This week I am analyzing the Washington Post article, “Are nuclear weapons keeping the India-Pakistan crisis from escalating — or making it more dangerous?” The main theme/question is poses is, do nuclear weapons promote hostility or maintain stabilization. The article references how this is shown from the United States vs Russia and Pakistan vs India.
Pakistan and India have been at odds over the past century. With multiple wars in 1947, 1965 and 1971, the feud continues today with various types of mutual attacks on the 21st century. This stems from the typical religious differences between Muslim and Hindus and the Jammu and Kashmir region. The fight for land is not something out of the ordinary for international conflicts, but what makes this special is that they border one another and are two of the nine countries with nuclear weapons. This article argues that although they have maintained a conflict, it will not escalate due to mutually assured destruction (MAD). This is the belief that one will not use nuclear weapons with the threat of being attacked by nuclear weapons because all will suffer. This is not the first time that the MAD concept has been displayed.
The Cold War was the first time that this concept was brought to light. With the development of nuclear weapons and the continuous conflict between communism and democracy, the United States and Soviet Union tested each other through their nuclear programs. This was on full display with the Cuban Missile Crisis and the crisis in Berlin. The result of this was no nuclear attacks due to the fear of a retaliatory attack.
When discussing the mutually assured destruction concept, I am reminded a principle of economics. Upon the foundation of economics is the idea that you are dealing with rational individuals/groups. This applies to the MAD concept, expecting the other nations to think rationally. Where this falls apart is dealing with irrational groups such as terrorist organizations. I believe that will be a turning point in the world, when an irrational group acquires the nuclear capabilities. The closes we see right now is Iran and that is an experiment that might come sooner than anyone hopes for.
One reply on “Consalvo-Week 11”
Justin,
The fear of an irrational actor has always been the “wild card” in nuclear strategy, even during the height of the Cold War. During the Cuban missile crisis, for example, there was uncertainty as to whether Khrushchev was entirely rational, given his performance at the UN where he took off his shoe and banged the table with it. But it turned out that he was and nuclear catastrophe was ultimately averted. But, as you suggest, that may not always be the case. More likely, however, is not a “madman” in control of nuclear weapons but someone who is totally isolated and poorly advised–e.g., Kim Jong-un in North Korea. –Professor Wallerstein