This week’s reading selection analyzes the Russian invasion of Ukraine from the geopolitical and historical focus but also explores some of the aspects of why the invasion has shown limitations of the military power of the Kremlin and the complex relationship between the US and Russia. In particular, something that caught my attention was Freedamn’s discussion on how the military power of one nation would be as good as its supreme and operational commanders. In addition, the effectiveness of the takeover would depend on how well the command is prepared to navigate the nation’s resistance.
Freedman’s article underscores the immense responsibility placed upon military commanders. They are entrusted with the fate and reputation of their nations, requiring unwavering determination, the ability to make critical decisions under pressure, and the capacity to assess situations and allocate resources on the spot. Moreover, commanders must be willing to adapt and consider alternative strategies, even if it means deviating from established plans. As highlighted by Freedman, this latter point serves as a critical point, where the contrasting commanding approaches used by Russia and Ukraine (modern vs. hierarchical) have significantly influenced the war’s course.
The contrasting command structures employed by Russia and Ukraine have emerged as a particularly compelling aspect of this conflict. Since the beginning of the invasion, Russia’s frequent changes in its military leadership have raised questions about Russia’s preparedness for the war and highlighted the tension between Putin’s ambitious objectives and his rigid hierarchical command approach. In this system, commanders often require approval for their actions, risking charges of insubordination if they act independently. On the other hand, Ukraine has adopted a flexible modern command structure to allow commanders to respond swiftly to changing circumstances and adopt strategies to counter Russian advances. As a result, Ukraine has been avalible to bolster Ukraine’s resilience but also expose Russia’s command structure vulnerabilities.
A recent development that illustrated the challenges faced by the Kremlin’s leadership was the rebellion of the Wagere Group leader, which showed the internal contradictions and power struggles within the Russian leadership. It raises questions about the unity and cohesiveness of the Kremlin’s decision-making process and the extent to which commanders are willing to challenge the “status” to pursue their objectives.
As this conflict evolves, it would be interesting to continue to see how both countries’ different commanding and leadership dynamics play out. Such insight would provide an analysis of how military campaigns and leadership affect the dynamics of warfare.
One reply on “Week #3”
Yaz,
Military historians will be analyzing this conflict for decades to come, precisely for the reason(s) you addressed in your blog post. There can be little doubt that Russia’s initial attempt to undertake a rapid invasion to try to take Kyiv in a matter of a few days was an abject failure, due in part to the factors you identified. They also made several other tactical and strategic blunders that ultimately forced them to retreat.
In modern military command structures, it’s not only that the battlefield commanders have substantial latitude to order changes in plans based on the conditions that actually exist, but it’s also that non-commissioned officers (meaning sergeants) have the authority to do the same. This could not happen in the Russian army, and it’s one of the reasons why they are losing–and dealing with hundreds of thousands of soldier killed or wounded. Yet another result of the Russian hierarchical structure is that they have had almost a dozen generals killed in action because they had to be so close to the front lines to issue orders. This is almost unheard of in modern warfare. –Professor Wallerstein