I find it horrifying and laughable that QA Khan circulated hundreds of catalog brochures for nuclear weapon components at one point in our recent history. It seems the stuff of a Hollywood action flick starring Charles Bronson and Lee Van Cleef.
On a more sobering and equally alarming note, the readings this week mention a scenario from the late 1990s when members of Congress held a private meeting where U.S. General Alexandar Lebed revealed that eighty-four 1 kiloton Soviet suitcase nuclear devices were missing and unaccounted for.
The Alison readings from this week further describe the reality that approximately 200 unique sources of fissile material exist, from where terrorists might acquire support for developing a nuclear bomb. It appears that if a group of actors has the technical knowledge and earnest motivation, they can likely carry out the most destructive and heinous acts: the detonation of a nuclear device.
In this context, global security and the propensity for cataclysmic destruction hinges on a delicate balance. This merits the following questions: What mechanisms and policy initiatives deter nonstate actors sourcing nuclear weapon components from the web of illicit supply networks encompassing Lybia, North Korea, Pakistan, China, and others? And what role will the United States and Europe play in this effort under President Biden’s administration?
The readings this week also point to the rapid evolution of Cyberwarfare. Ten years ago, the threat of cyberattacks was contained to the destruction of data and digital networks. After Stuxnet, the barrier between the physical world and cyber domains has been significantly eroded. Today, cyber offensives have the potential to destroy critical infrastructure and supply chains.
Unlike nuclear weapon development programs, which the U.S. and others can suppress in countries like Iran, cyberwarfare capabilities are difficult if not impossible to suppress. Counterattack measures might be the best and only deterrent to cyber engagements. However, when the U.S. launches a cyber offensive against an advisory it runs the high-risk that those same capabilities can be quickly duplicated and directed back towards the U.S. at a later date.
When cyber offensives are directed towards IP theft, it causes major concerns for U.S. national security. For example, Chinese cybercriminals stole Pentagon secrets describing details behind strategic weapons systems like the Patriot missile and F-35 fighter jet programs, as mentioned in the readings this week. I am left wondering how the U.S. stops cyber offensives designed to steal our strategic IP.
Riley,
Regarding your first point, there are agreements and informal mechanisms in place for states to cooperate if it is learned that enriched uranium or plutonium has gone missing. For many years after the end of the Soviet Union, the US had a strong working relationship with the Russians in this regard, and we spent millions of dollars to help them improve the physical security of their weapons storage and fissile material reserves. All that cooperation ended, however, after they were sanctioned due to their annexation of Crimea.
Regarding cyber-warfare, you are correct that it is extremely difficult both to trace the origin of a cyberattack and deter such activity (because it is so difficult to trace). The US has responded to some of the cyber activity emanating from Russia, and I suspect it will be revealed at some point that we undertook active measures to suppress their ability to meddle in our recent election. The Chinese are potentially a bigger problem for the reasons you state. — Professor Wallerstein