Summary
When referring to 'traditional security threats,' it is imperative to recognize the prevalence of traditional war theory. The development of the international system, the recognition of new actors, and the study of new theories and paradigms often relegate to the background those foundational theories that laid the groundwork for the study of the International System and interstate interaction. The conflict in Ukraine, specifically the confrontation between a Western bloc led by the United States and Russia, is a clear example of how theories developed centuries ago remain relevant and can favor the conduct of a successful war.
The texts by Freedman, Mearsheimer, Toal, and Charap do an excellent job of identifying the strategic errors that the Russian leader has made when dealing with the Ukrainian state. More importantly, the arguments developed by these scholars support my assertion that 'warfare has changed but war per se has not.' Russia is a state with great military potential, undeniable economic capabilities, and a vast territory that has allowed it to achieve favorable outcomes in historical wars. Unfortunately, this war is not unfolding on its territory, and the geopolitical advantages that authors such as Kotkin identify this time do not work in its favor.
Carl Von Clausewitz, among many elements identified in his theory of war, emphasizes the importance of a good commander, and a good leader. Since war is a political act, the design and conduct of a war strategy must be meticulous, but evidently, the Russian leader failed miserably in this regard. As Freedman points out, 'Putin's war in Ukraine, then, is foremost a case study in a failure of supreme command.' Furthermore, the leader and his advisors underestimated the capacity of the Ukrainian state, under the leadership of a president determined to lead the war for his country. Without a long-term strategy, Russia's sudden attack led to a power confrontation between major powers and a return to Cold War dynamics.
One reply on “Week 3 / Maria”
Maria,
You make a number of interesting points in your blog post, and I was glad to see your effort to connect what is happening in Ukraine to classic war theory. Russia has actually had a mixed historical record regarding the outcome of wars in which it participated. It was, of course, invaded twice–once by Napolean in the 19th century and by Hitler in the 20th. Both invasions ultimately failed, but not before millions of people died.
I agree with your assessment that Putin has failed spectacularly in his command of the Ukrainian “special military action.” He completely misjudged the US and NATO’s determination to continue to help Ukraine to resist and to take back its territory. He also misjudged NATO itself, and it has resulted in a strenghened alliance and two new member countries, Finland and Sweden. With more than 200,000 casualties (and counting), this war has been an unmitigated disaster for Russia. But that said, Putin has such an iron grip on the reigns of political power in Russia, it seems plausible that he could continue to the war for years–quite possibly turning it into a long-term “frozen conflict,” which may at this point be its preferred outcome. –Professor Wallerstein