For the past three years, Qatar has managed to successfully forge and strengthen economic and diplomatic ties with foreign allies outside the GCC despite continued strife and backlash in the region following the 2017 air, land, and sea blockade imposed by its close Arab neighbors – Bahrain, Saudi Arabia, UAE, and Egypt. These strengthening of ties with transcontinental nations have led to rumors of Qatari foreign minister Lolwah al-Khater announcing the severing of relations altogether with the Gulf Cooperation Council. Al-Khater has since denounced these rumors, calling for the prospective reintegration into the policy platform for further cooperation and coordination.
Since the inception of the council back in 1981, n0t much strides have been taken collectively to ensure the economic security of the region. Many projects and economic initiatives have now been either downplayed or not fully agreed upon by all member states, which has put into question the viability of encompassing multilateral cooperation around foreign defense and economic policy in the Gulf States. As a result, Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Kuwait have begun forming bilateral alliances amongst themselves. The Saudi-UAE Joint Co-operation Committee (JCC), announced in December 2017 that the two governments would cover “all military, political, economic, trade and cultural fields, as well as others, in the interest of the two countries”. The Saudi and Emirati governments had previously run a number of joint retreats of their officials while their forces are also both fighting on the same side in the ongoing Yemen conflict. Furthermore, Saudi Arabia and Kuwait have also implemented a bilateral cooperation council to ensure successful coordination with oil production activities within their shared neutral zone, which highlights Riyadh’s defined interest in regional bilateralism.
More justification on why the GCC may not be a sturdy collaborative force in regional diplomacy may derive from the nations’ lack of desire to establish a common currency, institute a Central Gulf Bank, or co-sponsor the infrastructure for a GCC rail project, and so forth. Ultimately, all of these factors have either guided or influenced the Qatari ministry on Foreign Affairs to act decisively in their future economic and diplomatic endeavors with nations beyond the Arab region. It is still too soon to tell whether Qatar may take decisive action to solidify its departure especially with the GCC’s policy track record.
Sources:
https://www.forbes.com/sites/dominicdudley/2018/07/25/is-time-running-out-for-the-gulf-cooperation-council/#7c20c6c756b8
https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2020/6/5/qatar-blockade-five-things-to-know-about-the-gulf-crisis
https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2020/6/4/qatar-will-roll-with-the-punches-with-gcc-crisis-analysts
Tim,
This was an interesting topic for a blog post. I must admit that, while I was aware that Qatar has forged a different path (for many years) than the rest of the Gulf countries, I did not know the details you provide in your post. That said, it’s hard to know what Qatar’s desired end game is in this regard? Especially as Iran’s power grows, will they, too, not feel threatened? Will this force them back into a closer relationship with the GCC? It will be interesting to watch how this develops in the coming years. –Professor Wallerstein