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Defense Intelligence Assessment

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Iraqi Denial and Deception: Countertargeting Methods ~~(S)~~

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
Iraqi Denial and Deception: Countertargeting Methods ~~(S)~~

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Iraqi Denial and Deception: Countertargeting Methods ~~(S)~~

Key Judgments

- ~~(S/NF)~~ Iraq has developed a multilayered strategy for reducing the effects of US air and cruise missile strikes.
- ~~(S)~~ Saddam Husayn tends to minimize the ability of US cruise missile strikes to inflict meaningful physical damage against his regime and its elite security apparatus.
- ~~(S)~~ Recent reluctance by most nations to support possible military action against Baghdad has reinforced Saddam's view that US strikes against Iraq will benefit him politically.
- ~~(S/NF)~~ This countertargeting strategy will use denial and deception, deterrence activities, and information warfare operations to exploit perceived limits of US military capabilities and acceptable behavior in conducting a bombing campaign.
- ~~(S)~~ The most likely deterrence measure is the use of "human shields" to prevent US targeting of key regime facilities and economic assets.

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


Figure 1. (U) The Operation DESERT STORM Air Campaign Applied Air Power Precisely and Nearly Simultaneously Against Key Iraqi Regime and Military Targets and Significantly Degraded Enemy Capabilities.

Iraqi Denial and Deception: Countertargeting Methods ~~(S)~~

Iraqi Countertargeting Strategy

~~(S/NF)~~ The Iraqi armed forces and the Office for Military Industrialization (OMI) have devised a national-level countertargeting strategy. This strategy is based on four factors:

- Preconceived ideas of the Iraqi leadership about American attitudes toward war.
- Historical experience with US bombing campaigns.
- General knowledge of US targeting doctrine derived from unclassified US analyses of the DESERT STORM air offensive and other open sources.
- Insights into probably US target sets obtained from recent US press articles and official US statements.

(b)(1), 1.4 (c)

~~(S/NF)~~ Saddam's pronouncements and countertargeting measures suggest that Baghdad believes the United States cannot conduct a sustained bombing campaign on the scale of the 43-day DESERT STORM air offensive. The 1991 offensive involved 2,780 fixed-wing aircraft, 288 Tomahawk land-attack missile (TLAM) attacks, 6,765 sorties against strategic

target categories, and 23,430 sorties against Iraqi ground forces.

~~(S/NF)~~ Saddam is mindful that he survived this onslaught and has declared himself the victor, having defeated what he believes was his enemy's primary war aim—his removal from power. Consequently, he tends to minimize the effectiveness of cruise missile strikes. Moreover, as early as 1993, Saddam reportedly viewed US military strikes against Iraq, or the threat of strikes, as a net gain, politically speaking. Recent reluctance by most nations to support possible military action against Baghdad and the lackluster, and in some cases hostile, international response to last September's US attacks on Iraq's southern air defenses have reinforced this view.

~~(S/NF)~~ Thus, even though Saddam remains concerned about potential damage that military strikes against his regime may cause, Iraqi countertargeting measures since 1993 indicate that Baghdad understands the limits of acceptable US behavior in executing a bombing campaign. Accordingly, Iraq has designed its countertargeting strategy to exploit self-imposed US legal and political restrictions on striking military targets located in residential areas or near civilian installations, as well as concerns about collateral damage and environmental pollution.

~~(S/NF)~~ Iraqi countertargeting strategy has three components: denial and deception measures; deterrence activities, specifically, the positioning of human shields; and information warfare operations.

Denial

~~(S)~~ To protect personnel (especially key leaders), command posts, and equipment from cruise missile bombardment, Iraq's denial strategy relies on comprehensive evacuation and relocation to alternate

sites. Such sites have included schools, hospitals, mosques, hotels, warehouses, private homes, and other nondescript civilian facilities, all of which have been used as command centers, hide-sites, and or sleeping quarters in a crisis.

~~(S/NF)~~ Iraqi behavior in DESERT STORM, DESERT STRIKE in 1996, and the October-November 1997 crisis indicates that the current countertargeting strategy will rely on four types of denial measures:

- Tactical-level concealment.
- Leadership relocation.
- Industrial facility evacuation.
- Military unit equipment dispersals and redeployments.

Tactical-Level Concealment

~~(S/NF)~~ The main purpose of tactical-level concealment is impairing target acquisition by fixed-wing aircraft, delaying restrikes by concealing weapon effects, and impeding rapid detection and confirmation of military facilities imbedded in civilian installations and units deployed in residential areas.

Leadership Relocation

~~(S/NF)~~ Saddam Husayn and his personal entourage probably will relocate to private, unofficial residences and mobile command vehicles and move constantly to impede realtime US targeting. Saddam may also occupy major mosques and religious shrines to avoid possible attacks. The use of concealed near-surface bunkers and underground facilities by Saddam and key officials cannot be excluded. The Iraqis will use nondescript vehicles, decoy convoys, and multiple simultaneous vehicle and helicopter departures to mask leadership relocation movements.

~~(S/NF)~~ Similarly, government ministers, senior Iraqi military commanders, and security officials probably will relocate to civilian facilities, including private residences, hospitals, nursing homes, schools, and hotels. Unlike Saddam, however, these officials may not move as often, possibly so that Saddam knows their whereabouts, easing his ability to communicate with them.

These officials are more likely to make regular use of alternate surface and underground command posts.

Industrial Facility Evacuation

~~(S/NF)~~ Iraq will rely primarily on evacuation to reduce the effectiveness of strikes against weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missile production facilities. Iraq has considerable experience in evacuating military industrial installations. (b)(1), 1.4 (c) and UNSCOM reports confirm that the Ministry of Industry and Military Industrialization, and its successor, OMI, removed machinery, documentation, and personnel from numerous defense industry installations to "alternate locations" before and during DESERT STORM, and in the October-November 1997 crisis.

~~(S/NF)~~ One way the Iraqis reportedly secure such items is loading them on trucks and driving them from location to location or parking them in ordinary garages. (b)(1), 1.4 (c) military industry employees will be tasked to take home computers and equipment to protect them from possible strikes, a practice confirmed by UNSCOM and International Atomic Energy Agency observations in the past.

(b)(1), 1.4 (c), (b)(3): 10 USC 424

Illustrative 1997 Facility Evacuation: Latifiyah Solid-Propellant Test Facility



(S/NF)

- 9 October — Last UNSCOM inspection.
- 29 October — OMI orders evacuation of production equipment.
- 5 November — Autoclave removed.
- 8 November — Solid-propellant mixer bowl removed.
- 20 November — Iraq orders reinstatement of equipment.
- 21 November — UNSCOM personnel return to Iraq.

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


Figure 2. (S/NF) Selected OMI Facilities Evacuated in October-November 1997.

Military Unit Redeployments and Dispersals

(S) From past experience, the Iraqi military believes that redeployments and dispersal of Republican Guard (RGFC), Special Republican Guard (SRG), and surface-to-air missile (SAM) units will be an effective countertargeting measure against US tactical cruise missile strikes.

"Dispersal Doctrine" at the Military Unit Level

(S) Procedures differ somewhat based on type and location of units, but the level of dispersal activity varies mainly according to Iraqi threat perceptions and assessments of enemy intent: the larger the expected enemy attack, the more widespread the redeployment and dispersal activity. The Iraqi military appears to feel more threatened by tactical air capabilities vice cruise missile capabilities.

(S) Typical dispersal procedures call for ground force equipment and aircraft to be relocated mostly in and around their bases. SAMs and antiaircraft artillery sites will relocate to alternate sites, usually close to their original locations. The Iraqis also use natural cover and concealment, trees and wadis for example, to hide dispersed military equipment. The Iraqis will, for force protection reasons, place combat equipment in civilian areas believing that they will not be targeted. If they are, the regime expects that civilian casualties will result that can be exploited for propaganda purposes.

(S) The directive to draw up a dispersal plan is probably issued by Iraq's General Headquarters, with general guidance, to all corps. The corps order their subordinate divisions to draw up dispersal plans within the guidelines of the corps' plan. Subordinate brigade headquarters will specify the methods used based on the division's instructions. This allows variations in dispersal distances and techniques employed by different brigades and divisions. Brigade commanders are responsible for executing the

plan and all requisite preparations. Iraqi doctrine published before DESERT STORM states the general policy regarding passive defense against hostile air attack as simply that vehicles must in all cases be at least 50 meters from one another and "all entrenchment, camouflage, concealment, and black-out measures will be observed."

~~(S)~~ There may be three degrees of a dispersal plan that correspond to designated threat levels. The Iraqi intent is protecting equipment against the effects of TLAMs and cluster munitions. At the lowest threat level, units disperse within garrison or immediately along the outside perimeter of the garrison. Vehicles are approximately 30 to 50 meters apart. As the perception of

threat increases, vehicles are moved farther from garrison (but within the immediate vicinity) and disperse approximately 75-100 meters apart. When the threat of an air/missile attack is deemed imminent, the highest degree of dispersion is implemented. Units relocate approximately 2 to 3.5 kilometers from garrison, and dispersal distances vary between 75 to 150 meters, depending on terrain.

~~(S)~~ Dispersing units further from garrison may be discouraged because of the lack of fuel and heavy equipment transporters. In addition, Iraqi manuals caution that "a large dispersal makes excessive demands on communications and local defense resources and reduces the effectiveness of headquarters."

(b)(1), 1.4 (c), (b)(3), 10 USC 424

(b)(1), 1.4 (c), (b)(3): 10 USC 424

(S) Maximum dispersal also can include large-scale removal of ammunition and equipment from storage depots and will encompass dispersing aircraft to revetments, civilian settlements, and ancient monuments, and moving FROG and ASTROS-II surface-to-surface missile units from storage areas to field locations.


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Table 2. Probable Dispersal Procedures

Status	Location	Distance Between Vehicles	Cover and Concealment
Dispersal within garrison	Along inside perimeter	30-50 meters	Pre dug revetments
Wide-area dispersal	Less than 1 kilometer outside garrison perimeter	75-100 meters	Pre dug revetments and/or hasty revetments
Complete dispersal	2.0-3.5 kilometers from garrison	75-150 meters	Hasty revetments

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(b)(1), 1.4 (c), (b)(3): 10 USC 424



Military Redeployments

(S) When Baghdad believes that strikes against Iraq may be large-scale or sustained, dispersal distance has been much greater, with major elements of units leaving their garrisons entirely. Such was the case in late 1992, when the Iraqis were unsure how far their conflict with the United States about UNSCOM access and the southern no-fly zone would go.

(S) Most units also have internal security missions that necessitate deployment away from garrison. Ground forces will deploy to such key locations as bridges, broadcast facilities, road intersections, and gas stations. Iraqi units will execute these missions in conjunction with an impending attack to prevent Iraqi

opposition elements from using an external attack to carry out antiregime activities.

Table 3. Vehicle Column Intervals

Situation	Distance Between Vehicles
Day	50 meters
Day under air threat	100 meters
Night	25 meters
Night under air threat	50 meters
Open desert (day)	At least 150 meters

NOTE: During tactical movement, as ground combat units and their mobile HQ deploy or relocate, Iraqi doctrine specifies vehicle distances to help protect them from air attack.

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Mobile Command Posts

~~(S)~~ When dispersing out of garrison in wide-area dispersal, units prepare alternate fixed headquarters and ready their mobile command posts (CPs). During redeployments, they activate both.

~~(FOUO)~~ In field manuals and special operating procedures, the Iraqis refer to a mobile CP as a Rover (Arabic: jawwal) or Rover Group. In a heavy division, the Rover Group consists of three command APCs equipped with HF radios and an additional one or two

APCs. In an infantry division, the Rover Group is four or five quarter-ton vehicles and a 3-ton vehicle. A heavy brigade's Rover Group is equipped with one command APC, another APC, and two quarter-ton vehicles. In an infantry brigade, the Rover Group consists of four quarter-ton vehicles equipped with HF radios, and one 3-ton vehicle. Each Rover Group has one or two motorcycles as well. Battalion commanders have a single VHF-equipped quarter-ton vehicle as their Rover, although tank and mechanized battalion commanders can opt to use their normal command tank or command APC for their mobile CP.

(b)(1), 1.4 (c), (b)(3): 10 USC 424

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Deception

(S/NF) The armed forces and OMI will execute deception measures to divert reconnaissance assets, cause the expenditure of precision-guided munitions and TLAMs against false targets, and slow the targeting cycle by impeding rapid bomb damage assessment of targets

(b)(1), 1.4 (c)

(b)(1), 1.4 (c) The purpose of such deception would be to attract US strikes to civilian targets and engineer a "strategic incident" similar to the 1991 Al Firdos bunker episode to use to discredit the entire bombing campaign.

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Figure 8. (U) "Volunteer" Human Shields, Presidential Palace, Baghdad.

(b)(1), 1.4 (c)

Deterrence Measures

(S) Saddam's most likely deterrence measure is the use of human shields to prevent US targeting of key regime facilities and economic assets. Saddam used this tactic last fall. Iraq could order civilian "volunteers" to encamp in or near presidential sites, major government buildings, and electric powerplants. Other deterrence measures could include dispersing select military units to civilian residential areas, religious shrines, hospitals, and schools, and secretly placing human shields at potential targets to cause civilian casualties in the event of US strikes.

Information Warfare

(S/NF) Iraq is experienced in using disinformation and propaganda to discredit US actions and generate favorable international public opinion. Recent Iraqi threats about retaliation with unspecified "long-range" and "special" weapons suggest initiation of information warfare measures designed to intimidate Arab governments and weaken their support for a US bombing campaign. Should the United States strike, Iraq would orchestrate official statements, stage media events, and covertly place press stories emphasizing the military ineffectiveness of US strikes, excessive collateral damage, assert Israeli military involvement, and claim unnecessary civilian suffering.

(b)(1), 1.4 (c)

Implications

~~(S/NF)~~ Iraqi countertargeting strategy could reduce the military effectiveness of US strikes and aid Baghdad in discrediting the entire bombing campaign.

~~(S)~~ Baghdad apparently is confident that it will obtain tactical warning of a US attack from monitoring international press reports, from foreign intelligence services or officials sympathetic to Iraq, or from Iraq's own intelligence and diplomatic sources. Military and OMI plans presume that such warning will give at least several hours warning before targets in the Bagh-

dad area are attacked, enabling completion of evacuation and dispersal plans. Saddam will wait until the last minute to order the full evacuation of OMI facilities, because it is time-consuming, disruptive, and costly. Failure to evacuate key OMI installations would be evidence that Saddam wants to avert a US strike.

(b)(1), 1.4 (c)

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