Lately, I looked up relevant information about International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS), because I am an international student and I want to know more about global issues about accounting. Plus, after a few years later, perhaps I will go back to my hometown China to continue work in this field. And at the time I am looking for some articles introducing IFRS, I found a new term “fair-value” which intrigued me to learn more about it. Then I found there are some critics argue that fair-value accounting exacerbated the severity of the 2008 financial crisis. And I found a journal where the authors Laux and Leuz (2010) believe that the claim that fair-value accounting exacerbated the crisis is largely unfounded.
They begin their analysis by explaining in more detail how pure mark-to-market accounting can cause problems in a crisis. Then they outline extant accounting rules for banks’ key assets. After the background information on how fair-value accounting actually works, they examine possible mechanisms through which fair-value accounting could have contributed to the financial crisis. Based on their analysis and an extensive review of the empirical evidence to date, they think it is unlikely that fair-value accounting contributed to the severity of the financial crisis in a major way, either by increasing banks’ leverage in the boom or by substantially amplifying banks’ problems in the downturn.
From my perspective, their conclusion that fair-value accounting caused the exacerbation of financial crisis can be generally acknowledged based on their researches and reasoning. I deem it is reasonable to deny the influence of fair-value accounting was a major cause of the U.S.’ banks problems in the financial crisis in a major way. Nevertheless, more research is necessary to understand the effects in fair-value accounting in booms and busts to guide efforts to reform the rules.