Author: RILEY O'CONNOR

Unless you’re a regular reader of nuclear weapon development capabilities, the name Mohsen Fakhizadeh probably didn’t mean much before this week.
His name is making international headlines after the successful assassination mission carried out near Tehran on Friday. The details are gruesome and point to clear signs the actions were deliberately coordinated.
A failed car bomb was followed by a string of gunfire. Fakhizadeh was later pronounced dead at the hospital.

Public sources have yet to name the responsible parties involved, but it’s a safe bet that Israeli forces contributed helpful hands. Their covert boots on the ground methods produce a recognizable signature. For example, in September of this year, working in a similar fashion but more efficient manner than the hit on Fakhizadeh, Mossad operatives riding a motorcycle in the streets of Tehran shot and killed Abu Muhammad al-Masri, a member of al-qeada’s top leadership responsible for the fatal attacks on U.S. Embassies in Africa.

If the hit on Fakhizadeh had been a U.S. mission, we might have sent AMG-114 hellfires, as was the case in eliminating Iranian General Qassem Soleimani, Abu Mahdi al-Muhandis, and seven others in Iraq without incurring civilian casualties, in January of this year.

As we think about Who Makes Policy, it’s important to consider all aspects of the policy landscape, including defensive measures. In some scenarios, the most effective policy measures to curtail ambition to develop a nuclear weapons program are eliminating its brain trust, such as in the lethal strike against Fakhizadeh. It’s an eerily discomforting feeling reaching this realization; nevertheless, it’s relevant and at times necessary for the security interests of the United States and our global partners.

 

 

 

I find it horrifying and laughable that QA Khan circulated hundreds of catalog brochures for nuclear weapon components at one point in our recent history. It seems the stuff of a Hollywood action flick starring Charles Bronson and Lee Van Cleef.

On a more sobering and equally alarming note, the readings this week mention a scenario from the late 1990s when members of Congress held a private meeting where U.S. General Alexandar Lebed revealed that eighty-four 1 kiloton Soviet suitcase nuclear devices were missing and unaccounted for.

The Alison readings from this week further describe the reality that approximately  200 unique sources of fissile material exist, from where terrorists might acquire support for developing a nuclear bomb. It appears that if a group of actors has the technical knowledge and earnest motivation, they can likely carry out the most destructive and heinous acts: the detonation of a nuclear device.

In this context, global security and the propensity for cataclysmic destruction hinges on a delicate balance. This merits the following questions: What mechanisms and policy initiatives deter nonstate actors sourcing nuclear weapon components from the web of illicit supply networks encompassing Lybia, North Korea, Pakistan, China, and others? And what role will the United States and Europe play in this effort under President Biden’s administration?

The readings this week also point to the rapid evolution of Cyberwarfare. Ten years ago, the threat of cyberattacks was contained to the destruction of data and digital networks. After Stuxnet, the barrier between the physical world and cyber domains has been significantly eroded. Today, cyber offensives have the potential to destroy critical infrastructure and supply chains.

Unlike nuclear weapon development programs, which the U.S. and others can suppress in countries like Iran, cyberwarfare capabilities are difficult if not impossible to suppress. Counterattack measures might be the best and only deterrent to cyber engagements. However, when the U.S. launches a cyber offensive against an advisory it runs the high-risk that those same capabilities can be quickly duplicated and directed back towards the U.S. at a later date.

When cyber offensives are directed towards IP theft, it causes major concerns for U.S. national security. For example, Chinese cybercriminals stole Pentagon secrets describing details behind strategic weapons systems like the Patriot missile and F-35 fighter jet programs, as mentioned in the readings this week. I am left wondering how the U.S. stops cyber offensives designed to steal our strategic IP.

From this week’s readings, I gained a new perspective on nuclear weapons, and the various ways countries pursue the development of nuclear weapons programs.

I had always assumed the path to develop a nuclear weapon capability was all more or less the same. Countries without a nuclear opinion want one if for nothing else then as a prestigious status symbol and keeping up with the international Jones’s.  And while most countries are eager to have nuclear weapons, the notion of mutually assured destruction is a deterrent from actually using them.

However, in the reading by Scott Sagan and Benjamin Valentino, I realized that the historical notion of nuclear weapon deterrence should not be assumed to last forever. The authors describe the “logic of consequence” in the reading might not hold up against shifting international norms, divergent ideologies, and regional political instability.

What stood out to me the most from this week’s reading is the various pathways countries pursue to develop nuclear weapons programs. It’s one thing to think about why a country might pursue a nuclear weapon, but there seems to be much more utility in studying how they go about developing them.

The Narang reading points to four typologies: hedging, sprinting, hiding, and sheltered. The hedging pursuit seems the least destructive to international peace. If countries can develop their nuclear weapons programs without completing an actual nuclear weapon capability, then perhaps mutually assured deterrence remains relevant to preventing the use of nuclear weapons.

At the same time, If an increased number of countries want to develop a hedging strategy for a nuclear weapons program, how is such activity monitored and controlled by the international community? While technical hedging may not pose significant risk factors, hard hedging or Insurance hedging is easy. Their potential to include dual-use delivery vehicles has the potential to pose significant threats.

As Narang points out, as a country moves closer to developing a capable nuclear weapon program, the level of regional instability increases. This includes economic turmoil and the increased potential for violent military confrontation. Narang mentions that the level of duress a country experiences influence the rate at which they might pursue a functional nuclear weapon.

From the readings, it appears the motivating drivers of nuclear weapons development programs are ouroboros in nature.

Could a revitalized international deterrence strategy for the 21st Century include a responsibility from the United States, Russia, and China to prevent duress from occurring within a country?

I found this table really insightful in thinking about how a country’s nuclear weapon strategy changes over time.

For example, as the table above illustrates, Iran appears to have changed their approach several times over the decades from Technical Hedging in 74′-78′; to  Hiding strategies between 81′-03′; and their current strategy of  Hard hedging.

Thinking along the lines of how a country purses it’s nuclear weapons interests could be a useful framework to analyze shifting geopolitical power balance between nations and drill down to understand a specific country’s broader military and economic strategic pursuites. IN other words, a given country’s nuclear strategy may be closely correlated to its overarching military and economic strategy, and as its nuclear strategy changes, so do geopolitical regional balances.

 

 

 

The next U.S. presidential administration will undoubtedly face continued challenges from our relations with Iran. In a second term, the Trump administration will likely continue a policy of maximum pressure. But how would a potential Biden administration approach Iranian relations?

One potential foreign policy outcome from a future Biden administration is rejoining the JCPOA.  We could see a  President Biden attempt to restore Iranian relations to resemble something from the pre-Trump era.

However, recent regional events will prove difficult to accomplish this outcome—for example, the assassination of General Soleimani. The assassination of General Soleimani is highlighted as a foreign policy accomplishment by the Trump administration. I tend to agree. Even a surface-level glance into Soleimani’s track record reviles a dangerous actor with numerous plans and attempts to strike American personnel with deadly force. The world and American personnel overseas are safer with Soleimani out of the equation.

The removal of Soleimani by the U.S. might negatively affect Iranian relations over the long-term. While Soleimani’s death brings short-term strategic gains for the U.S., it may also stand as yet another brick in the wall of deep-seated resentment and perceived grievances from the Ayatollah.

Additionally, a potential President Biden foreign policy agenda with Iran would likely face challenges from newly developed peace processes in the middle east. For example, recognition of Isreal by the UAE, Kosovo, and others likely in the future will further alienate Iran.

Statecraft can often be a bloody business; however, diplomacy’s importance to accomplish long-term strategic goals cannot be overemphasized. If Biden becomes president, his administration will have to balance the Iranian relationship carefully if they are to rejoin a negotiation table.

 

 

 

The United States and Russian officials are met in Finland yesterday to renegotiate the NEW START Nuclear weapon treaty. The U.S. Ambassador, Marshall Billingslea, and Sergei Ryabkov, the Russian Deputy Foreign Minister will continue talks held earlier over the summer in Vienna.  There is not much time remaining on the proverbial clock.  The NEW START treaty is due to expire on February 2021.

Part of the delay is attributed to the fact that the Trump administration wants China’s commitment to the treaty.  Back in August, speaking after the negotiation rounds in Vienna, Billingslea said this:

“The next treaty will have to be multilateral, it will have to include China, and the framework that we are articulating together as two great powers, us and the Russians, will be the framework going forward that China will be expected to join,

The perspective from the Trump administration is that China should have skin in the game, and make concessions in the build-out of their nuclear weapons program.

Recent DOD reports show significant increases in China’s buildout of military capability. Increasingly, China is marrying its state-sponsored enterprises from the private sector economy with military applications. This includes nuclear arsenals and advanced missile technology.

What remains unclear is how advanced weaponry buildouts on the part of the Chinese will impact nuclear weapons negotiations between Russia and the U.S.

Today, Ambassador Billingslea mentioned, “important progress” was achieved, however, specific outcomes remain unclear.

As a student of international affairs, I think about why events occurring in one country affect outcomes in another country or region. Sometimes, at first appearance, the significance of events unfolding in one region seem obscure or unrelated to the developments in a different region, but in the hyper-interconnected global economy of the 21st century; what happens in  country (A)  impacts country (B) at a greater magnitude than at any other point in modern history.  Edward Lorenz’s theory might even hold up to scientific scrutiny in the decades ahead, as further advances in AI and the Internet of Things come online.

Recent events across Eurasia has me wondering how Moscow and St. Petersberg might respond. For example, the independent states of Serbia and Kosovo recently normalized economic relations. They formally agreed to a one-year suspension over recognition claims – Serbia agreeing to stop claims that Kosovo does not exist as a sovereign state.

Although measuring the outcomes of normalization requires time, the ability of Serbia and Kosovo to engage in open cross-border commerce will likely have immediate positive economic benefits for both states. For example, removing Kosovo’s 100 percent tax on  Serbian goods will likely benefit the Serbian economy. Moreover, Serbia and Kosovo have mutually agreed to recognize professional licenses and educational certificates from doctors, lawyers, and engineers. Before normalization, academic certificates from Kosovo were not recognized in Serbia and visa versa. The removal of this restriction is likely to have immediate benefits. Moreover, economic normalization might encourage further discussions between the European Union, Kosovar leadership, and Serbian officials regarding the EU accession process, which both states have sought after for years. Finally, Kosovo has agreed to formally recognize Israel and move its embassy to the capital, Jelersiurm, becoming the first Mulsim majority state to do so.

So what does this mean for Russia, and how are the Russians likely to respond?  Provided Serbia’s strong affinity for Russian culture, what impact will this agreement have on Russia – Serbia relations?
What impact, if any, does this have on Israeli – Russian relations?

This week’s reading by Gerard Toal offers a useful framework to approach these questions. Toal’s Geopolitical culture construct provides an interpretative analysis of Russian geopolitical motivations by addressing three distinct fronteers— who are the Russian people, how does this narrative survive, and what does prosperity look like in the Russian context.

Developing these constructs further, Toal describes three Ideological networks, resulting from economic drivers towards modernization, collective national identity narratives that centralize authoritative power, and state-level security capabilities. Held together, Toal’s geopolitical assessment appears to suggest that Russian state actions are driven by the preservation of their national identity coupled with an ambition towards economic modernization.

Assuming Toal’s Geopolitical culture assessment of Russia is accurate, we can begin to build a forward-looking analysis that as the Kosovar and Serbian economies normalize, Russia will likely attempt to pull their economic activity closer towards its orbit.

We can observe a similar occurrence happening in Belarus, where  Russia’s little green men have arrived.  Putin’s commitment of military support for Lukashenko has been widely reported in the last few weeks. It’s reasonable to conclude that backing Lukashenko serves the strategic geopolitical objective of Putin, or what Stephen Kotkin refers to as Russain exceptionalism and the sense of a special mission to correct perceived historical wrongs. As Kotkin points out, as a result of  Russian defeats in the Russo-Japanese War, WWI, and the Cold War, the Soviet Union lost approximately 2 million miles of territory.  This history continues to impact the Russian psyche and what Kotkin calls a sense of perennial vulnerability, humiliation, and a feeling of betrayal at an international scale.

This historical perspective might also give credence to O’Hanlon’s argument that under Putin’s leadership, Moscow and St. Petersberg will likely pursue a geopolitical strategy to recapture post-Soviet space. For example, Russia’s invitation of George and annexation of Crimea might inspire the future playbook whereby the Kremlin attempts to expand territorially inside Baltic states on the assumption that NATO partners will not respond militarily from fear of risking military escalation to a nuclear conflict. And what about the Balkans? Is Russia preparing to reclaim post-Soviet space with an eye on Moldovia, Romania, or even Serbia?

Answers are uncertain, however as international events and new power balances continue to unfold across Eurasia, gauging Russia’s response will remain a key priority to U.S. national security interests. 

The readings for this week describe the development of artificially intelligent systems by the CCP. James Johnson’s article, in particular, stands out as the author highlights how the CCP is connecting AI technology with autonomous weapon systems, such as UAVs. This strategy is not unique. The military powers in many developed nations are pursuing these capabilities in some form.

What is unique, in the case of the CCP, is the fusion of military and civil sectors to support geopolitical ambitions. For example, the digital arm of China’s Belt and Road Initiative, which extends far outside of China’s borders—across Africa, South America, and Europe—benefits the CCP  militarily and economically.

Written in July of this year, a Democratic staff report for the Committee on Foreign Relations illustrates CCP military-civil-fusion and the scope of their AI surveillance systems internationally. What is concerning here is the authoritarian nature of the CCP regime. Can we rationally deduce the AI system capabilities that China employs domestically will have different outcomes when similar AI systems are sold internationally?
This question extends far beyond telecommunication technologies, such as 5G.

As the line separating China’s military and economic ambition becomes increasingly blurred, How should U.S. executive leadership respond?  It appears that contentious rhetoric is a favored answer. Whatever opinions you have about Donald Trump, it pays to listen to the official statements from the President of the United States.

During two recent White House press conferences, the first on Labor Day  (listen from 10:40 to 11:13) and the other on September 10th,  (listen from  18:23 to 18:44), the President mentioned  U.S. nuclear weapons capabilities. Additionally, during a series of interviews with Bob Woodward, between December and July 2020, Trump spoke of  U.S. secretive nuclear weapon systems. This is unusual for Trump’s rhetoric.

Why is President Trump mentioning U.S. nuclear weapons capabilities in recent White House Press press conferences and elsewhere?

Is Trump’s touting of U.S. nuclear weapons a response to the PLA’s increasing naval power, which now outpaces U.S. naval fleets in absolute numbers; or is he simply attempting to rally support from his base as we approach November 3rd?

Joseph Nye’s article, “The Rise and Fall of American Hegemony from Wilson to Trump,” calls attention to the decline of Pax America and the unipolar world order led by the U.S. since the end of the Cold War.

While the U.S. and allied partners grapple with shifts in the global power balance, the world economy and strategic interests among nation-states have become increasingly interdependent, perhaps more than any point in our collective history.  This warrants thinking on the various types of power used by regimes to influence geopolitical outcomes. In conventional terms, hard-power is the use of military force: mobilized boots on the ground and airborne B-52s. Conversely, the use of non-military means to win geopolitical objectives is defined by Nye as soft-power, which is not a euphemism for weakness or ineptitude. In fact, the profound success of Wilsonian Interventionism, the rules-based world order that immerged as a result, and strategies of game-theory, which aided the U.S. victory in the Cold War, are prime examples of effective soft-power.

Soft-power does not have a moral prerequisite; it’s neither good nor bad. The application of soft-power is what counts. Still, soft-power, as a tool of statecraft, is a mechanism in support of international democratic institutions.

On the opposite end of the spectrum, the term sharp-power, first defined by Christopher Walker and Jessica Ludwig, describes authoritarian regimes, such as China and Russia. It’s my understanding that sharp-power is inherently bad, as it strives towards illiberal ends and undermines democratic institutions.  The  Russian sponsored interference of the U.S.  presidential election in 2016, or Chinese censorship demands of the NBA and Hollywood film production studios are examples of sharp-power. 

Increasingly, it seems, free and open societies are exploited by illiberal, authoritarian regimes, who aim to reconstitute the rules-based world order to serve their ambition.  In a Foreign Affairs article, Nye further describes the features of sharp-power and the difficulty in responding to it.

The bygone era of Wilsonian Interventionism offers a rich historical context to think through the complexities of the modern world.  In addressing current challenges with China, President Trump’s zero-sum approach to leadership, which Nye describes as Hobbesian realism, is easy to dismiss as unproductive. Indeed, he has strained relations with prominent international institutions and allies. However, Trump’s response to Chinese sharp-power might demonstrate the most substantive results compared to past administrations and other world powers, considering how far China has gamed the international system since joining the WTO in 2001.