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Long term consequences Bhopal
During the night of December 3rd of 1984, the Bhopal incident –one of the world’s worst industrial catastrophe- occurred; in fact the gas leakage of methyl isocyanate at a Union Carbide plant killed thousands of people and left many others to deal with disabilities, birth defects and many others diseases. It is needless to say that this disaster led to very serious consequences to all Union Carbide’s stakeholders in terms of legal lawsuits, financial recovery, toxic waste cleaning, and illnesses of victims.
It is interesting to see that 28 years after the incident the Bhopal issue is still a sensitive subject as the long terms consequences remain of major importance.
We would agree to say, “Industrial crises do not end. They simply change form and content.”
Who are Union Carbide’s stakeholders?
1-Union Carbide Corporation
2- The Bhopal community (victims)
3- The Indian government
- The long terms consequences for Union Carbide Corporation:
After the disaster the corporation was in a real financial distress and opted for a survival strategy pushing them to restructure the company. In 1987, Union Carbide changed to three divisions- Chemicals and Plastics, Industrial Gases, and Carbon Products.
UCC then sold its most profitable segment (consumer goods) to buy more stocks. In 1988 they made a come back which did not last long. In 1990 they tried out diversification in pharmaceuticals and consumers with a strategy that pretty much looked like the pre-Bhopal era. “At the end of 1991, debt still remained at 50 per cent of capitalization and sales were $7.35 billion. In 1992, UCC sold its Linde Gas Division for $2.4 billion, leaving the company at less than half its pre-Bhopal size.”(Shrivastava)
“Union Carbide Corp. sold its holding in the unit involved in the leak — Union Carbide India Ltd. — in 1994. The unit was then renamed Eveready Industries India Ltd.“( WJS)
After the Bhopal incident, the Indian subsidiary for Union Carbide decided not to get involved in other businesses not related to the pesticides industry and tried to stay out of lawsuits.
- Government versus UCC:
The major long-term effect UCC faces is the lawsuit with the government of India. The company first claimed they were not liable for the accident, for they were the result of sabotage. Since then it has been long dispute between the parties and many cases have been filed, dismissed and appealed.“The first major judgment in the Bhopal issue came in 1989 when India’s Supreme Court asked Union Carbide to pay $470 million in damages to the victims.”(WSJ) Despite appeals by victims’ organizations for a higher compensations, until now the court did not review its decision.
In June 2012, a case outraged the victims when in New York a judge held the following decision:
“New York federal court has dismissed all claims by Indian plaintiffs against Union Carbide Corp. for any environmental fallout of a gas leak which killed thousands of people in the Indian city of Bhopal 28 years ago.”
Giving his reasons for the order, the judge said “it is beyond dispute that Union Carbide India” — and not the U.S.-based parent — “generated and disposed of the waste which allegedly polluted plaintiffs’ drinking water.”
The court added that since Union Carbide sold its stake in the India unit, it’s not liable for the clean-up.”( WSJ)
- 28 years later the Bhopal Community has to live to the toxic waste:
The exact number of people who died from this incident and who are affected from its consequences remain unknown. Its hard for officials to estimate the real damages. There are records from hospitals saying that 20,000 people died and nearly 600,000 were left with physical damages.
Also, Dow Chemical maintained its position for more than 16 years after the catastrophe: they cannot be held liable for Union Carbide. For many victims , organizations defending them as well as organizations protecting the environment, Dow Chemical has miserably failed regarding its moral obligations of giving adequate payout and cleaning up the site of the disaster.
Not only Dow Chemical , but the government of India has been held responsible by activists for inadequate compensation of victims, and for the steps not taken to hold a party responsible for cleaning up of toxic wastes. Activists blamed the government for its “perennial inaction”.
Unfortunately, late November 2012 “tests reveal the groundwater near the plant, which has yet to be dismantled, is laced with carcinogens, and there is increasing evidence that this has caused birth defects and chronic illnesses.” ( the Guardian)
28 years later we can say the ecological footprint left by Union Carbide definitely have changed Bhopal forever. And the vestiges of such catastrophe will continue to mark the Bhopal soil and community for many more years and generations. In fact, The legal battle for justice between victims, the government and Union Carbide is far from being over.
This blue link gives further details on the types of physical effects the gas leak cause.
Source:
– Shrivastava, Paul. N.p.. Web. 25 Apr 2013. <http://archive.unu.edu/unupress/unupbooks/uu21le/uu21le0d.htm>.
Bhattacharya, P. n.d., n. pag. <http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052702303561504577493642502980690.html>.
Ramesh, Randeep. N.p.. Web. 25 Apr 2013. <http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2009/dec/03/bhopal-anniversary-union-carbide-gas>.
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economic recovery for Union carbide
Economic recovery
“Economic losses from the accident included loss of jobs, loss of earning capacity of victims, business disruptions, cost of compensation and rehabilitation, and legal costs. The UCIL plant, a $25 million investment, was shut down immediately after the accident, and 650 permanent jobs were lost. A few months later the Union Carbide Research and Development Center, located in another part of Bhopal, was also cut back to a skeleton staff. Local businesses and state government offices were shut down for three weeks, losing business and tax revenues. The two mass evacuations disrupted commercial activities for several weeks, with resulting business losses of $8-65 million. Loss of work in government offices was not included in these estimates (Morehouse and Subramaniam 1988; Shrivastava 1992).In the year after the accident, the government took many well-intentioned steps to provide economic relief to victims. Compensation of about $800 per fatality was paid to relatives of dead persons. Smaller cash compensation awards (less than $100) were distributed to 20,000 victims and 3,000 more victims were provided with part-time employment. New schools were also opened in the affected neighbourhoods. Unfortunately, in proportion to the tremendous relief needs these early (1985-1987) efforts were miniscule. Government relief failed to alleviate the misery of victims; it was simply too small in scale and limited in scope. But, given the many competing demands for government support, this was all that the government could manage at the time.Beginning in March 1991, new interim relief payments were made to victims. Sums of Rs 200 (about $8) per month were paid to all victims who lived in 37 of the city’s 54 wards that were officially classified as “gas affected.” A total of $260 million was disbursed, but the money was given to all people who lived in the affected wards, not just the victims. In fact, many of the people who lived in these 37 wards were not victims at all: they had moved in after the accident. As cash relief payments flowed into the city, the local inflation rate jumped to between 15 and 20 per cent per annum. Most people pinned their hopes of long-term recovery on anticipated compensation from Union Carbide.”
Source:- Shrivastava, Paul. N.p.. Web. 25 Apr 2013. <http://archive.unu.edu/unupress/unupbooks/uu21le/uu21le0d.htm>.
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consequences of this crisis
This an overview of how the different stakeholders were affected by union carbide crisis.
This is a nice study take a look at it this can help us
“A multiple-perspectives understanding of crises
This chapter employs a multiple-perspectives analysis of Bhopal (Shrivastava 1992). This approach seeks to understand the crisis from the perspectives of all key stakeholders. Stakeholders are individuals and organizations that influence, or are influenced by, the crisis. The key stakeholders in the Bhopal crisis included victims (i.e. the community in Bhopal), Union Carbide Corporation, and the Government of India.
A multiple-perspectives approach also acknowledges the complexity of causes and the importance of contextual factors. It interprets causes in systemic terms (Mitchell, Devine, and Jagger 1989). Technological, organizational, and societal systems are susceptible to multiple, simultaneous, and interacting failures. A main limitation of the traditional systems view of causation is that it does not indicate which causes are more or less important, and from whose point of view. The multiple-perspectives approach addresses this limitation and accepts the impossibility of unambiguously fixing blame for industrial crises. Attempts to affix blame are reductionist: they merely divert analysts from proper understanding of the events. Finally, the multipleperspectives approach regards controversies and conflicts as an integral part of crises. Such conflicts cannot be denied or brushed away: they are the central defining features of crises.
The most controversial elements of crises are their impacts or consequences. Consequences are difficult to ascertain because they are many, diverse, and difficult to measure. Some consequences are indirect, some are unknown, some are trans-generational, and some extend in space to unforeseeable areas. In the Bhopal case, victims saw the crisis largely in terms of personal losses: they lost their lives or faculties, their health, their sources of income, and their sense of community. An army of lawyers, government officials, activists, reporters, and researchers invaded Bhopal. The lives of residents have already been disrupted for months and years, and will continue to be disrupted for a long time to come. In these circumstances, recovery has involved efforts to rebound from multifaceted losses.
Officials at Union Carbide viewed this crisis as an unfortunate technological “incident.” Because of its long history in the chemical industry, the company was familiar with the types of losses such incidents generate. These include legal liability for damages, financial losses, and bad reputation. Union Carbide’s main concern was to protect its financial assets and reputation. It embarked on an elaborate strategy of legal defence, financial restructuring, and public relations (Union Carbide Corporation 1985).
For the Government of India, the crisis was a socio-economic and political disaster. As the institution responsible for safeguarding public safety, the government had failed abysmally. It needed to redeem itself in the eyes of the public, by deflecting responsibility for its role in the disaster. It was also saddled with the far more difficult task of managing recovery and rehabilitation of victims.”
Source : http://archive.unu.edu/unupress/unupbooks/uu21le/uu21le0c.htm#a%20multiple%20perspectives%20understanding%20of%20crises
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here are some images of the plant and protesting people + bbc video
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Location for the Plant : wise choice ?
Which activities are standardized across markets? Which activities are localized to meet market demands and tastes? Why? Evaluate and compare the cost gains from standardization and the market gains from localization.
The choices made by Union Carbide were driven by the outgrowing pesticide market in India. ” The events in Bhopal revealed that expanding industrialization in developing countries without concurrent evolution in safety regulations could have catastrophic consequences “. The disaster is a proof that local problems of industrial hazards and toxic contamination are closely related to global market dynamics. Nothing was made to go around environmental regulations in the U.S., in fact the plant was built in Madhya Pradesh to exploit the large and growing Indian pesticide market.
Lesson Learned ?
Governments should not allow industrial facilities to be located within urban areas. In case of such accidents municipalities and local authorities should make sure that they have the adequate medical facilities to assist a large number of employees in case of mass casualty emergency. Yet, “Public health infrastructure was very weak in Bhopal in 1984.” example: poor quality tap water only available for only a few hours a day, no functioning sewage system, untreated human waste.
No matter how profitable the market looks like, there is a need to take into account existing public health infrastructure when hazardous industries choose to localize their manufacturing plants. Advanced planning should done before any disaster occurs. Locations ” that do not possess infrastructure and technical expertise to respond adequately to such industrial accidents should not be chosen as sites for hazardous industry”.
“National governments and international agencies should focus on widely applicable techniques for corporate responsibility and accident prevention as much in the developing world context as in advanced industrial nations . Specifically, prevention should include risk reduction in plant location and design and safety legislation ”
Source :http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC1142333/
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