How to Keep Iran Out of the Nuclear Game

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A common disciplinary measure against ‘rogue’ nations or, more specifically, nations that operate counter to international orthodoxy, is the placement of sanctions.  One such nation, Iran, is exemplary of such a measure.  Regardless of whether or not Iran is a rogue nation having many sanctions placed against it, do these sanctions really work or do they only feed the flame of resentment and hostility against the participatory nations?  Given the events (or lack thereof) of recent months on the part of Iran, the answer suggests that sanctions do more harm than intended – to the dismay of those favoring the coalition of the willing.

Writing for the New York Times on March 12, 2010, David E. Sanger suggests that sanctions against Iran might not be the best thing: “Those who advocate sanctions acknowledge that three rounds enacted by the United Nations Security Council failed to change Iran’s behavior” [1]; it appears that the left acknowledges the futility of international unanimity.  As an organization lacking in authoritative executive power, the UN can do little more than express its discontent over individual nations’ or people’s actions; it is then no wonder that over the course of his presidency to date, Obama has broken several of his promises [2].  Moreover, as Michael Singh points out in his blog entitled “Incremental Sanctions Make a Nuclear Iran More Likely”, the predictability of sanctions in their scope and timing allow Iran to prepare for them in advance [3].  In placing sanctions (typically economic) against Iran, the aim is to weaken the resolve of the government there.  However, the general citizenry is also negatively affected as well.  Needless to say that broad economic sanctions unnecessarily harm more people than needed.

If sanctions prove ineffective in checking Iran’s ambitions for acquiring nuclear capabilities, what can be done?  Solutions may include but are not limited to orchestrating mutually beneficial interstate relations in the Middle East region.  This can then lead to a Middle East coalition posed against Iran, which may do well to become a kind of coalition of Middle Eastern states to stand against rogue nations such as Iran.  Other solutions may do well to include encouraging (not waiting for) other nations to take initiative in halting their relations with Iran that would bring them closer to acquiring the bomb.  Such actions may include re-evaluating business contracts, ceasing investments in Iranian oil, ending the sale of conventional arms (Russia) and other such measures.

However the U.S. chooses to engage Iran in the coming months, it cannot afford to vacillate in its direction; the longer the wait, the more severe the consequence; the Iran government is a dog whose bite may very well be worse than its bark.

Works Cited

Lindsay, James M., and Ray Takeyh. “After Iran Gets the Bomb. (Cover story).” 33-49. Foreign Affairs, 2010. Academic Search Premier. EBSCO. Web. 14 Mar. 2010.

[2] “Promise Broken Rulings on the Obameter.” The Obameter: Tracking Obama’s Campaign Promises. PolitiFact.com, n.d. Web. 14 Mar. 2010.  http://www.politifact.com/truth-o-meter/promises/rulings/promise-broken/

[1] Sanger, David E. “So Let’s Say Iran Gets the Bomb…” New York Times. N.p., 12

Mar. 2010. Web. 14 Mar. 2010. http://www.nytimes.com/2010/03/14/weekinreview/14sanger.html?partner=rss&emc=rss&pagewanted=print

[3] Singh, Michael. “Incremental Sanctions Make a Nuclear Iran More Likely.”  Shadow Government. Foreign Policy, 28 Feb. 2010. Web. 14 Mar. 2010.  http://shadow.foreignpolicy.com/blog/2199

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