The readings for this week discuss the question of why Pakistan and India, despite possessing nuclear capabilities, have refrained from using them against each other. Abdullah addressed this question by breaking down the notion of nuclear taboo, military principles, and the significance of no-first-use policies, which I found interesting. He concluded that Pakistan’s reluctance to deploy its nuclear arsenal is due to a strategic and ethical evaluation of the circumstances and consequences associated with the use of such actions. He emphasized that Paskistan’s military has demonstrated a commitment to carefully considering the ethical implications, showcasing a reluctance to resort to nuclear options without thorough evaluation.
These policies underlying philosophy encourages nations to explore alternative conflict resolution methods, steering away from nuclear confrontation. Rather than relying solely on nuclear deterrence, these approaches aim to foster accountability between countries, making nuclear conflict a last resort. Talmodge’s article, on the other hand, brings a different perspective. He argues that when two nations possess a secure nuclear arsenal, an implicit agreement of mutually assured destruction emerges. This agreement alters their behavior, where while they maintain the status quo, the adversary is put in a position to provoke at a lower level to test the response of the opposing nation.
While both discussions present intriguing points on the rationale behind Pakistan and India’s choices of not using or using their nuclear capabilities, the lingering concerns persist. What specific issues might lead Pakistan to perceive a direct conflict warranting a nuclear response from India? Aligning with a point raised earlier during the semester, countries acquiring nuclear weapons may be linked to how they position themselves globally and in front of other superpowers, seeking a seat at the table and defending their interests. This could be the case for Pakistan and India. Although they have nuclear capabilities, the acquisition may be more related to presenting themselves as a powerhouse rather than intending to “use.” But although this is true or not, I also contemplate whether acquiring nuclear capabilities ingrains the anticipation of a potential World War III.
One reply on “Week #11”
Yaz,
This was a thoughtful and interesting blog post. Pakistan (much more than India) presents a complex and often seemingly contradictory case study. They are the only Islamic state with nuclear weapons (at least for the moment). They are totally outnumbered by India, probably by a ratio of as much as 5:1, and they have consistently lost whenever they have gotten into a shooting war with India. So they are paranoid and fearful. And given the short distance between these two contiguous countries, a “launch on warning” situation cannot be ruled out. –Professor Wallerstein