Photo from FutureAtlas
This column comments on potential misconceptions between the United States and China.
Misunderstandings between individuals are some of the greatest sources of conflict that can enter a relationship. Friendships have ended because one person thought that the other meant something else; marriages have broken because of misconceptions about the other partner’s intentions or actions. This holds true not only for individual relationships, but relationships between different cultures and nations as well. Such things become clearer when one views relationships between nations already in conflict, such as the United States and China. To examine this relationship, we must look at a misconception that arose as a result of legitimate worry and anger, concerning American imperialism.
The idea that the US is still an imperialistic power tainted the Chinese perspective of American actions during the mid- to late twentieth century, despite the fact that American expansionism ended decades before. Just as important, American fear of Soviet communism during the mid-twentieth century resulted in the refusal to accept a Communist China as a sovereign state, viewing the People’s Republic of China as a pawn of the Soviet Union and thereby refusing to work with them. Avoiding these two misconceptions and focusing on cultural similarities and understanding, as has become a focus in more recent years, has improved relations between the two nations immensely.
The Chinese perception of America as an imperialist power dates back to its involvement in Chinese affairs starting with the Opium War in the early nineteenth century. Despite not participating in the war, the US reaped the benefits when the English won, gaining access to ports, extraterritoriality, and most-favored nation status [1]. At the time, the Chinese considered foreigners as barbarians, whose cultures were less developed than the Chinese—there was a great deal of contempt in their view. For a long time, Americans were considered as better than the English, but as time went on, these perceptions began to change. The U.S. government did not exercise its authority over those Americans in China, and so Americans began to develop a bad reputation in the port cities. More importantly, however, the US sided with the British on political issues, demanding that the Chinese allow them to revise treaties early and give them greater freedoms [2]. The American policies seemed just as bad as those of the other European powers. In many ways—they just stood by and silently endorsed the idea that the Chinese only responded to violence.
There were high points in the relationship—a new era appeared to be on the horizon when a Chinese delegation went to America under the leadership of Anson Burlingame. The resulting treaty included America’s promise not to interfere in China’s internal affairs [3], which stood out against the European powers’ continued focus on influencing China. However, this too was later challenged because of John Hayes’ “Open Door” policy: rather than trying to hold true to the spirit of the treaty and support Chinese independence and territoriality, the US legitimized the claims of other imperialist powers in China. “The United States had not challenged the existence of spheres of influence… Hay at no time consulted with the Chinese government, at no time sought any expression of Chinese needs” [4]. Such policies continued tension among US-Chinese relations.
Such tensions were only exacerbated by American actions towards immigrants, which made clear the differences between the two powers. The Burlingame treaty changed immigration rules, sparking an increase in Chinese immigration to the United States, but their treatment was less than ideal due to American racism. “[The Chinese immigrants] wanted to close shop and return to China…staying here, they would be unhappy and fear for their lives” [5]. When Chinese ambassadors were sent to try and fix policies concerning Chinese immigrants, their efforts were largely in vain.
These views of American imperialism came back to haunt diplomacy between the two nations once Mao Zedong and the Chinese Communists took over the country. Mao’s feelings are expressed clearly in an article he wrote: “Acheson [the American Secretary of State] is telling a bare-faced lie when he describes aggression as “friendship”” [6]. Mao had a valid point in the fact that the America’s policies hurt China, mentioning such things as the indemnity for the Boxer Rebellion, missionary work in China, abuse of extraterritoriality, and aid given to Chiang Kai-shek for his wars against the Communists. And while these are issues, the motives attributed by the Chinese are not necessarily the complete truth.
There were also many individuals who wanted to keep Chinese interests in mind, and Mao misunderstood American fear of Communism for the desire to control China. The US made the choices that would be in its own best interests, but this is the regular policy for countries. The choices did not favor Chinese Communism, but oftentimes this was not out of hatred for the Communists, but because favoring the Communists seemed to go against American interests. The misunderstanding is that American motives for getting involved in Chinese, Korean, and Vietnamese affairs were made out of the desire for control rather than the fear of instability and national security. American support for Chiang Kai-shek, South Korea, and South Vietnam was given not because they hated the individualists or the goals of the Communist party, but because they believed that a democracy was a better form of government. True, there were many Americans who wanted a regime change, but Acheson and many others involved in foreign relations focused on stability as being more important than ideology.
However, this belief of American imperialism is brought to an extreme in concurrent Communist articles, often verging on propaganda to keep support for the Party and its aims: “[America] is the place where reaction, darkness, cruelty, decadence, corruption, debauchery, the oppression of people by people, cannibalism, and all the evils in the whole world today are produced…” [7]. Other articles held that capitalists are truly in control of everything in America and that their goal was to oppress and control people for the purposes of making war and bullying nations in other areas of the world [8]. Such viewpoints show that the Communists did not understand American culture, allowing their view of the US as an imperialist nation to distort their ideas and reactions towards it.
This can be seen in the reactions of China to the United States’ involvement in Korea in 1950. The Communists didn’t understand the deep-rooted American fear of Communism, and their predisposition towards viewing the US as an imperialist power meant that any militaristic action on their part would be viewed as such, despite the fact that other motivations were behind it. “From the view of CCP leaders, the United States threatened both the revolution and the security of the newly founded nation” [9]. This perspective brought the hatred of American imperialism to the front when the Korean War broke out. The Communist government supported this viewpoint, even going so far as to call the Korean War “Resist America, Support Korea” [10]. Thus the Chinese misconception about imperialism being America’s major motive, rather than American desire for a stable and united Korea, for intervening in Asia led them to view America as a threat to their national security.
It is extremely important to remember that America too had many deep misconceptions about the Chinese, specifically about the Communist party. Since the Open-Door policy and the advent of anti-imperialism in the United States, policy had tended towards supporting a strong China, one that was able to stand against the influence of Russia and Japan. However, once Mao’s Communist Party took power, “people and their leaders were blinded by fear of Communism and forgot the sound geopolitical, economic, and ethical basis of their historic desire for China’s well-being. Having always assumed that China would be friendly, Americans were further bewildered by the hostility of Mao’s China” [11]. America’s greatest experience with Communist state was with Russia, and Russian Communism was extremely expansionist and seemed to threaten American security and world stability. Taking this into account, Americans felt that they had every right to be fearful of a Communist China. The American reaction was one of fear— the long-held sympathy for China turned, almost overnight, to mistrust and hostility towards China now that a Communist regime was in charge.
These views become clear when looking at US policies towards the Korean War. At this point, the US had already broken off diplomatic relations with the People’s Republic of China, and although there were indirect methods of communication, there was no real push for re-establishing relations with the Communists. This lack of willingness to directly work with the Communists resulted in skewed perspectives on what was going on in the area and how Communist China would react. Americans were under the misconception that China was a pawn of the Soviet Union and believed that “China would intervene only at the behest of Moscow” [12]. Due to the political climate with the USSR at the time, the US believed that there would be no such pressure because it could lead to general warfare, something that Soviets and Americans alike wanted to avoid. In addition, there was the belief that China was focused on domestic issues. This was true, but the invasion of North Korea would become a security concern for the Chinese due to their fear of American imperialism.
Such misunderstandings of one another’s cultures have harmed US-China relations. If the United States and People’s Republic of China had not been so ignorant of one another, the fear would not have come to the violent crescendo that it escalated to. Diplomatic relations probably would have been maintained and, as with any two powers, there would have been rocky points. But tension would have lessened after the two countries accepted one another: “Without the Korean War… the United States and China might have established a normal, though perhaps not really a friendly relationship” [13]. History would have played out very differently if the United States and China had been able to come to some sort of agreement over mutual interests, if not mutual ideologies, and worked together.
It is extremely important for the current administrations to seek better understandings of one another’s viewpoints. President Obama and Premier Hu Jintao cannot look at international relations as merely a political thing—the agreements or arguments between the United States and China can have far reaching consequences, ranging from small-scale trade disputes to nuclear warfare. The decisions made by these two governments have the potential to affect the entire world, and that is a grave responsibility. Looking at history, the best path here seems clear: do not allow ideologies to get in the way of partnership or hinder communication. In the past, the refusal to compromise and seek to understand one another has only led to hatred and violence. In order to prevent the continuation of such policies, the US and Chinese administrations must learn to look past their differences and work past their misunderstandings.
Notes
i. Extraterritoriality is the state of being exempt from the jurisdiction of local law.
Works Cited
[5][6][7][8] Arkush, David R., and Leo O. Lee, eds. A Land Without Ghosts: Chinese Impressions of America from the Mid-Nineteenth Century to the Present. Los Angeles, California: University of California, 1993.
[1][2][3][4][11] Cohen, Warren I. America’s Response to China: A History of Sino-American Relations. 4th ed. New York: Columbia UP, 2000.
[9][10][12][13] Swaine, Michael D., and Zhang Tuosheng, eds. Managing Sino-American Crises: Case Studies and Analysis. Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2006.
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1. Cover image from FutureAtlas.com
