Author: t.pamias

As a result of the lockdowns around the world to control the coronavirus outbreak, huge decreases in aerial transportation and industrial output resulted in a considerable drop in daily global carbon emissions of 17% in April of this year. However, COVID-19 is also prompting lackluster responses by governments that could pose detrimental impacts on the environment and on the ability to combat climate change. It is imperative that more large-scale actions be introduced in global legislatures to avoid the worst impacts of this crisis.

Overall, international agreements on Climate Change mitigation and adaptation have been halted due to the pandemic. The World Conservation Congress, responsible for gauging global conservation levels, has been postponed to January 2021. The Convention on Biological Diversity, which would have established new global measures to protect wildlife and plants from climate change and other threats, has also been postponed until next year. Lastly, The 2020 U.N. Ocean Conference scheduled for June this year has been delayed. All of these pushbacks have led many governments to temporarily devote their attention to other pressing issues regarding Public Health. As a result, due to the virus threatening the finances and economic output of many countries, many of the financial pledges towards implementing target-based practices to mitigate emissions may be largely overlooked in the coming months, or years. 

Many of the root causes of climate change also increase the prevalence of global pandemics. Deforestation, which occurs mostly for agricultural purposes (a significant cause of Climate Change), is the largest cause of habitat loss worldwide. It has been argued that loss of habitat forces animals to migrate and potentially contact other animals or people, thus transmitting viral or bacterial matter. Large livestock farms can also serve as a source for spillover of infections from animals to society.Recent research has also found that people who live in places with poor air quality (another principle cause of Climate Change) are more likely to die from COVID-19 even when accounting for other factors that may influence risk of death such as pre-existing medical conditions, socioeconomic status, and access to healthcare.

On the contrary, the high infectivity rate of the virus has compelled city governments to implement curfews and lockdowns, which can have an impact on carbon emissions levels. Furthermore, to avoid public transportation and contact with possible infected individuals, cities like Oakland, CA introduced Slow Streets, which banned cars on 74 miles of streets, encouraging slower driving and promoting biking and walking. New York, San Francisco, Minneapolis and Seattle have followed suit by implementing street closures, which in turn, decreases vehicular usage. Brookline, MA, a Boston suburb, used temporary structures to widen sidewalks and increase bike lanes. Moreover, European cities have also expanded biking initiatives. Barcelona added 13 miles of city streets for biking, with Berlin incorporating 14 new miles of bike lanes into their vast network. Though air pollution levels have decreased considerably within the last few months, this should not take precedence over the progress that must be met in addressing Climate Change at a global scale, particularly once the virus becomes contained and a vaccine is finalized and distributed.

 

Sources:

Coronavirus and Climate Change

COVID-19’s Long-Term Effects on Climate Change—For Better or Worse

 

Latin America remains vulnerable to hostile cyber activity, especially as the region’s economies become more technically adept. Cyber security practices are currently failing to keep up with advancements in digitization as Cyber crime, cyber espionage, and hacktivism have targeted Mexico, in particular. On pace to be among the top ten economies in the world by 2050, Mexico has achieved economic heights as a result of increased Internet access and implementation of e- commerce. As such, Mexico has been attracting the attention of enterprising hostile cyber actors seeking to exploit commercial organizations for financial reward. While promising government initiatives like the establishment of a national cyber security strategy and legal frameworks demonstrate Mexico’s awareness of the importance of cyber security, they are at a nascent stage. Though Mexico houses several command centers for cybersecurity crises,  enforcement of such laws against cyber attacks has been universally weak.

To further complicate things, several international state actors have been accused of usurping the country’s finances. Suspected North Korean hackers attempted to steal money from Mexican banks in 2016. The hackers ended up deploying destructive malware after they had unsuccessfully exploited the SWIFT payment system to steal money via fraudulent transfer requests. In 2017, more than 500 companies in Mexico were infected with the WannaCry ransomware, believed to have been orchestrated by North Korea. Even Mexico’s own government has been suspected of complicit behavior in which surveillance spyware was deployed on journalists’ and activists’ smartphones back in 2017. Russia has also been actively seeking to expand its influence in Latin America in order to offset U.S. influence in the region. Russian operatives are believed to have conducted cyber espionage against Government of Mexico targets, although no specifics were provided to determine the cause. 

However, while legislation exists that addresses technology-related crime, Mexico’s failure to incentivize or compel organizations to report breaches, makes it difficult to understand the full impact of hostile cyber activity in the country. This needs to change in order to develop proper cyber security initiatives to adequately address these criminal activities. Such changes require budget reallocation towards enhanced firewall technology to protect government and corporate encrypted virtual private networks and proxy servers.

 

Sources:

Guenther, Rita, et al., eds. Science and technology to counter terrorism: Proceedings of an Indo-US workshop. National Academies Press, 2007.

https://www.lookingglasscyber.com/wp-content/uploads/2019/03/STRATISS-Cyber_Landscape_Mexico.pdf

 

At the turn of the 21st century, The Gulf Cooperation Council began looking into nuclear power as its primary consumption of energy, attempting to diversify its power source from the region’s traditional reliance on domestically produced fossil fuels. Throughout the 2000s, both the UAE & Saudi Arabia have also taken subtle measures that, some may argue, serve as a countervailing effort against Iran’s contentious nuclear program under the guise of the peaceful acquisition of nuclear energy technology. So far, within the GCC, the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and Saudi Arabia have the most advanced nuclear power production plans; Abu Dhabi began construction of its first nuclear reactor, Barakah-1, in July 2012, and it is planned to follow this with three further reactors. Should Saudi Arabia’s plans be realized, the Kingdom could become the Middle East’s largest nuclear power producer over the next 20 years. Current plans involve the construction of 16 nuclear power plants, which would supply one-sixth of the Kingdom’s anticipated electricity needs by 2032.

Given that rapidly rising levels of domestic energy consumption have already made the GCC a regional energy consumer which rivals the combined energy demand of Latin American countries, this endeavor also holds significant potential for nuclear energy to become deeply entangled in the region’s existing geopolitical context. The significance of the GCC’s nuclear plans extends to the region’s wider regional relationships, including those with nearby Iran, whose nuclear program has been a source of tension between Tehran and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) for decades. After Iran, the UAE and Saudi Arabia will possibly be the Middle East’s only power producers, and the first Arab countries with access to nuclear technology. Although the GCC states have emphasized their exclusively civilian interest in nuclear power, the option to develop a nuclear weapons program once the technology is in the country is, of course, a possibility that can never be fully discounted. The acquisition of this technology would elicit calls from international leaders to have GCC states adopt additional protocols within existing nuclear proliferation treaties. GCC efforts to develop local uranium enrichment or plutonium reprocessing facilities could threaten multilateral cooperation with other actors within the region.

If the GCC continues in the pace of domestic nuclear production, member states would also be tempted to rely even more intensively on US protection from Iran, which could be considered a double-edged sword. Moreover, Saudi Arabia and the UAE have recently embraced closer defense ties with Russia, which would allow the GCC to balance strategic alliances in the act of confronting Iran with imminent diplomatic entreaties. Furthermore, the European Union (EU) also has vested interests in the Gulf region, remaining particularly dependent on the safe and steady access to relatively cheap energy supplies. On the other hand, Gulf countries are primarily interested in getting access to EU technology and manufactures. Moreover, they are increasingly interested in investing in diverse economic sectors within the EU.

More importantly, the EU is concerned with the rise in nuclear energy production principally due to geographical proximity and the possible consequences in terms of environmental and soft security issues. Though a risk of direct attack towards the EU is not likely, these concerns stem from the probable consequences of eventual nuclear attacks in the Middle East such as an increasing influx of migrants, the risk of energy supply disruptions, the harm to EU economic interests within the region, and the imaginable environmental consequences of a nuclear attack. As a result, the concern over the nuclear race in the region remains at the top of GCC & EU diplomatic agendas.

 

Sources:

https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/172379/Gulf_Nuclear_4008.pdf0.pdf

El-Katiri, Laura. “The GCC and the nuclear question.” Oxford Energy Comment (2012).

Perkovich, George. “Nuclear developments in the GCC: risks and trends.” the Gulf Research Center’s Gulf Yearbook 2008 (2007).

For the past three years, Qatar has managed to successfully forge and strengthen economic and diplomatic ties with foreign allies outside the GCC despite continued strife and backlash in the region following the 2017 air, land, and sea blockade imposed by its close Arab neighbors – Bahrain, Saudi Arabia, UAE, and Egypt. These strengthening of ties with transcontinental nations have led to rumors of Qatari foreign minister Lolwah al-Khater announcing the severing of relations altogether with the Gulf Cooperation Council. Al-Khater has since denounced these rumors, calling for the prospective reintegration into the policy platform for further cooperation and coordination.

 

Since the inception of the council back in 1981, n0t much strides have been taken collectively to ensure the economic security of the region. Many projects and economic initiatives have now been either downplayed or not fully agreed upon by all member states, which has put into question the viability of encompassing multilateral cooperation around foreign defense and economic policy in the Gulf States. As a result, Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Kuwait have begun forming bilateral alliances amongst themselves. The Saudi-UAE Joint Co-operation Committee (JCC), announced in December 2017 that the two governments would cover “all military, political, economic, trade and cultural fields, as well as others, in the interest of the two countries”. The Saudi and Emirati governments had previously run a number of joint retreats of their officials while their forces are also both fighting on the same side in the ongoing Yemen conflict. Furthermore, Saudi Arabia and Kuwait have also implemented a bilateral cooperation council to ensure successful coordination with oil production activities within their shared neutral zone, which highlights Riyadh’s defined interest in regional bilateralism. 

 

More justification on why the GCC may not be a sturdy collaborative force in regional diplomacy may derive from the nations’ lack of desire to establish a common currency, institute a Central Gulf Bank, or co-sponsor the infrastructure for a GCC rail project, and so forth. Ultimately, all of these factors have either guided or influenced the Qatari ministry on Foreign Affairs to act decisively in their future economic and diplomatic endeavors with nations beyond the Arab region. It is still too soon to tell whether Qatar may take decisive action to solidify its departure especially with the GCC’s policy track record.

Sources:

https://www.forbes.com/sites/dominicdudley/2018/07/25/is-time-running-out-for-the-gulf-cooperation-council/#7c20c6c756b8

https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2020/6/5/qatar-blockade-five-things-to-know-about-the-gulf-crisis

https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2020/6/4/qatar-will-roll-with-the-punches-with-gcc-crisis-analysts

 

 

Many analysts contend that the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) introduced by the United Nations Development Programme and adopted by many world leaders in September 2015 continue to lack the inclusion of certain fundamental principles, such as defense and security. Although the UN reaffirms their notions of peace and stability according to the targets of Sustainability Goal 16 (Peace, Justice, and Strong Institutions), much of those objectives do not mention the need to address state militaristic corruption and sustainable fiscal progress in the defense sector. It is also interesting to note that the framework for the SDGs derives from the Millenium Development Goals implemented in 2000, which also did not include any mention of addressing security and defense.

 

As a result, since the turn of the century, displacement of persons due to violence has been exacerbated by many inter-regional conflicts and wars. A record 79.5 million persons  have been forcibly displaced at the end of 2019 according to a report published by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees. At least 100 million persons were forced to flee their homes during the last 10 years alone, as forced displacement and statelessness has remained high on the UN agenda in recent years and continues to generate much needed discussion within global policy forums. Furthermore, several major crises have contributed to the displacement of persons, two of which have been the result of warfare and violence exacerbated by regional militaristic forces – the Syrian conflict and South Sudan’s post-independence fallout.

Solutions that would assist in security and defense reforms would involve several UN agencies addressing not only the reduction in flow of illegal arms, but also criminalizing the corruption that pervades defence and security institutions and ensuring they work for citizens, not just those in power. Moreover, fiscal governance must be taken into account to ensure that defense spending is not disproportionately allocated from the overall state budget while not addressing other pertinent issues such as public health, education, and infrastructure. Although there are many agencies that work towards peacekeeping and bilateral solutions amongst nations and agencies alike, not having a forthcoming target that addresses military corruption cannot advance the overall goal of global peace and security.

 

Sources:

https://www.ft.com/content/af202f82-72be-11e7-aca6-c6bd07df1a3c

Global Trends 2019: Forced Displacement in 2019

https://www.un.org/sustainabledevelopment/peace-justice/

https://www.undp.org/content/undp/en/home/sustainable-development-goals/goal-16-peace-justice-and-strong-institutions.html

https://www.csmonitor.com/World/2019/0619/UN-Record-71-million-people-displaced-by-war-and-violence

 

Much of China’s imperialist endeavors in the modern world has largely centered around maintaining sovereignty over special administrative regions such as Hong Kong, and the Republic of China (ROC), also known as Taiwan. China’s handling of these regions has garnered much scrutiny from international media outlets and has received admonishment from many leaders, both domestic and abroad. 

China’s adamant position on retaining control of Hong Kong’s state of security while undermining its judicial independence has been the premise for the region’s separatist demonstrations. Largely due to the extradition bill sanctioned by the National People’s Congress, violence in Hong Kong ensued until the bill’s withdrawal back in September 2019. However, China’s retaliation led to the passing of a comprehensive national security law that would, in effect, imprison anyone (up to life) who is found complicit in crimes of secession, subversion, terrorism and collusion with foreign forces. The implementation of this law indubitably violates the “one country, two systems” framework, as more than 9,000 protestors, including pro-democracy lawmakers and activists, face imminent arrest and imprisonment. Furthermore, China’s aggressive stance on reaffirming its sovereignty over such administrative divisions has translated to many states covertly forging diplomatic missions with another particular semi-autonomous region considered one of Asia’s most disputed – Taiwan.

Taiwan, also known as the Republic of China, has a reputation for being the most actively unrecognized autonomous region in the world in terms of economic output, trading, and contribution to tech supply chains. Yet, China has strategically militarized its characterization of dominance over the region, having pointed approximately 1,600 ballistic missiles at the island territory, while exerting pressure on global companies to label Taiwan as a province of the mainland. Taiwan Foreign Minister Joseph Wu contends the notion that Taiwan has felt the pressure of China’s aggression to concede to their political demands, demands which threaten the very existence of their well-being and may turn the territory into the “next Hong Kong.” Nonetheless, the United States has maintained their decades-long alliance with Taipei and have ensured the people of Taiwan that their interests are vested with that of the United States. 

Much of the nascent developments in Taiwan has amassed US military and diplomatic interests throughout the years, given that Congress believes that any attempt to coerce Taiwan into unification with the POC would be viewed as a grave threat to American security. Although China has vowed to reunify the mainland once its military and ballistic missile capabilities are adequate enough for a “full-scale barrage and invasion of mainland Taiwan”, the superpower must also be prepared to supersede many diplomatic and militaristic hurdles imposed by the United States, which would make for an interesting setup in any anticipated acts of aggression in the region.     

Sources:

https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2019/07/taiwans-status-geopolitical-absurdity/593371/

https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/jun/30/china-passes-controversial-hong-kong-national-security-law

https://www.cnn.com/2020/09/02/asia/china-taiwan-us-analysis-intl-hnk/index.html

https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-china-49317695

https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/aug/11/the-next-hong-kong-taiwans-foreign-minister-sounds-warning-over-china

 

Throughout much of the third wave of globalization (beginning from 1989 to the present), China has amassed much of its geopolitical sphere of influence through its lateral economic partnerships with many Global South countries, resulting in much financial strain for investors and governments alike. Extracting a few examples of this commercial trend, particularly in Ecuador and Kenya, China’s indubitable force of financial dominance has contributed towards the construction and upkeep of many transportation, healthcare, and telecommunications infrastructures; However, much of this so-called bilateral economic integration has come at the expense of governments receiving loans and not being able to follow through with repayment installations. 

The Ecuadorian government has been involved in a slew of scandals since the inception of many infrastructure projects financed by the Chinese government. One project in particular, the Coca Codo Sinclair Dam, was constructed by the Sinohydro Corporation at the price tag of $2.25 billion USD. Considered the largest energy project in Ecuador’s history, the government soon realized that settling the loan required granting 80% of the country’s most valuable export to China as a method of repaying contracts – Oil. This practice of ceding control of Ecuador’s oil supply chain to Chinese companies has led to increased deforestation of the country’s most biodiverse regions. This scenario has not only played out in South American countries, but also in nations along the East African rift, with Kenya having received much financial assistance from the Chinese government and not much support from domestic partners. 

 

Kenya’s bilateral relationship with Chinese investors is attributed to Beijing’s “One Belt, One Road” initiative, a multi-billion dollar infrastructure project aimed at improving land and maritime transportation routes between China and Europe, Asia and Africa. However, financing the project has been deemed too expensive by Parliament following the raising of the government’s debt ceiling to $87 billion USD, as well as the increasing in government spending up to approximately 55% of the nation’s GDP. Many analysts contend that the nation may not recover from its negative-sloping debt-to-income ratio, with President Uluru Kenyatta now banking on future investors to set up shop along the railway’s newly-built transportation hubs. 

 

[1]https://archive.nordregio.se/en/Metameny/About-Nordregio/Journal-of-Nordregio/2008/Journal-of-Nordregio-no-1-2008/The-Three-Waves-of-Globalisation/index.html

[2] https://www.nytimes.com/2018/12/24/world/americas/ecuador-china-dam.html

[3]https://www.reuters.com/article/us-kenya-railway/kenya-opens-1-5-billion-chinese-built-railway-linking-rift-valley-town-and-nairobi-idUSKBN1WV0Z0

 

 

According to multiple sources, scholars have noted the Trump Administration’s consistent attacks imposed onto Nicolas Maduro, his repressive regime, as well as his constituents following the debt default crisis in 2017 . Largely due to the death of former President Hugo Chavez and Maduro’s desire to extend his predecessor’s socialist agenda, much of Venezuela’s economy has spiraled into disarray. As a result of the issuance of financial and individual sanctions on most of Maduro’s closest allies, much of these restrictive mandates have included the revocation of travel visas into the US, the sanctioning of two Russian-related oil subsidiaries that transported Venezuelan oil, the blockade of funding sources towards US-deemed terrorist organizations in the Middle East (i.e. Hezbollah), and much more.

Ultimately, all of these US sponsored sanctions have been proven to be effective within the grounds of US Diplomacy; However, much of these sanctions have crippled the Venezuelan economy and has caused for much political upheaval and uncertainty for the next potentially democratic government to take its place. Although much of these sanctions aforementioned have not caused much of a dent in the overall economic output of the nation, a particular sanction, authorized under Trump, caused for the embargo of Venezuela’s state oil company to effectively collapse, not allowing gas to be transported into the US to be converted into gasoline.  It has been proven that Venezuela may have more reserves than Saudi Arabia. But in terms of output, Venezuela’s oil industry has collapsed. The country’s production of oil is at its lowest point in 77 years. With a crippled economy and an exacerbated migration crisis comparable to the likes of the Syrian War migration event, The US has not made matters easy for the potential regeneration of Venezuela’s economy.

A remedy to allow for the survivability and sustenance of the Venezuelan economy may involve detaching the state-sponsored aspect and privatizing production output under effective oversight by a delegation from The United Nations Economic and Social Council.

 

 

Sources:

Sullivan, Mark P. “Venezuela: overview of US Sanctions.” Congressional Research Service, May 8 (2019).

https://www.bloomberg.com/graphics/2019-venezuela-key-events/