“America First” and Nonproliferation

I found this article by former U.S. Ambassador to NATO Ivo Daalder very interesting. He suggests that a consequence of the Trump Administration’s “America First” foreign policy may be further breakdown of the Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT). Trump and Pompeo’s disdain for alliances have brought America’s commitment to protecting its allies, including if Article 5 is triggered, into question. While the Biden Administration will certainly work to rebuild alliances and reassure allies of the U.S. commitments, our allies and adversaries can hardly be blamed for noticing that 70+ million Americans voted for Donald Trump’s re-election, despite everything, and draw the conclusion a future, less incompetent administration could come to power and revive Trump’s disastrous foreign policy.

Daalder argues that the greatest threat to the NPT is not from adversaries, but from allies who conclude they can’t trust in U.S. protection and pursue nuclear capabilities so they can protect themselves. While I appreciate his concerns about our allies fearing they can’t trust the U.S. to protect them, I would like to believe his concerns are slightly overblown. He opens with a suggestion that Europe worried the U.S. might not defend Poland and the Baltic States from a nuclear threat from Russia. I see no reason Russia would suddenly decide to start nuking its neighbors. If that became a genuine concern, or if any NATO member was threatened or attacked, the U.S. is not the only nuclear state in NATO. The UK and France both have nuclear arsenals that are more than capable of responding to any Russian aggression and protecting Europe.

He mentions South Korea and Turkey as two allies who might be motivated to acquire nuclear weapons. I’m sure Erdogan would love a handy excuse to break the NPT and pursue nuclear capabilities for his own ambitions, but I doubt it would be driven by any real concern about the U.S., especially as Erdogan is friendly with Russia and France and the UK are capable of protecting a NATO ally. The UK and France do not have ICBMs, however, potentially limiting their response range if a threat occurs far from Europe. Their submarines may have stepped up patrols around the world in response to uncertainty from the U.S., but it’s impossible to know.

I also find it hard to imagine South Korea seeking nuclear weapons against North Korea. The threat from North Korea appears to be directed further from home for the most part, as evidenced by their pride in showing off their new ICBMs. It would be likely to only increase the risk to South Korea if they inflamed tensions by acquiring nuclear weapons. I could see this situation pushing South Korea to forge closer ties with China in a hope China will protect the region from North Korea’s nuclear weapons and help constrain the threat.

I think the greatest threat to nonproliferation comes from the states we are already aware of, Saudi Arabia and Iran. While Iran seems interested in the U.S. re-entering the JPCOA, I fear Saudi Arabia and Iran’s power struggles and proxy wars in the region make it even more likely both will become nuclear states. I can’t see any situation where one accepts the other having nuclear weapons if they do not. The focus has been on Iran for some time, but Saudi Arabia is likely not waiting around to find out if the JPCOA will halt Iran’s nuclear ambitions. In recent weeks, both nations have thrown accusations at each other and called on the IAEA to investigate the other. Perhaps the U.S. and other signatories could use this to their advantage. Already, Riyadh knows their time of impunity from Washington is at an end. If the U.S. commits to ensuring Saudi Arabia is held to the same rules and investigations as Iran and neither will be allowed to posses nuclear arms, perhaps it could help prevent both from becoming nuclear states. Obviously, nothing is that simple, but I worry that especially during the Trump Administration, Saudi Arabia has been allowed to fly under the radar and needs to be checked before they destroy any chance of preventing Iran from obtaining nuclear weapons.