Class Session #2 Post

The New York Times Article “U.S. Examines Whether Saudi Nuclear Program Could Lead to Bomb Effort” discusses the findings of spy agencies this week in Saudi’s production of nuclear fuel and the role China will play in enabling to create and build it. The report does say that the findings are much too early and that nothing would likely be built in a short amount of time. The article describes Saudi’s steer away from the U.S. post- J.C.P.O.A as Saudi believes they “can’t rely on anyone reining in the Iranians, and they are going to have to deter Iran themselves,” said Rolf Mowatt-Larssen, a former C.I.A. officer and director of intelligence and counterintelligence at the Energy Department. So now Saudi has turned to China to “begin building the multibillion-dollar infrastructure needed to produce nuclear fuel. China has traditionally not insisted on such strict nonproliferation safeguards, and is eager to lock in Saudi oil supplies.” However, the U.S. has enabled Saudi Arabia”s nuclear proliferation by remaining quiet while remaining strict and intolerant about Iran’s nuclear production ability.

This article particularly caught my interest after our last discussion in class on the levels of security and the impact of nuclear proliferation. I also think this article ties in pretty well with Burn’s question on the appropriate extent the U.S. should push its global dominance. He argues that to begin remedying the past tricky methodology, future administrations should begin with “the purpose and limits of the United States’ international engagement”.