24 thoughts on “Colin Powell’s Speech to the UN”

1. There are a few things that could have led to Powell and the others to believe strongly that weapons of mass destruction (WMD) were in Iraq. First, there is representativeness. America had recently been under the attack of Osama Bin Laden in 9/11 and it is possible that officials took this individuals attack on Iraq as representative of the desire of the entire country of Iraq to implement an attack on the United States, and thus increasing the likeliness of having WMD.
   Second, there is availability. It is well documented that Saddam Hussein had a series of human rights violations during his era of presidency. Recalling these previous experiences, it was more easily conceived that Iraq also would be violating other rulings, especially ones that pertained to human life.
   Closely linked to availability, we can look at confirmation bias. The United States wanted to believe that Iraq was hiding WMD, especially in light of 9/11. Thus, it is possible that they were directly looking for evidence and information that would support these predispositions. It seemed to me that they also used peripheral route processing. A small building and a truck were used as evidence of a chemical weapons facility. It doesn’t seem as if serious thought or challenge was put into this very basic and limited evidence.
   Lastly, there is commitment and consistency. Even when Iraq allowed more inspections and no further proof of WMD was brought to light, it was not enough to dismiss our prior statements and beliefs. Strong commitment to the idea of Iraq having WMD could have been part of the reason that war was initiated.

2. In 1988 during the Iran and Iraq war Saddam Hussein launched a biological attack and used mustard gas killing thousands of Kurdish people. The Iraqi army did engage in biological war fare and Saddam Hussein was considered a menacing presence in the Middle East. Two years later Saddam Hussein invaded Kuwait, oil rich country, which resulted in the Gulf War involving the United States. Many people believe the primary motive for US involvement was oil. In fact, Saddam Hussein set the Kuwait oil fields as he was forced out by the US invasion. I do believe that Saddam Hussein was a representative figure for biological weapons, which is why Colin Powell used that reference to invade Iraq. There is also the use of availability because there was a recent history of biological attacks on civilians by the Iraqi military under Saddam Hussein. Whether or Colin Powell believed that Iraq had weapons of mass destruction has been a subject of debate for many years.
   In the first U-tube clip you are introduced to Colin Powel and a panel of Doctors who make an authoritative panel. Colin Powel himself is an intelligent, well-spoken, four star general with an important message about the grave danger that’s lurking in Iraq. A large part of the evidence presented is recorded communications of military personnel talking to each other prior to an inspection. Colin Powell highlights the intended effort to clean up and hide unauthorized equipment or vehicles. I take issue with the snippets of conversation presented because it did not amount to more than conjecture. Even in a hospital before a Joint Commission Inspection the whole system undergoes a massive clean-up with teams of people circulating just to remind you of what to say. Furthermore, anchoring was also used to relate all the evidence to an effort to hide weapons of mass destruction. The past atrocities committed against the Kurdish people may have caused the US Military to overestimate the threat of Iraq.

   In the second and third U-Tube videos undercover more of the same vague evidence with the continued urgency for military action communicated by Colin Powell. Under the principles of authority Colin Powell is gives a very persuasive presentation with weak examples of subversive activities on the part of the Iraqi military. As far as the overall attitude of Saddam Hussein we can all assume he wasn’t happy with our involvement. The experts, witnesses, and testimony were also just hearsay with no real substance.

   I know the end result of this conflict so I can pick apart all the variables now, but I also believed Saddam Hussein was an evil man back when these problems erupted.

3. This speech made by Colin Powell is one of the more well known speeches made during the Bush Administration, as he tries to make the case for the Bush Administration to the international community that Saddam Hussein is secretly hiding weapons of mass destructions.

   Throughout the video, former Secretary Powell uses several types of heuristic technics to make his argument for intervention in Iraq. The most notable heuristic he uses is authority. Powell, himself, is a four star general who is generally well respected across the political spectrum. He also serves in arguably the most important position in a presidential cabinet. This gives Powell authority, or credibility to speak on these issues to a regular individual who sees this speech. But, he also uses authority in different capacities as well. In the second video, Secretary Powell states that the evidence he is presenting was bolstered by credible analysts, who believe Iraq is hiding weapons of mass destruction. In effect, Powell claims these doctors and analysts also have the authority to make this call. General Powell uses the heuristic of authority to his advantage in these two different capacities.

   Another heuristic Secretary Powell uses in his speech to the U.N. is social proof. In the third video, Powell outlines how Saddam Hussein has tried to avoid weapons inspections. This is is even more powerful because Americans and the international community had a very poor view of him. In the Iraq-Iran War of 1980 to 1988, Hussein used chemical weapons on Iranians and civilians in that war. On top of this, Saddam brutally suppressed minority religious groups such as the Kurds throughout his presidency. His reputation has already been cemented by the time of this speech, and it only made sense for Powell to use this to his advantage in the speech. Saddam is already viewed poorly in the U.S. and international community. Powell used this social proof that Saddam is a terrible person as a pillar in his speech to the U.N.

4. “Ladies and gentlemen, these are not assertions, these are facts. Corroborated from many sources.” – During the third YouTube segment, Colin Powell says this line and it’s a perfect example of how he, along with the Bush Administration carefully crafted a case for WMD in Iraq. Colin Powell used the availability of statements to create a message that, if reiterated enough would become believable. He used his authority to create a sense of trust and an convince the public that he was in a position to be the authoritative figure on the matter of Iraq.

   Powell also uses the technique of scarcity. Proof of WMD that supposedly at the time existed was not not publicly shared. The information that was provided was carefully distributed by the Administration. The scarcity of knowledge made the information that was shared all that more powerful. Powell’s speech to the UN released facts and information that were just enough to provide speculation of Iraq’s WMD program but not enough facts to show the entire story.

   Now knowing that there were no WMD, it’s interesting to listen to the carefully chosen words such as calling Iraq’s lack of cooperation a “deliberate campaign” to block inspections. Today it’s easily said that Powell’s speech was a deliberate campaign campaign to launch a war against Iraq.

5. Colin Powell’s speech uses a multiple huerstic’s and cognitive shortcuts for a variety of reasons. I believe that Colin Powell was blinded himself by these shortcomings and he also used them to influence the American public and other politicians. In his speech, Colin uses various techniques to bring credibility to his argument

   I believe that Colin’s justification of a further search comes from the representative heuristic. Colin Powell mentions that Iraq has committed other sanctions in the past and has tried to deceive previous inspectors. He states that Iraq’s report was filled with information about permitted weapons in an effort to distract inspectors from uncovering prohibited weapons. This argument is based of the representative heuristic because providing ambiguous information may be a characteristic of a guilty party, it does not mean that the information is false.

   I also noticed that Colin Powell mentioned his “credible sources” whenever possible. The primary figure that he named was Dr. Hans Blix, a Swedish expert on atomic energy. This is an example of the Authority cognitive shortcut. While Dr. Blix is of course an expert, he was wrong in assuming that the information that Iraq handed over was not complete. Colin Powell was heavily influenced by Dr. Blix’s credentials as opposed to the lack of evidence that he was able to find.

6. For one, I think that Powell relies too much on the cognitive shortcut, “social proof” (Cialdini 1993). That is, he relies too much on the evidence provided by others, as a means to convince the public that there are weapons of mass destruction; the public has a tendency to rely on the evidence of experts all too much, and does not use critical thinking enough. At the beginning of his speech, Powell states his support for Dr. Blix and Dr. El-Baradei’s report on Iraq failing to accept disarmament. Hence, when listeners hear citations of experts, they tend to go into “automatic pilot” (ibid), and do not engage in thoughtful message processing. He does this throughout this speech with his reference to secondary sources.

   Second, on a related point, Powell’s arguments also fall under the cognitive shortcut of consistency; he reinforces the idea that Iraq is not to be trusted with mass chemical weapons, bringing viewers’ “impulses” to align their attitudes with that has already been done or decided (p.138). Once this view is accepted subconsciously, then it follows that viewers may be more likely to believe that Iraq had weapons of mass destruction. His rhetoric on terrorism also reiterates listeners’ negative perceptions against the Middle East, thereby gaining acceptance of his logic and evidence on the presence weapons of mass destruction.

7. In my opinion, in terms of heuristics, I think it is representativeness. The title of the speech is Colin Powell’s UN Presentation on Iraq WMD. Essentially, by discussing directly about Saddam Hussein and his administration, it is using that to represent Iraq’s motive as a country and not looking at the matter as the possible motivation of one person. The action of a country’s leader does not necessarily represent the overall motivation of the country.

   Colin Powell definitely presented some level of confirmation bias in his speech. The pre-disposition of the Bush administration is, that they believe that Iraq is hiding weapons of mass destruction. Base on this pre-disposition, Powell announced that he had gathered solid evidence to support the claims about the presence of weapons of mass destruction. Because of that, there is a possibility that the listeners on the meeting will use Peripheral Route Processing to judge this matter and look at this only from Colin Powell’s perspective instead of searching for other information.

   Lastly, in terms of cognitive short comings, i think it is consistency. Once Powell believes that is the weapons of mass destruction in Iraq, there is a need of consistency to present with evidence of possible hiding sites and unusual movements and actions in Iraq that will ultimately suggest Iraq is hiding something from the inspectors and even the rest of the world.

8. A few way President Bush, Powell, Congress and the people of the United States were swayed into thinking that Iraq had weapons of mass destruction were Representativeness and Availability. After 9/11 the overall feeling in the United States was that countries in the Middle East that had populations that were a majority Islamic were now a threat to national security. Through Represntativeness the idea manifested that the entire region was now our enemy. Looking back it is easy to say that Iraq and Afghanistan are two separate countries, how could you think the two are related and how could you think Iraq helped with 9/11. But severe ignorance led to the perception that they were our enemy and by dodging the UN inspectors was the “last straw” so to speak

   Through Availability the public and our leaders looked at Iraq’s previous track record. Whether that be the 15 previously broken resolutions that it had made with the UN or the Iraq & Iran war in which chemical weapons were used. Even when we first invaded Iraq in the early 1990s our forces had to wear anti-chemical weapons gear because the fear of mustard gas was a reality.

   With the Anti-Middle East sentiment and the track record of Iraq in the past it becomes clearer where our leaders came from when invading Iraq but by acting out of fear and lack on information we spent trillions of dollars and are still dealing with the destabilization of the area.

9. After reviewing a substantial portion of Colin Powell’s speech to the United Nations, and knowing that there turned out not to be any actual weapons of mass destruction in Iraq, I find that Colin Powell and others would have believed this information as true because of representativeness, cognitive consistency, and confirmation bias. In terms of heuristics, I believe that Mr. Powell’s speech is an example of representativeness, because his findings primarily look at the patterns and behavior of Saddam Hussein as an individual rather than Iraqis as a whole. He identifies and Saddam’s actions to represent or define the actions of all citizens of Iraq. In this case, Colin Powell is generalizing that Saddam’s motives embody the motives of all the people he represents; therefore, Saddam’s choices must be the desired choices of the people.

   Colin Powell’s speech is an example of cognitive consistency because he states on more than one occasion, with more than one source, that these weapons do actually exist. In order to remain consistent, he needed to continually argue the same position as well as state similar information to support his claim. Likewise, Mr. Powell believed that this was true, so his attitude and behaviors became consistent with his beliefs.

   In terms of biases, I believe that Mr. Powell’s speech is an example of confirmation bias, because he is stating this information with sources that clearly support his claims. In order to have his audience believe the statements he is making are true, Mr. Powell must look for and provide evidence that prove his claims are valid. If people see that Colin Powell has the evidence to demonstration the presence of weapons of mass destruction in Iraq, from reputable sources, they are much more likely to believe and accept that what he says is fact.

   Lastly, I also believe that some people may have been more likely to believe that there were actual weapons in Iraq simply because he is a man of authority. If nothing else, Colin Powell’s position as U.S. Secretary of State gave him reputability, with that being said, so some people were automatically willing to believe him.

10. There are many factors that came into play that caused Colin Powell, government officials and the American people to believe there were weapons of mass destruction in Iraq. In this series of videos, Colin Powell reveals many of the heuristics, biases and mental shortcuts that can create a false illusion as was demonstrated by American forces invading Iraq and unsuccessfully searching for weapons of mass destruction.
    The most prominent heuristic in my opinion is that of Authority. As the Secretary of State, Colin Powell was in a position to shape the public opinion and the attitudes of the American people. His authoritative word was not only commanded but trusted by many due to his position of power.
    The second heuristic, which I feel played a large part in the U.S. involvement in Iraq, is that of representativeness. During this period of suspected weaponry, the United States was still feeling the effects of the attacks on 911. For some time after the attacks, the U.S. government and the American people searched for answers to the many questions brought about by the events. As a country we believed there to be a threat in Iraq and therefore believe there were further threats to be realized unless action was taken.
    Finally, as with most strong convictions, confirmation bias played a significant role in the U.S. involvement in Iraq. Due to the representative belief that there were weapons of mass destruction in Iraq and Colin Powell’s authority, the U.S. continued looking for something that was never there. In his speech Colin Powell presented evidence that Iraq did not cooperate with inspections and never intended to, because of our strong confirmation bias we did not look for evidence that told the truth but rather searched for evidence that proved our conviction. Most of the evidence presented only confirms our notion that there is reason to be suspicious but not there that is a reasonable threat to act on.
    The mistakes in human reasoning are clearly evident by our pursuits in Iraq. Our nation’s authority, representative nature and confirmation biases shaped public opinion and government action towards a goal that was seemingly never in sight.

11. The speech given by Colin Powell, the US Secretary of States in the United Nations General Assembly reiterating that Iraq was possessing weapons of mass destruction shows the evidence of usage of heuristics, cognitive speech, and biases. As became evident at a later stage that Iraq did not possess any weapons of mass destruction and the war waged by the US on Iraq was futile, the speech shows various heuristic techniques like representativeness, authority, and credibility. Additionally, “social proof” technique is used in his speech to prove his point about Iraq.

    Heuristics, Cognitive Speech, and Bias used in the speech: An Analysis
    Colin Powell, in his speech mentions that Iraq had violated 16 resolutions including resolution 1441 in a course of 12 years, and thus, there is a social proof that on this account as well, Iraq has violated the resolution and is possessing weapons of mass destruction. Additionally, he mentions that Saddam Hussein had avoided many inspections of weapons in the past and the general negative view of the international community including the US of Saddam as a political leader helps Powell to reassert that Iraq possesses weapons of mass destruction. Thus, social proof has been used in abound by Colin Powell in his speech to the UN.

    Colin Powell also uses the heuristic technique of representativeness. According to Powell, Iraq has been guilty of committing various sanctions along with deceiving the authorities and inspectors in charge of inspecting the presence of any weapons of mass destruction. Powell further states that Iraq had provided information about permitted weapons in order to obliterate and distract the attention from the weapons of mass destruction. This statement as was proved later was incorrect and without any substantial proof and was just built up on the legs of representativeness.

    Another important and widely used heuristic technique by Colin Powell is that of “authority” and “credibility”. Colin Powell himself was an authority whose information was always considered as credible as he was a four star general and had created his own lace in the political galleries of the United States. Along with this, he was serving in the President’s cabinet as well and thus can be considered as credible authority over the assessment of the possession of weapons of mass destruction by Iraq. He also names other authorities as credible sources of information such as Dr. Blix and Dr. El-Baradei who claimed that Iraq had not fully accepted the disarmament policy till date.

    Another technique used by Colin Powell is availability of information. This has been used in two different ways. First of all, Powell states that the US has many proofs such as intercepted phone calls, pictures taken from satellites, and information from other countries which asserts that Iraq possesses weapons of mass destruction. But Powell cannot share all the proofs and he shared only shards of information. Thus, in lack of a holistic view or complete information, only some pieces of puzzle made the statements given by Powell more powerful and acceptable. The incomplete information was taken at its face value also due to the availability of the fact that terrorist activities of 9/11 were perpetuated by some terrorists from Iraq. This was projected as a negative image of the entire country in general. Thus, usage of this heuristic technique helped Powell in gaining acceptance and support of the UN General Assembly as well as the international community and the general public.

    Thus, Colin Powell used various heuristic techniques, biases, and cognitive speech in order to gain acceptance of his view points in the UN General Assembly and wage a war on Iraq.

12. There are a number of reasons why Powell and others, with some legitimacy, believed so strongly that weapons of mass destruction were located in Iraq. First is the fact that the events of September 11, 2001 were on the forefront of every American’s (and much of the global community’s) mind. Thus the availability heuristic came into play because the information that we had recently received from Iraq was that they had the means and capabilities to cause mass destruction in the US and perhaps they also had weapons to do just that. Secondly and unfortunately, after September 11, strong biases began to emerge against all persons from the Middle East, rather than those few who were committing the crimes and wrongdoings. Thus, representativeness was also a factor.

    Furthermore, many high ranking officials chose to ignore facts tending to show that Iraq did not in fact have weapons of mass destruction in their possession; this is where cognitive dissonance and consistency comes into play. These officials had so completely convinced themselves that the WOMD existed that they were willing to dismiss facts that might have otherwise disproved their beliefs.

13. I believe that the availability heuristic played a big role in leading Powell and others to believe that Iraq had weapons of mass destruction. When this speech was given, the tragedy of 9/11 was fresh in everyone’s mind. People became afraid that a similar tragedy would occur, and were very suspicious of Iraq. With this event occurring not too long ago, people were more inclined to believe that Iraq did in fact have weapons of mass destruction. 9/11 was able to cloud Powell’s mind so that he could only see one side. He couldn’t see any way that Iraq could not have these weapons. People were very deeply affected by the event, and so began to see Iraq as the enemy. Iraq was now associated with 9/11. The events of that day made it so people could no longer consider this issue in a rational way. In addition, they were too emotionally tied to it to approach the issue objectively. Finding out that Iraq had weapons of mass destruction would seek to confirm that what they thought was correct.

    Powell was also led astray by confirmation bias. Throughout the speech, he continues to provide evidence to prove that Iraq has these weapons. Every piece of evidence cited further strengthened his case. Was Powell deliberately leaving out the evidence that would go against his claim? It may be that Powell did consider this evidence, but his own bias was so strong that he was able to twist it to fit his claim, or even dismiss it completely as being valid evidence. Going back to availability, recent events such as 9/11 made his bias so strong, that he knew he was going to argue that Iraq had weapons of mass destruction before he had any evidence of it. It’s very easy to cherry pick evidence to fit our claims, and simply ignore all evidence opposing it. It’s important to be aware of our biases so that they do not cloud our perception of the evidence.

14. There are many reasons to why Collin Powell and other senior officials believed in Iraq having weapons of mass destruction. confirmation bias played a huge role in how they took the evidence and made it fit with their narrative that Iraq was developing weapons of mass destruction considering that the Israelis had previously destroyed Iraq’s nuclear facility. The Bush administration for whatever reason had already seen Iraq as the next battleground in the war against terror and used the information to support their own theory of WMD. Collin Powell also states in the video that he does not know what they were hiding but it must have been pretty serious and especially with the telephone conversations, which was vague at best but Powell used it to strengthen their argument.
    Another one is availability and it has to do with 9/11. 9/11 was fresh in the minds of many of these officials and through the biased information connected Iraq with Al Qaeda and used that as a pretext for the invasion of Iraq. Later it was found out that the two were not related at all and the president with many of the officials spun this war as war for democracy.
    Collin Powell also used Authority in that he used the IAEA and other nations information on Iraq credible sources of authority on why and how Iraq was developing WMD. This relates with the availability of information and for some odd reason does not cite them. It seem these sources like when he said other nations agencies, he did not cite which nation and when he did, he citied biased sources like the UK, which skewered the information that he was getting.

15. I noted a few specific heuristics, biases, and cognitive shortcuts that were either experience by Powell, or that he was exploiting for the purpose of convincing the UN Security Council of Iraq’s involvement with WMD’s and Terrorism. It’s important to note that this is specifically what he set out to prove.

    From the model of limitations on human reasoning, we see availability as an issue: how we let recent events and experiences influence our estimation of the problem. In an interview conducted by Al Jazeera in 2011 (Here), Powell indicates that 9/11 changed the way people thought about terrorism as not just something that happens in the Middle East and how the US was entered into a “permanent conflict” in which it had to guard itself and also go after the problem. We can say that the statements made to the Security Council recall on that fear and that genuine belief that it could happen at any moment – to put all members of the Council on the same mind frame, irrespective of the actual likelihood that it would happen again: “it could happen to anyone of us at any given moment if we don’t act.”

    From the model of irrational modes of processing, we can observe both confirmation bias and the peripheral routing process from the “Elaboration Likelihood Model”. With confirmation bias, we see how particular pieces of evidence – such as the audio tapes and satellite images – that by themselves can be ambiguous in meaning, get used as evidence that they are trying to conceal rather than as evidence that they are unwillingly complying. The remaining members of the Security Council who do not have evidence from their respective intelligence agencies are relying on the evidence being presented by the US without looking at their own security apparatus – hence they are letting Powell’s representations of the facts become their own representation of the facts. This may be a consequence of the structure of the Security Council in general seeing as how different countries have different sized security apparatus and they need to rely on information shared (and not always corroborated by each security apparatus) before collectively deciding to take action.

    From Cialdini’s model, we can say that the Powell as a representative of the US, arguably the most powerful member of the UN Security Council, used his authority to qualify statements that weren’t necessarily fact simply by stating “these are not assertions, these are facts.” In one instance, he states “every statement I make today is backed up by sources, solid sources” and “what we know from eye witness accounts.” But the sources are never revealed nor is any evidence of the credibility of these eyewitness accounts presented. We take it on his authority that the sources are legit and assume that it is enough because, again, we were hearing from the Secretary of State for the US. His authority allowed him to turn conjecture into fact.

16. I believe that Collin Powell’s speech to the UN used the heuristics of authority and representativeness in order to gain traction and support. Mr. Powell appears in his full military uniform and spoke of the Iraqi history of avoiding inspections while making his points. He is well articulate and thoughtful in his words and gives the appearance of a man who knows all of the facts, even though in hindsight we now know that was not the case. Mr. Powell uses Iraq as a symbol for how America was harmed on September 11 and how their actions have helped to invigorate and motivate those who wish to harm American ideals. By combining his authoritative nature while holding up false impressions of who the Iraqi people and their government were, Mr. Powell is able to create the impression that weapons of mass destruction are not only in Iraq but that their application on the global stage is imminent.

17. One could attribute Colin’s speech to the heuristics of representativeness and cognitive shorthand of authority and consistency. During his speech before the United Nations, he was confident about the information he laid out and as an authority figure in the United States, his speech was taken as truth. In the wake of 9-11, no one uncertain about the events would relay such information unless they were sure they were properly informed. With regards to consistency, a key principle is to bring one’s beliefs, values and attitudes in line with what already done or decided. Deciding to go before the United Nations and appear on the world stage, his beliefs had to be align with what he was stating.

    There are several aspects to representativeness connected to Colin Powell’s address especially the illusion of validity. His confidence while discussing the conversation between the colonel from the elite Iraqi unit and the guard, he starts to predict the officials’ behavior based on the conversation or “input of information.”

18. 9/11 is a nightmare to all Americans. In the post-9/11 era, though the terroristic attack is an infrequent event, the availability heuristic overestimates its likelihood if it can be easily brought to mind. Powell also used the representative heuristic to decide whether Iraq had weapons. The 9/11 attackers became the prototype of the category. As Powell had categorized Iraq to the same category, he tend to believe that Iraq had WMD and would attack the U.S.

    In addition, Powell might know that the evidence was not as firm as Powell asserted in public, he had to use his authority and a powerful tone in his speech to influence the audience. So in fact this speech is the “securitization” of the WMD threat as a justification for launching the Iraq invasion. Though I don’t think Powell believed so strongly that weapons were in Iraq, I agree that his bias influenced him to tend to believe it even though the evidence was not so firm.

19. In Colin Powell’s speech to the UN on Weapons of Mass Destruction in Iraq prior to going to war with the country, we see a number of heuristics and biases come up. For one, there was the availability heuristic, given the fact that, at that point in time, the terrorist attacks of 9/11 was still fresh in the minds of the public, and bringing up such a recent traumatic event makes people think that another, similarly devastating event is very likely to happen.

    There was also the authority heuristic at play, with Mr. Powell presenting himself so confidently as a strong military figure, presenting suppossed evidence coming from other known sources of authority such as the IAEA. There was representativeness, with Iraq standing in for terrorists wanting to do grave harm to the West (the US in particular). And, there was confirmation bias, with all of the evidence presented by Powell fitting into a particular narrative, and no regard for anything that could counter it.

20. As presented in the videos, Mr. Colin Powell is the speaker and the presenter of the facts and evidence and the Security Council was the recipient. So there are two parties here who can be a victim of heuristic, bias or cognitive shortcut. In the first video, Mr. Powell repeatedly mentioned about the two persons (doctorate) who he seems to be very relied upon and tried to convince the council about them. At the same time, he has mentioned how Saddam Hussein has violated resolution in the last 12 years, formed a committee and policy to hide evidence. These are example of representativeness, in my opinion. The council got a negative vibe that Saddam Hussein was hiding something. They might be biased further by the two tape conversation presented that military officials were hiding something. The point to consider here is, nobody was sure what the people in the conversation were trying to hide, it could be WMD or anything else. They might get biased that as there were efforts to hide something, it must have the WMD out of so many other things. I have also observed the application of adjustment and anchoring which was set and delivered by Mr. Powell. He has set the negative image of Saddam Hussein in such a way that it might have acted as an anchor by the Security Council who might have been biased make their decision based on the image more or less.

    In the second video, Mr. Powell was presenting evidence about how Iraq was hiding two things, the documents and the weapons plus materials from different facilities. In the third video it was about how Iraq restricted individuals (especially scientists) to be interviewed by U.N. inspectors outside Iraq or with the presence of an Iraqi official. In my understanding, I see both cognitive consistence & dissonance and elaboration likelihood model. To support the first one, I would like to emphasize the fact that, there might be members in the Security Council who thought that Iraq did not have WMD or material. On the other hand, so many evidence pushed by Mr. Powell may led them to experience what is called cognitive dissonance. The result of this might lead to the attitude change towards the fact Iraq had WMD. Next, instead of thinking rationally, I have found that the council influenced by authoritative impression of Mr. Powell, emphasized the fact the Iraq was hiding something. Mr. Powell definitely established the fact that Iraq was putting a lot of efforts to hide something from the U.N. inspectors. Now the option was to find the answer, whether Iraq was hiding WMD or anything else? As later on, after the war, it was found that there was no WMD, it can be said that, Mr. Powell could convince the council that it had to be WMD which Iraq had and hid without providing any solid evidence.

21. I think it’s easy for us now to see through all of the assertions being made by Colin Powell that he so artfully crafted to sound like undeniable truths, when really he was just making inferences based on his previous inclinations and beliefs. At that time though, everything he said seemed very reasonable probably due to the events surrounding that time period. September 11 was still a very fresh wound and the Americans needed an outlet or recipient for their anger, and so, influenced by the cognitive bias of contrast, the American government felt justified in moving forward with their attack on Saddam Hussein and their search for WOMD. At least this made it seem like they were doing something to counter the terrorist attacks on the WTC. If the issue of possible WOMD had arisen before the September 11 attacks I do not believe that such drastic measure would have been taken.

    The representative heuristic plays into this as well. Powell wanted so badly to believe that something had been found in Iraq that was worth pursuing, something that could supported as being a sufficient reason for the U.S. to take action, that he failed to take into consideration the level of uncertainty truly involved. He unwittingly was overly reliant on the probability of there being WOMD, rather than the factual certainty that they existed.

    Powell can be quoted in these videos self-assuredly saying “these are facts, not assertions” and “this is evidence, not conjecture”. His conviction is inspiring, but it is important to not let emotional biases take hold in these situations, especially when the consistency heuristic seems to be playing a part in the speaker’s immense confidence. Even if the things he listed were truly proven as undeniable, tangible fact, there is still no denying, especially in hindsight, that Powell interpreted these facts in a way that supported his preconceived notions, and drew conclusions which cannot be considered facts.

22. There are several factors that lead Powell and others to believe the weapons were there. One of the most influential factors was self-selecting bias. I took an American foreign policy class in undergrad, and we went over in detail why the government was so wrong on an issue of such importance. Much of the academic writing on the issue concluded that intelligence agencies were pressured by the administration to find evidence against Saddam. This had the effect of clouding judgment and leaving out important facts in order to appease the administration. This bias explains why when people make up their mind on something they find it very hard to change their mind. The intelligence agencies in effect had their minds made up and they were going to find evidence whether it was there or not.
    Another major cognitive shorthand the government and the American people fell prey to was liking. Collin Powell was by far the most liked character in the administration, and this was a reason he was chosen to testify before the U.N. Not only was Powell a likable figure, he was considered an authority on the issue. He had two major cognitive biases in his favor. Just imagine how different the situation could have been if Dick Cheney testified, he had extremely low likability, and no military background. This stood in strak contrast to Collin Powell, and was a major reason Powell was chosen, and everyone believed him.

23. I have never believed that Colin Powell or any other individual in the Bush administration purposely misled the world with respect to Iraqi weapons of mass destruction. In some respects the debate continues as you can see in this NY Times forum, http://op-talk.blogs.nytimes.com/2014/10/17/who-was-right-about-w-m-d-s-in-iraq/?_r=0 , as US troops did discover and were even injured by plentiful amounts of old WMD’s dating to earlier in Saddam’s rule. There is no question however, that a new weapons program did not exist.

    In hindsight, we can see that Sec. Powell’s speech and indeed the whole invasion of Iraq scheme, was heavily influenced by the cognitive shortcut of confirmation bias. Straussian neo-conservatives in the administration truly believed that the establishment of a stable democracy in the region would set off a domino effect of modernization and liberalization (i.e. Arab Spring) that would effectively eliminate radical extremism, and improve the lives of millions. Iraq was always a great candidate for this social experiment as Saddam Hussein was a familiar boogey man to the American people, Iraq possessed great and untapped oil wealth, and had well educated population with all the makings of a future middle class.

    From this premise, administration officials and the intelligence agencies set out to find a casus belli in Iraq. I have no doubt that they believed one was waiting to be discovered, as Bush administration folks had little respect for Saddam, seeing him as a corrupt figure who almost certainly breaking every international law he could. Again, they weren’t entirely wrong, but their biased search for information was merely a means to an end that was already committed to. Sec. Powell has held quite a grudge ever since and suggested his reputation was sacrificed in this biased pursuit, but I find it hard to believe he was as unaware as he suggests.

24. After viewing these three clips and reading Tversky and Kahneman, I believe that the representativeness heuristic is relevant. In particular, the segment that sheds light on this dialogue is thoughtfulness to previous possibility of consequence and how the value or lack of proof has an impact on how results are ignored or considered. The section on the misunderstandings of regression is also useful in understanding how these decision makers considered that weapons existed.I also believe that the judgment heuristic of availability also describes the prejudices that influenced decision-making here. The prejudices of imaginability is useful to realize how dangers are framed. I also believe phenomenon attaching had a function to show in this decision-making process, because if decision makers are given the starting point for discussion, then their thinking have a tendency to be less flexible and not as expose to debate, discussion, or questioning.

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