Summary
The rise of China, initially as a regional power but now increasing its influence on the global stage, undoubtedly represents a threat to the security of the United States. A threat to economic security, human security, and national security; but above all, a threat to the supremacy of the American state in the international system. Now, can China reshape the international system? As Gewirtz and Economy point out, the Chinese leadership is confident that it has the power and influence to supersede Western values that govern and determine the contemporary international system. Furthermore, it is undeniable that the rivalry between these two states could escalate into an armed conflict that subsequently involves military alliances (as India fears and thus limits its participation in the “Quad” which could result in a protracted war. The threat is real; however, it is premature to assert that China has the capacity to rearrange the order of the international system.
The 'Thucydides trap,' mentioned by Alisson and Shifrinson, implies a concerning and uncertain future for the United States. Undoubtedly, the strengthening of new states poses a threat to the unipolar order that the United States has imposed since the end of the Cold War. However, personally, I consider that this outcome is more likely in the case of mishandling relations and tensions between Russia and the United States than between China and the United States. It would be theoretically incorrect to label Russia as a "rising power," but in practical terms, it can be asserted that its power has rising again, especially as a result of the foreign policy of the Trump administration. Russia primarily represents a military and political threat, and indisputably, its state capacity poses a threat to the balance of power.
The rise and conduct of the Chinese state have been primarily based on economic capacity and cooperation, although states willing to trade Western values of free trade, human rights, and international law are limited. Now, I am not downplaying China's advancements or denying its capacity for influence; in fact, economic interests are a determining factor in state decisions. Nor am I ignoring the military advancements this state has developed; however, if I categorize the strategies pursued by this state as mentioned by Shifrinson as "weakening strategies," and conclude that with appropriate political and diplomatic handling, the likelihood of prolonged war is greatly reduced.
One reply on “Week 4/ Maria Rojas”
Maria,
I really liked the way you wove together some of the major points from the readings together with your own views and conclusions. Clearly, there are differences between our old adversary, Russia (previously the Soviet Union) and China. Russia’s decision to invade Ukraine hearkens back to the darkest days of the Cold War, where the US worried that it would seek to invade NATO territory. But the Russian economy is in shambles (due to the sanctions), and it mainly exports only oil, gas, and agricultural products.
China, on the other hand, is pushing hard for leadership across a large number of technology sectors, and it exports a huge volume of goods that give it a strong trade surplus with US and a number of other Western countries. It’s curious on some levels that China is willing to risk its beneficial trade relationships by threatening to invade Taiwan or exclude other countries from the South China Sea. That is almost certainly what would happen if they take either action. China also presumably has studied the world’s reaction to the Russian invasion of Ukraine. –Professor Wallerstein