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Union Carbide Immediate Response Blog

Posted on April 25, 2013 by erin.donahue

Upon researching Union Carbide’s response to the Bhopal Disaster I find it peculiar how the company conducted itself when the crisis occurred and after. First of all, even though the focus of this is geared towards the tragedy when it actually occurred (1984) it is the company’s stance then and now that is relevant. The company has the same stance and maintains they are not responsible for the tragedy. To rehash Union Carbide’s stance – even 28 years later they said

“The 1984 gas leak in Bhopal was a terrible tragedy that understandably continues to evoke strong emotions even 28 years later. In the wake of the gas release, Union Carbide Corporation, and then chairman Warren Anderson, worked diligently to provide aid to the victims and set up a process to resolve their claims. All claims arising out of the release were settled 21 years ago at the explicit direction of and with the approval of the Supreme Court of India.The Bhopal plant was owned and operated by Union Carbide India, Limited (UCIL), an Indian company in which Union Carbide Corporation held just over half the stock. The other stockholders included Indian financial institutions and thousands of private investors in India. Union Carbide India Limited designed, built and managed the plant using Indian consultants and workers. In 1994, Union Carbide sold its entire stake in UCIL to Mcleod Russel India Limited of Calcutta, and UCIL was renamed Eveready Industries India Limited (Eveready Industries). As a result of the sale of its shares in UCIL, Union Carbide retained no interest in – or liability for – the Bhopal site.  The proceeds of the UCIL sale were placed in a trust and exclusively used to fund a hospital in Bhopal, which now provides specialist care to victims of the tragedy.After the disaster, plant owner UCIL obtained permission from the government to conduct clean-up work at the site and did so under the direction of Indian central and state government authorities. Eveready Industries continued this remediation effort until 1998.  That year, the Madhya Pradesh State Government, which owns and had been leasing the property to Eveready, took over the facility and assumed all accountability for the site, including the completion of any additional remediation.  What additional clean-up work, if any, has been undertaken since that time is unclear.Shortly after the gas release, Union Carbide launched an aggressive effort to identify the cause. Engineering consulting firm, Arthur D. Little, Inc., conducted a thorough investigation. Its conclusion: The gas leak could only have been caused by deliberate sabotage. Someone purposely put water in the gas storage tank, and this caused a massive chemical reaction. Process safety systems had been put in place that would have kept the water from entering into the tank by accident.Union Carbide, together with the rest of the chemical industry, has worked to develop and globally implement Responsible Care to help prevent such an event in the future by improving community awareness, emergency preparedness and process safety standards.” (bhopal.com/union-carbide-statements).

While Union Carbide feels sympathetic and started to become more diligent following the crisis it’s their attitude that should be noted. – Which is the fact they were indeed negligent but don’t believe they should take responsibility.

Former CEO Warren Anderson’s face in a Bhopal Protest

Also, I want to rehash the CEO’s actions following the crisis.

“Union Carbide CEO, Warren Anderson felt it was important for him personally to go to Bhopal to demonstrate the commitment the company had to the rescue effort and to the investigation. Most of his executives, and the U.S. State Department (p. 114) advised against his going. Corporate attorneys for Union Carbide were adamant that Anderson’s presence in Bhopal would only serve to tighten the connection between Union Carbide and the Bhopal tragedy.They and several senior executives continued to advise that, seeing how the Bhopal Plant was actually operated by a subsidiary of Union Carbide (Union Carbide India Limited) (Shrivastava, 1987, p. 51) and that the U.S. based corporation only owned about half the publicly traded stock in the Indian operation, the best strategy would be to distance Union Carbide’ leadership in the U.S. from the events in Bhopal. This might serve to limit future liability as the inevitable flood of lawsuits started to roll in and protect the corporation’s stock price.Warren Anderson rejected this advice (Kurzman, 1987, p. 115). He felt the scope of the tragedy was so significant and already connected in the mind of the public with Union Carbide that efforts to distance the Company from the tragedy were futile. Anderson traveled to India and was promptly arrested by Indian authorities upon arrival (Kurzman, p.108).The Company also experienced severe difficulties in getting accurate information from the plant in India regarding the specifics of the incident (Kurzman, p.89) Phone lines were scarce and already packed with calls. The Indian Government was not forthcoming with information, as they intended to shift blame away from themselves to Union Carbide (Shrivastava, p.97). As a result, the company’s first formal release regarding the Bhopal incident came one week after the tragedy (Smith, p. 154)”
(ou.edu/deptcomm/dodjcc/groups/02C2/Union%20Carbide.htm)

So what this article is saying that Warren Anderson, CEO in charge at the time of the tragedy, went over to the site because he wanted to show both the home and especially the host country that he and the company he was running were sympathetic towards the tragedy that occurred. These efforts were futile though and didn’t seem sincere enough to the people affected because after all Warren Anderson was able to go home at the end of the day where as many others who perished would no longer be able to. It’s crazy to read about how much chaos ensued after the crisis. While I can appreciate the CEO showing a bit of effort, the fact he did not influence the company’s lawyers or advisers to do something to help makes it seem like “it’s all talk but no action”

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Union Carbide’s CEO Response/Actions

Posted on April 25, 2013 by erin.donahue

I found this information from a case study analyzing Union Carbide’s response after the crisis. Interesting because it says the CEO seems to be very sympathetic towards the tragedy at Bhopal. He even went when his company’s attorneys were against it.

“Union Carbide CEO, Warren Anderson felt it was important for him personally to go to Bhopal to demonstrate the commitment the company had to the rescue effort and to the investigation. Most of his executives, and the U.S. State Department (p. 114) advised against his going. Corporate attorneys for Union Carbide were adamant that Anderson’s presence in Bhopal would only serve to tighten the connection between Union Carbide and the Bhopal tragedy.

They and several senior executives continued to advise that, seeing how the Bhopal Plant was actually operated by a subsidiary of Union Carbide (Union Carbide India Limited) (Shrivastava, 1987, p. 51) and that the U.S. based corporation only owned about half the publicly traded stock in the Indian operation, the best strategy would be to distance Union Carbide’ leadership in the U.S. from the events in Bhopal. This might serve to limit future liability as the inevitable flood of lawsuits started to roll in and protect the corporation’s stock price.

Warren Anderson rejected this advice (Kurzman, 1987, p. 115). He felt the scope of the tragedy was so significant and already connected in the mind of the public with Union Carbide that efforts to distance the Company from the tragedy were futile. Anderson traveled to India and was promptly arrested by Indian authorities upon arrival (Kurzman, p.108).

The Company also experienced severe difficulties in getting accurate information from the plant in India regarding the specifics of the incident (Kurzman, p.89) Phone lines were scarce and already packed with calls. The Indian Government was not forthcoming with information, as they intended to shift blame away from themselves to Union Carbide (Shrivastava, p.97). As a result, the company’s first formal release regarding the Bhopal incident came one week after the tragedy (Smith, p. 154)

http://www.ou.edu/deptcomm/dodjcc/groups/02C2/Union%20Carbide.htm

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Crisis Developments

Posted on April 21, 2013 by Racheal Du

Some news/events that happened within a week of the crisis…

  • Factory in Bhopal where the gas leak had taken place had been closed down.
  • Five managers arrested for negligence.
  • Union Carbide might be asked to pay hundreds of million of dollars in compensation.
  • Indian police seized all factory records and refused to allot a US executive access to the Union Carbide pesticides plant.
  • Doctors in Bhopal’s hospitals report that at least 3,000 are dead. Many of the estimated 60,000 treated are expected to suffer long-term heart, kidney and lung disorder.
  • Mr Anderson, chairman of Union Carbide, stated that the company had set aside $1m for immediate distribution for victims of the tragedy.

BBC Monitoring Service: Asia-Pacific. Gas Leak Disaster in India. Factiva. N.p., 05 Dec. 1984. Web. 21 Apr. 2013. <http://global.factiva.com.remote.baruch.cuny.edu/aa/?ref=bbcfe00020011205dgc500dz6>.

“Mr Warren Anderson, Chairman of Union Carbide, Has Said That Victims of the Bhopal Gas Leak Could Be Fairly Compensated without Marked Effect on the Financial Condition of the Company.” Factiva. Textline Multiple Source Collection (1980-1994), 11 Dec. 1984. Web. 21 Apr. 2013. <http://global.factiva.com.remote.baruch.cuny.edu/aa/?ref=tmsc000020011207dgcb02t8d>.

“Overseas News: Police Refuse US Chief Entry to Plant.” Editorial. Financial Times 07 Dec. 1984: 1+. Factiva. 07 Dec. 1984. Web. 21 Apr. 2013. <http://global.factiva.com.remote.baruch.cuny.edu/aa/?ref=FTFT000020070505dgc7031g5>.

Sharma, K. K. “Union Carbide May Face Big Indian Claim.” Editorial. Financial Times 06 Dec. 1984: 1+. Factiva. 06 Dec. 1984. Web. 21 Apr. 2013. <http://global.factiva.com.remote.baruch.cuny.edu/aa/?ref=FTFT000020070505dgc6031mb>.

“Studies of the Accident at the Union Carbide Pesticide Works in Bhopal, India, by Investigative Reporters Suggest That the Number of Dead Has Been Underestimated, and That Most Damage Was Done by Phosgene, Not Methyl Isocyanate.” Factiva. Textline Multiple Source Collection (1980-1994), 09 Dec. 1984. Web. 21 Apr. 2013. <http://global.factiva.com.remote.baruch.cuny.edu/aa/?ref=tmsc000020011207dgc902srj>.

 

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How did Union Carbide assist people after the disaster?

Posted on April 18, 2013 by Jawad Chaudhrey

Immediately following the gas release, Union Carbide Corporation began providing aid to the victims and established a process to resolve their claims. Among the many efforts Union Carbide took to address the situation were:

  • Organizing a team of top medical experts to help identify the best treatment options and work with the local medical community;
  • Providing substantial amounts of medical equipment, supplies and expertise to the victims;
  • Openly sharing all its information on methylisocyanate (MIC) with the Government of India, including all published and unpublished toxicity studies available at the time;
  • Dispatching a team of technical MIC experts to Bhopal on the day after the tragedy, which carried MIC studies that were widely shared with medical and scientific personnel in Bhopal;
  • Establishing a $100 million charitable trust fund to build a hospital for victims, and
  • Offering a $2.2 million grant to establish a vocational-technical center in Bhopal to provide local jobs.

In 1989, Union Carbide and UCIL entered into a $470 million legal settlement with the Indian Government that settled all claims arising from the incident. The Indian Supreme Court affirmed the settlement and described it as “just, equitable and reasonable.” Union Carbide and UCIL promptly paid the money to the Government of India. (Please see “The Incident, Response and Settlement” section of this website for additional information on UCC’s efforts and contributions.)

An India media report in September 2006 stated that the “registrar in the office of Welfare Commissioner… said all cases of initial compensation claims by victims of the 1984 Bhopal gas tragedy have been cleared… With the clearance of initial compensation claims and revision petitions, no case is pending…”

 

Browning, Jackson. “UNION CARBIDE: DISASTER AT BHOPAL.” Union Carbide. N.p., 1993. Web. 25 Apr. 2013.
<http://www.bhopal.com/~/media/Files/Bhopal/browning.pdf>

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Short Term Effects after the disaster

Posted on April 18, 2013 by Jawad Chaudhrey

Immediately after the disaster, UCC began attempts to dissociate itself from responsibility for the gas leak. Its principal tactic was to shift culpability to UCIL, stating the plant was wholly built and operated by the Indian subsidiary. It also fabricated scenarios involving sabotage by previously unknown Sikh extremist groups and disgruntled employees but this theory was impugned by numerous independent sources [1].

The toxic plume had barely cleared when, on December 7, the first multi-billion dollar lawsuit was filed by an American attorney in a U.S. court. This was the beginning of years of legal machinations in which the ethical implications of the tragedy and its affect on Bhopal’s people were largely ignored. In March 1985, the Indian government enacted the Bhopal Gas Leak Disaster Act as a way of ensuring that claims arising from the accident would be dealt with speedily and equitably. The Act made the government the sole representative of the victims in legal proceedings both within and outside India. Eventually all cases were taken out of the U.S. legal system under the ruling of the presiding American judge and placed entirely under Indian jurisdiction much to the detriment of the injured parties.

In a settlement mediated by the Indian Supreme Court, UCC accepted moral responsibility and agreed to pay $470 million to the Indian government to be distributed to claimants as a full and final settlement. The figure was partly based on the disputed claim that only 3000 people died and 102,000 suffered permanent disabilities [9]. Upon announcing this settlement, shares of UCC rose $2 per share or 7% in value [1]. Had compensation in Bhopal been paid at the same rate that asbestosis victims where being awarded in US courts by defendant including UCC – which mined asbestos from 1963 to 1985 – the liability would have been greater than the $10 billion the company was worth and insured for in 1984 [10]. By the end of October 2003, according to the Bhopal Gas Tragedy Relief and Rehabilitation Department, compensation had been awarded to 554,895 people for injuries received and 15,310 survivors of those killed. The average amount to families of the dead was $2,200

At every turn, UCC has attempted to manipulate, obfuscate and withhold scientific data to the detriment of victims. Even to this date, the company has not stated exactly what was in the toxic cloud that enveloped the city on that December night [8]. When MIC is exposed to 200° heat, it forms degraded MIC that contains the more deadly hydrogen cyanide (HCN). There was clear evidence that the storage tank temperature did reach this level in the disaster. The cherry-red color of blood and viscera of some victims were characteristic of acute cyanide poisoning [11]. Moreover, many responded well to administration of sodium thiosulfate, an effective therapy for cyanide poisoning but not MIC exposure [11]. UCC initially recommended use of sodium thiosulfate but withdrew the statement later prompting suggestions that it attempted to cover up evidence of HCN in the gas leak. The presence of HCN was vigorously denied by UCC and was a point of conjecture among researchers

As further insult, UCC discontinued operation at its Bhopal plant following the disaster but failed to clean up the industrial site completely. The plant continues to leak several toxic chemicals and heavy metals that have found their way into local aquifers. Dangerously contaminated water has now been added to the legacy left by the company for the people of Bhopal

Broughton, Edward. “The Bhopal Disaster and Its Aftermath: A Review.” Environmental Health. EHJournal.com, 10 May 2005. Web. 26 Apr. 2013

 

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economic recovery for Union carbide

Posted on April 18, 2013 by fathia.bentahar

Economic recovery

“Economic losses from the accident included loss of jobs, loss of earning capacity of victims, business disruptions, cost of compensation and rehabilitation, and legal costs. The UCIL plant, a $25 million investment, was shut down immediately after the accident, and 650 permanent jobs were lost. A few months later the Union Carbide Research and Development Center, located in another part of Bhopal, was also cut back to a skeleton staff. Local businesses and state government offices were shut down for three weeks, losing business and tax revenues. The two mass evacuations disrupted commercial activities for several weeks, with resulting business losses of $8-65 million. Loss of work in government offices was not included in these estimates (Morehouse and Subramaniam 1988; Shrivastava 1992).In the year after the accident, the government took many well-intentioned steps to provide economic relief to victims. Compensation of about $800 per fatality was paid to relatives of dead persons. Smaller cash compensation awards (less than $100) were distributed to 20,000 victims and 3,000 more victims were provided with part-time employment. New schools were also opened in the affected neighbourhoods. Unfortunately, in proportion to the tremendous relief needs these early (1985-1987) efforts were miniscule. Government relief failed to alleviate the misery of victims; it was simply too small in scale and limited in scope. But, given the many competing demands for government support, this was all that the government could manage at the time.Beginning in March 1991, new interim relief payments were made to victims. Sums of Rs 200 (about $8) per month were paid to all victims who lived in 37 of the city’s 54 wards that were officially classified as “gas affected.” A total of $260 million was disbursed, but the money was given to all people who lived in the affected wards, not just the victims. In fact, many of the people who lived in these 37 wards were not victims at all: they had moved in after the accident. As cash relief payments flowed into the city, the local inflation rate jumped to between 15 and 20 per cent per annum. Most people pinned their hopes of long-term recovery on anticipated compensation from Union Carbide.”

Source:- Shrivastava, Paul. N.p.. Web. 25 Apr 2013. <http://archive.unu.edu/unupress/unupbooks/uu21le/uu21le0d.htm>.

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Company Response

Posted on April 16, 2013 by Racheal Du

I found this Factiva post that includes the company’s initial response!

http://global.factiva.com/aa/?ref=NYTF000020080722dh1s000jh&pp=1&fcpil=en&napc=S&sa_from

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Could the crisis have been prevented?

Posted on April 16, 2013 by Racheal Du

This crisis could’ve definitely been prevented.

Reporters of The New York Times started on a seven-week investigation on this “accident.” According to present and former employees, company technical documents and the Indian Government’s chief scientist, the gas leak resulted from operating errors, design flaws, maintenance failures, training deficiencies and economy measures that endangered safety.

After looking through company documents and interviewing with chemical experts, plant workers, company officials and former officials, evidence of violations surfaced:

  1. Several months before the accident, plant employees say, managers shut down a refrigeration unit designed to keep the methyl isocyanate cool and inhibit chemical reactions. The shutdown was a violation of plant procedures.
  2. The leak began about two afters after a worker washed out a pipe that had not been properly sealed. This worker has not been properly trained and that procedure is prohibited by plant rules. Numerous workers think the most likely source of the contamination that started the reaction leading to the accident was water from this process.
  3. There are three main safety systems in the plant. At least two of them were built according to specifications drawn for Union Carbide plant. One system was unable to cope with conditions that happened at the night of the incident, another one was out of service for maintenance for several weeks and the last system was inoperable for several days.
  4. “Plant operators failed to move some of the methyl isocyanate in the problem tank to a spare tank as required because, they said, the spare was not empty as it should have been. Workers said it was a common practice to leave methyl isocyanate in the spare tank, though standard procedures required that it be empty.”
  5. According to Shakil Qureshi, the isocyanate supervisor on duty at the time of the accident, instruments at the plant were undependable. For that reason, he said, he overlooked the early warning of the accident, a gauge’s indication that pressure in one of three methyl isocyanate storage tanks had risen fivefold in an hour.
  6. The Bhopal plant does not have the computer system that other operations use to observe their tasks and quickly prepared the staff to leaks, employees said. The management depended on workers to sense escaping methyl isocyanate as their eyes started to water. Thit practice violated specific orders in the parent corporation’s technical manual, titled ”Methyl Isocyanate,” which sets out the basic policies for the manufacture, storage and transportation of the chemical. The manual says: ”Although the tear gas effects of the vapor are extremely unpleasant, this property cannot be used as a means to alert personnel.”
  7. There was little automated equipment at the methyl isocyanate plant and in 1983 the staff was cut from 12 operators on a shift to 6. The plant ”cannot be run safely with six people,” said Kamal K. Pareek, a chemical engineer who began working at the Bhopal plant in 1971 and was senior project engineer during the building of the methyl isocyanate facility there eight years ago.
  8. “There were no effective public warnings of the disaster. The alarm that sounded on the night of the accident was similar or identical to those sounded for various purposes, including practice drills, about 20 times in a typical week, according to employees. No brochures or other materials had been distributed in the area around the plant warning of the hazards it presented, and there was no public education program about what to do in an emergency, local officials said.”

This crisis could’ve been prevented if management took the proper precautions. Management should’ve been responsible for plant maintenance, hiring and properly training employees.

Diamond, Stuart. “THE BHOPAL DISASTER: HOW IT HAPPENED.” Editorial. New York Times 28 Jan. 1985: 1+. Factiva. 28 Jan. 1985. Web. 16 Apr. 2013. <http://global.factiva.com/aa/?ref=NYTF000020080612dh1s000b5>.

“Union Carbide Has Stated That an Inspection of Its Bhopal Pesticides Works in 1982 Showed Serious Problems with Plant and Safety Procedures.” Factiva. Textline Multiple Source Collection (1980-1994), 12 Dec. 1984. Web. 16 Apr. 2013. <http://global.factiva.com/aa/?ref=tmsc000020020316dgcc01fw9>.

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How did it all happen?

Posted on April 11, 2013 by Racheal Du

I decided to take a look into a few articles that came out on the day after the incident has happened and tried to put pieces of this event together.

On December 3, 1984 about 11:30 P.M., workers in the methyl isocyanate structure of the Bhopal plant, about 100 feet from the control room, detected a leak. Their eyes started to water. V. N. Singh, an operator, saw a drip of liquid about 50 feet off the ground, and some yellowish-white gas in the same place. He then went to the control room about 11:45 P.M. and told Mr. Qureshi (the plant’s supervisor for about 2 years) of a methyl isocyanate leak. But Mr. Qureshi said he would see the leak after tea. According to the employees on duty, no one took an initiative to investigate the leak until after tea ended. The leak of methyl isocyanate from one of the plant’s three underground tanks started shortly after midnight. The tank contained 45 tons of methyl isocyanate when a pressure build-up led to the rupture of a valve. Methyl isocyanate is stored in liquid form but erupts into gas at 21 degrees centigrade. “Mr Kumaraswamy, regional manager of Union Carbide in New Delhi, said any escaping gas would normally be neutralised by a caustic soda scrubber but that yesterday pressure apparently rose too fast for the safety equipment to be activated in time to prevent a large volume from escaping.” Doctors estimate that 4,000 people were badly affected by the gas and another 10,000 victims were given emergency treatment. Five managers at the plant have been detained. A judicial inquiry is to be held. Union Carbide described the accident as “unprecedented.”

“At Least 400 People in the Central Indian City of Bhopal Have Died after a Leak of Poisonous Gas from the Union Carbide Pesticides Factory.” Factiva. Textline Multiple Source Collection (1980-1994), 04 Dec. 1984. Web. 11 Apr. 2013. <http://global.factiva.com/aa/?ref=tmsc000020011207dgc402s72>.

Diamond, Stuart. “THE BHOPAL DISASTER: HOW IT HAPPENED.” Editorial. New York Times 28 Jan. 1985: 1+. Factiva. 28 Jan. 1985. Web. 11 Apr. 2013. <http://global.factiva.com/aa/?ref=NYTF000020080612dh1s000b5>.

Sharma, K. K. “Financial Times.” Editorial. Factory Gas Leak Kills More than 350 in India 04 Dec. 1984: 1+. Factiva. 4 Dec. 1984. Web. 11 Apr. 2013. <http://global.factiva.com/aa/?ref=FTFT000020070505dgc4031x3>.

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25 years later …the area affected by the gas leak

Posted on April 9, 2013 by fathia.bentahar

bhopal

Souce: http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/10354583

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