The second Presidential debate would take place at NBC studios in Washington, D.C. on October 7, 1960. The format was similar to that of the first debate, with the major exception of no opening or closing remarks from either candidate. What the viewers saw during this debate was a reinvigorated Richard Nixon, who seemed to drop much of his past formality and niceties, in favor of a more aggressive and locked stance. This was seen most prominently in his tough stance with John F. Kennedy over the issue of the spread of communism, more specifically the islands of Quemoy and Matsu.
MR. MORGAN: Senator, Saturday on television you said that you had always thought that Quemoy and Matsu were unwise places to draw our defense line in the Far East. Would you comment further on that and also address to this question; couldn’t a pullback from those islands be interpreted as appeasement?
MR. KENNEDY: Well, the United States uh – has on occasion attempted uh – mostly in the middle fifties, to persuade Chiang Kai-shek to pull his troops back to Formosa. I believe strongly in the defense of Formosa. These islands are a few miles – five or six miles – off the coast of Red China, within a general harbor area and more than a hundred miles from Formosa. We have never said flatly that we will defend Quemoy and Matsu if it’s attacked. We say we will defend it if it’s part of a general attack on Formosa. But it’s extremely difficult to make that judgment. Now, Mr. Herter in 1958, when he was Under Secretary of State, said they were strategically undefensible. Admirals Spruance and Callins in 1955 said that we should not attempt to defend these islands, in their conference in the Far East. General Ridgway has said the same thing. I believe that when you get into a w- if you’re going to get into war for the defense of Formosa, it ought to be on a clearly defined line. One of the problems, I think, at the time of South Korea was the question of whether the United States would defend it if it were attacked. I believe that we should defend Formosa. We should come to its defense. To leave this rather in the air, that we will defend it under some conditions but not under other, I think is a mistake. Secondly, I would not suggest the withdrawal at the point of the Communist gun. It is a decision finally that the Nationalists should make and I believe that we should consult with them and attempt to work out a plan by which the line is drawn at the island of Formosa. It leaves a hundred miles between the sea. But with General Ridgway, Mr. Herter, General Collins, Admiral Spruance and many others, I think it’s unwise to take the chance of being dragged into a war which may lead to a world war over two islands which are not strategically defensible, which are not, according to their testimony, essential to the defense of Formosa. I think that uh – we should protect our commitments. I believe strongly we should do so in Berlin. I believe strongly we should d- do so in Formosa and I believe we should meet our commitments to every country whose security we’ve guaranteed. But I do not believe that that line in case of war should be drawn on those islands but instead on the island of Formosa. And as long as they are not essential to the defense of Formosa, it’s been my judgment ever since 1954, at the time of the Eisenhower Doctrine for the Far East, that our line should be drawn in the sea around the island itself.
MR. McGEE: Mr. Vice President.
MR. NIXON: I disagree completely with Senator Kennedy on this point. I remember in the period immediately before the Korean War, South Korea was supposed to be indefensible as well. Generals testified to that. And Secretary Acheson made a very famous speech at the Press Club, early in the year that k- Korean War started, indicating in effect that South Korea was beyond the defense zone of the United States. I suppose it was hoped when he made that speech that we wouldn’t get into a war. But it didn’t mean that. We had to go in when they came in. Now I think as far as Quemoy and Matsu are concerned, that the question is not these two little pieces of real estate – they are unimportant. It isn’t the few people who live on them – they are not too important. It’s the principle involved. These two islands are in the area of freedom. The Nationalists have these two islands. We should not uh – force our Nationalist allies to get off of them and give them to the Communists. If we do that we start a chain reaction; because the Communists aren’t after Quemoy and Matsu, they’re a- they’re after Formosa. In my opinion this is the same kind of woolly thinking that led to disaster for America in Korea. I am against it. I would never tolerate it as president of the United States, and I will hope that Senator Kennedy will change his mind if he should be elected.
The chain reaction which Nixon is referring to is often most recognized as the “Domino Theory”, the school of thought which believes that every nation which turns to Communism will ultimately lead to several others soon falling susceptible after. Dwight D. Eisenhower most notably supported this notion throughout his presidency in regard to Southeast Asia. [11] This was undoubtedly an appeal to his base supporters, the Republicans who supported Eisenhower so strongly, and also indicative of the campaign strategy at work behind Nixon.
After the first debate Nixon’s team recognized the swing in the polls, what was likely to be indicative of the rest of the election run, and realized he must not only appeal to his base but also to the undecided voters. The Gallup poll following the first debate seemed to show that Kennedy was quickly snatching up undecided voters. In response to this, Nixon offered up his viewpoint that voters should not simply vote within their party lines but instead for the man best suited for the Presidency.
MR. LEVY: Mr. Vice President, you are urging voters to forget party labels and vote for the man. Senator Kennedy says that in doing this you are trying to run away from your party on such issues as housing and aid to education by advocating what he calls a me-too program. Why do you say that party labels are not important?
MR. NIXON; Because that’s the way we elect a president in this country, and it’s the way we should. I’m a student of history as is Senator Kennedy, incidentally; and I have found that in the history of this country we’ve had many great presidents. Some of them have been Democrats and some of them have been Republicans. The people, some way, have always understood that at a particular time a certain man was the one the country needed. Now, I believe that in an election when we are trying to determine who should lead the free world – not just America – perhaps, as Senator Kennedy has already indicated, the most important election in our history – it isn’t the label that he wears or that I wear that counts. It’s what we are. It’s our whole lives. It’s what we stand for. It’s what we believe. And consequently, I don’t think it’s enough to go before Republican audiences – and I never do – and say, “Look, vote for me because I’m a Republican.” I don’t think it’s enough for Senator Kennedy to go before the audiences on the Democratic side and say, “Vote for me because I’m a Democrat.” That isn’t enough. What’s involved here is the question of leadership for the whole free world. Now that means the best leadership. It may be Republican, it may be Democratic. But the people are the ones that determine it. The people have to make up their minds. And I believe the people, therefore, should be asked to make up their minds not simply on the basis of, “Vote the way your grandfather did; vote the way your mother did.” I think the people should put America first, rather than party first. Now, as far as running away from my party is concerned, Senator Kennedy has said that we have no compassion for the poor, that we are against progress – the enemies of progress, is the term that he’s used, and the like. All that I can say is this: we do have programs in all of these fields – education, housing, defense – that will move America forward. They will move her forward faster, and they will move her more surely than in his program. This is what I deeply believe. I’m sure he believes just as deeply that his will move that way. I suggest, however, that in the interest of fairness that he could give me the benefit of also believing as he believes.
MR. McGEE: Senator Kennedy.
MR. KENNEDY: Well, let me say I do think that parties are important in that they tell something about the program and something about the man. Abraham Lincoln was a great president of all the people; but he was selected by his party at a key time in history because his party stood for something. The Democratic party in this century has stood for something. It has stood for progress; it has stood for concern for the people’s welfare. It has stood for a strong foreign policy and a strong national defense, and as a result, produced Wilson, President Roosevelt, and President Truman. The Republican party has produced McKinley and Harding, Coolidge, Dewey, and Landon. They do stand for something. They stand for a whole different approach to the problems facing this country at home and abroad. That’s the importance of party; only if it tells something about the record. And the Republicans in recent years – not only in the last twenty-five years, but in the last eight years – have opposed housing, opposed care for the aged, opposed federal aid to education, opposed minimum wage and I think that record tells something.
While the Gallup polls are lacking data from directly after this debate, the final poll conducted right before the final debate would prove that the momentum John F. Kennedy gained from the first debate put him on a upward streak which Nixon would never surpass, regardless of Nixon’s perceived slight advantage in this debate.