as premium products that came with corresponding price tags.
Inventions such as Crest, Swiffer, and others are what fueled the rapid growth and dominance of the P&G brand and the company particularly capitalized on this and the prices these products could command in the years leading up to the 2008 recession. With the recession came declined consumer expenditures on many of the premium beauty and household goods offered by P&G – consumer behavior rapidly commoditized these products and instead of altering their corporate strategy in response to this change, the firm further stuck their heels in and drove prices even higher in spite of the worst recession many had ever seen in their lifetime. These decisions allowed other consumer goods companies such as Unilever and Colgate-Palmolive to obtain increased market share in areas where P&G previously was the clear winner.
In this respect, it is easy to see why although P&G is still more profitable than most of its competitors, its inability to simultaneously achieve increased profit and sales revenue growth in the same fiscal year and fully maximize its profitability is troubling for investors and financial analysts alike. It provides an explanation for how the company “lost share in 49% of the markets where it competes in the first quarter of this year.” P&G has chosen a path where many of their consumers can no longer afford or just simply are no longer interested to follow along on. Once consumers have tried other brands and have determined they deliver comparable results as pricier P&G products do, there is no reason why they would return to purchasing P&G goods that not only are more expensive, but do not deliver a substantial difference in intrinsic value.
Additionally, the power that P&G’s headquarters in middle-America, USA (Cincinnati, Ohio) has and exerts over the overall direction and strategy of the business makes it hard for the company to thrive in global markets – essentially, they are just unable to be (and stay) in touch with the increasingly diversified and divergent needs of an international market. The company itself has a very centralized organizational structure making it difficult for it to gain share in emerging international markets; only 40% of P&G sales (an improvement from 33% in 2008), whereas 57% of Unilever sales and 53% of Colgate sales come from these markets. The organizational structure and one-track focus on innovation is also to blame for the ability of start-ups selling razors online to undercut and underprice Gillette’s line of razors and has the potential to significantly impact the profitability of that P&G division.
In conclusion, the “end” as we know it for P&G is nowhere near, but if the company and its newly reappointed CEO would like to remain a highly and consistently profitable going-concern for decades to come, the business must realign itself with its consumer target base. This means understanding that although innovation is what brought the company to where they are now, it is not necessarily what will keep them there. When it comes to household goods, consumers do not always want the most innovative cleaning product – instead they want the best product they can get for the best price that they can get. Lastly, emerging markets should be a top priority for P&G and this can only be effectively accomplished by having field offices and research facilities in those global markets where P&G either has a leading market share or has identified as a rapidly growing and untapped geographic location that can provide substantial returns for the firm.