After World War II Latin America experienced many revolts and clashes for power from different political groups. The United States’ goal, at this time, was to intervene and prevent Latin American countries from becoming communist. However, a country only 90 miles off the coast of its borders in Cuba would become a socialist nation. Cuba had been overlooked by the US ever since they won their independence. Tourism from the elite of the United States would occur in Cuba and it was made to be a present day Las Vegas. Outrage would ensue from its citizens and small revolts would go on to occur. One revolt was attempted by Fidel Castro in the early 1950s. Castro’s plan was to try and rob a military base to use their weapons to take over. Castro was defeated with ease and sent away to Mexico. This would lead to more internal fighting and many were displeased with the government and the United States. Castro was known for making speeches to the poor and creating connections with people. (Dawson 208).He would be known as a hero to Cuba as someone who stood for them and against the corrupt government of Cuba and The US. Castro would take charge in 1959 and moved away from the tourism age. Castro would focus on his country and its large peasant population. Castro would  meet with the US leaders and talk about him not wanting to be a socialist but instead he was a nationalist for Cuba. Castro would go on to deceive them, become a socialist nation, and meet with Soviet leaders in Moscow and invite some to Cuba. 

The document above is a conversation between Raul Castro and Premier Nikita Khrushchev in July 1960 in which they discussed Cuba, a nation that achieved socialism without any outside help like they did decades prior. Khrushchev and the USSR saw Cuba as a threat to the United States so close to their borders in which most other socialist nations were across the globe. Khrushchev first praises Cuba for its revolution and switch to socialism. Raul Castro wanted to meet with Khrushchev to talk about the people of the Soviet Union and their life in socialism. Khrushchev wanted to use this opportunity to build a relationship with Cuba and talk about the imminent response this will have from the United States. The United States was definitely going to respond to the shift towards socialism and now connections with the Soviet Union. Khrushchev, knowing this, planned on building a military compound in Cuba which would impose fear on the United States. Khrushchev also planned on supporting Cuba with resources like oil which would help in their fight against the United States. They also planned on setting up trade between the two nations and the USSR believed that they would not blockade Cuba for a long time. Castro also inquired about military support in which Khrushchev promised support but did not want Nuclear bombs to be put into Cuba just yet. He did not want to rush a United States invasion into Cuba as the country was just transformed into a socialist state. 

The United States reaction to Cuba transforming into a Cuban state was very unpleasant in the eyes of Khrushchev. They had a blockade already in place but the Premier believed the United States would not invade as long as Cuba did not provoke them . This would not be the case however, as the United States would eventually invade Cuba less than a year later to this conversation. The United States did already have a small territory in Guantanamo Bay already installed in Cuba. The United States wanted to overthrow Castro and eliminate the threat of socialism on its borders. 

Document Link

https://nsarchive.gwu.edu/document/29119-document-1-memorandum-conversation-between-nikita-khrushchev-and-raul-castro-moscow

Work Cited

    Dawson, Alexander S. Latin America since Independence: A History with Primary Sources. Routledge, Taylor & Francis Group, 2022. 

References:

Dawson, Alexander S. Latin America since Independence: A History with Primary Sources. Routledge, Taylor & Francis Group, 2022.

https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB483/docs/1986-01-10 NSC minutes on Central America [BBQs].pdf

Politics during the Cold War in Latin America involved the rise and fall of leftist and conservative governments which either embraced democratic practices or resorted to authoritarian rule. Interestingly, after the rise of Castro in Cuba, the United States began to take a moderate approach towards foreign relations. Under President Kennedy’s Alliance for Progress initiative, the U.S. would promote reform in Latin America through the building of public housing and universities, as well as funded land reform. The U.S. came to the conclusion that backing dictators would only result in more Castros and subsequently, would support middle-class centrist politicians such as, Romulo Betancourt and Arturo Frondizi in Argentina; Fernando Belaunde in Peru; and Eduardo Frei in Chile.

However, with the election of Marxist Chilean President Salvador Allende, the U.S. had come to grips with the failure of its centrist approach. Allende’s election represented the popular rejection of centrism and so, the U.S. began to fund any opportunity which would create enough instability that would result in the ousting of leftist governments – these opportunities so often came in the form of dictatorships. As stated by David F. Schmitz, “Advocates of greater military aid for [Anastasio] Somoza argued that Latin American military leaders, such as that Nicaraguan dictator, worked more closely with the United States than any other groups, and those who come to this country and see what we have and what we can do are frequently our most useful friends in those countries” (Wood 2019, 244). Administrations following President Nixon would align themselves with dictators such as Somoza since they gave them the assurance that the threat of communism would be rooted out from internal politics.

Returning back to the topic of Nicaraguan politics, the document illustrated above reveals a court case heard by the International Court of Justice (ICJ) regarding Sandinista Nicaragua’s accusation of the U.S. violating its sovereignty, with evidence pointing as early as 1981. For instance, furious at the newly Marxist government in charge of Nicaragua – after they ousted the Somoza regime – the Reagan administration “launched an economic blockade and pressured the World Bank and International Monetary Fund to freeze the country out of international markets… More significantly, his administration played a key part in creating and funding the Contras, former National Guard members who by 1981 were launching regular incursions into Nicaragua from bases in Honduras” (Dawson 2022, 265). In light of the violent clashes between the Sandinista and the Contras, much of the anticipated change that the leftists wished to implement had to be diminished on account of the resources needed to maintain control over the state. As a consequence of American reaction to their government, the Sandinista implemented elections in 1984 because “they needed a democratic mandate to establish their legitimacy” with foreign observers invited (Dawson 2022, 265). The results were overwhelmingly supportive of the Sandinista National Liberation Front (FSLN) which only bolstered Latin American rejection of U.S. centrism.

The telegram presented illustrates CIA support towards Eduardo Frei in the 1964 elections in Chile. The United States provides a one million dollar subsidy for the Frei campaign as political action towards the defeat of Salvador Allende. The goal of this US campaign in Chile was to provide Frei with the support necessary within Chile from other democratic pirates in order to ensure victory against Allende.  

World relations soon started to become critical during the events of the Cold War as the United States saw it best fit that the spread of communism did not slowly take over Latin America. This came down to the premise that the United States believed that many Latin American countries “Showed signs of instability and weaknesses” and because of this notion that they were displaying that it would create an opening for communist forces and would allow them to be able to exploit them and eventually have influence over them (Wood and Alexander, 244). The events of the Chilean elections of 1964 demonstrate the United States’ intervention to secure democratic runner Eduardo Frei’s position over opponent socialist Salvador Allende. 

The CIA plays an integral part during the elections as various forms of propaganda are on display which ranged from print advertisements to radio and news programs. The propaganda had one main objective which was meant to showcase what life would be like for Chilean citizens if they were to vote for Salvador Allende. They would paint images in the heads of Chilean citizens that in voting for Allende one would eventually have to adhere to a communist way of life. They constructed that a communist society would also remove gender constructs that Chile had built and that voting for Frei it would maintain what Chile had built (Wood and Alexander, 250). So one can see that the United States uses nationalism as a form of swaying Chilean citizens to vote for Frei. In addition to the propaganda made in support of Frei, there was also an equal amount of propaganda in favor of demonstrating how frightening rule under Allende could be. 

Despite the propaganda demonstrating how voting for Allende would lead to a communist way of life for those under chile, it did not seem to show how voting for Frei would lead to better living conditions. For the Chilean citizens, since both men and women could vote there were campaigns that targeted them individually to ensure maximum sway in favor of the democratic party which is important to note and does not simply go target males to vote for Frei. Women had as much of a say in the political campaigns and having their vote would be just as crucial in this election. 

It is evident that even though the United States was mitigating the spread of communism against the Soviet Union they were also vigilant toward Latin American countries ensuring that communist influence did not take over. In viewing this, it is apparent that if a Latin American leader was not an ally to the United States in this case Allende, they would be met with constant opposition to solidify their removal from power. To conclude Latin American leaders were limited in what they could do as they were either seen as an asset or a liability to the United States’ interest during the Cold war. 

Primary Source

https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/news/20040925/docs.htm

Works Cited

Wood, James A., and Anna Rose Alexander. “The Cold War.” Chapter. In Problems in Modern Latin American History: Sources and Interpretations. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2019.

The world was at ease after the ongoing threat of communism, and the United States was under pressure for the survival of democracy. Their desperation led to alternative ways of combating leftist movements without combat or war efforts. Military dictatorships were placed throughout Latin America. Dictatorships were often allied with one another and were tolerated by the United States due to them being the lesser evil as they prevented the spread of communism. Argentina’s dictatorial militant leader, Jorge Rafael Videla, abused his power over the nation and threatened anyone against his rule. Operation Condor was the kidnapping, abuse, torture, and killing of socialists and communists, which the United States backed. Members of the junta, such as the police patrol, controlled how to resolve the ongoing revolts against the dictatorship. The primary source details the assassination of thirty leftist organization members in Fatima, Buenos Aires covered up by the police patrol. The government used the excuse of terrorism to kill anyone against the revolt, including children and religious leaders. Waiting for the anticipated World Cup to arrive in Argentina, dictator Videla wanted to keep the issues discreet for the tournament’s success. The United States maintained relations with the nation as conversions of Henry Kissinger, U.S secretary of state, and  Foreign Minister Admiral Cesar Guzzetti were recorded.

An international soccer tournament is held every four years, known as the World Cup, one of the biggest sporting events. Argentina wanted to make a good impression and avoid any scandals that could arise before the anticipated event. Videla wanted to create an atmosphere of positivity for any visitors. Unfortunately, this continued the reign of terror against leftist organizations before the games. It was reported that on August 20th, 1976, the police patrol had murdered thirty people from a supposed leftist group. The police then displayed the thirty bodies as a threat to the Peoples Revolutionary Army and the Montoneros due to suspected coordinated attacks. The Fatima Massacre was brought to the attention of Videla, who was angered not that the people were murdered but that they were publically displayed, portraying a devious reputation to Argentina. The murder of different civilians was excused as Argentina used the ongoing argument that these were terrorist groups whose goal was to overthrow the government and give rise to communism. The Argentina government desired to prevent as much controversy from surfacing in the media, and the discreet murders could continue without anyone stopping them. 

The United States was aware of the persecution and did not interfere because it benefited democracy. The conversation between Henry Kissinger and Cesar Guzzetti exposes the United States for knowledge of the different operations occurring in Argentina. The two start the discussion about the upcoming World Cup and how Kissinger believes that Argentina will win the World Cup, but if they manage to lose and the Argentinan government can control the crowd, then they have successfully stated that they have resolved the security problem (Dawson 246). The instability of people after a significant sporting event can become reckless, a rebellion of its own that occasionally needs the police or even military to be involved. Kissinger implies that if the Argentinian government has managed to resolve this issue, it will no longer have to fear the magnitude of other rebellions, including socialist and communist revolts. Kissinger is aware of the rebolts and supports their authority enforcement, claiming that the United States could provide financial help (Dawson 247). Kissinger is also aware of the atrocities being committed but still ignores how many lives are being lost because he claims it is best for democracy.

Works Cited 

Dawson, A. (2022). Latin America since Independence: A History with Primary Sources (3rd ed.). Routledge. https://doi-org.remote.baruch.cuny.edu/10.4324/9781003146094

CIA cable, “Responsibility of the Federal Police for Killing the Thirty People Whose Bodies Appeared 20 August 1976,” August 25, 1976. | National Security Archive (gwu.edu)

Che Guevara after his execution on October 9, 1967

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A 1939 Norton 500cc motorcycle races through the rural countryside of South America, snaking its way up the roads and encountering the beauty and the ugly truths that the land has to offer; the odyssey will capitulate a naive 23-year-old medical student to becoming one of the centuries most controversial figures.

Ernesto “Che” Guevera, his iconic portrait by Alberto Korda, is adorned on the shirts of budding rebels to murals on the side of schools is a testament to the lasting legacies of the Marxist revolutionary who helped to overthrow the Batista regime in Cuba. In the midst of the Cold War, the Cuban revolution opened up new possibilities throughout the third world; no longer would countries have to be “vassals” to the United States or other imperialist nations; instead, they could choose to side with the Soviet Union in the hopes of acquiring greater autonomy over their affairs. Not oblivious to the significance of the successful revolt and counter-attack against American back troops in the Bay of Pigs invasion, Che hoped to spread the Communist revolution throughout the world. Creating the Ministry of Exporting Revolution, Guevara traveled to the Congo and Bolivia in the hopes of manufacturing “100 Vietnams” to contest the imperialist core (Woods et al. 210). After failing to recruit more revolutionaries in the Congo, he headed to Bolivia in hopes of better luck under the pseudonym, Adolfo Mena Gonzalez (Anderson 669). However, in less than a year, Che and his comrades would be surrounded by the Bolivian military with no chance of escape. Captured, Che spent his last few hours in a location that would have ignited his journey in the first place, a dilapidated mud-walled schoolhouse left in “a state of poverty that depresses the heart” (Anderson 704).

Declassified CIA documents offer us a glimpse into the final hours of Guevera’s life in La Higuera; his exchange with his captors is charged with stubborn resistance and ideal, or naive, affirmations of the future of Latin America. Although the name is censored in the original document by the CIA director, Richard Helms, the CIA operative assigned was Felix Rodriguez. Rodriguez’s attempt to interrogate Che about the whereabouts of other revolutionaries failed but managed to coax him into a conversion. Discussing a wide array of topics, from former fallen comrades to his failures in the Congo, Che arrives at the topic of Cuba’s economic situation, describing Cuba as the “only self-sufficient country in the socialist world.” In a plan to shift away from Cuba’s reliance on sugar export, the young revolutionaries wanted to diversify and industrialize the country; Che played a vital role in this endeavor as he would helm the title of Minister of Industry until 1964 (Dawson 214). However, the idealism present in Che’s early doctrine to shift away from individualism and cultivate a new consciousness in the Cuban people had failed, and so had economic diversification as the government encountered food shortages in 1962 (Dawson 216). Che retorts that the production of meat would make Cuba self-sufficient; eventually, Cuba will begin to export this product to further help their dire situation.

As Rodriquez and Guevera’s conversation continues, Che is able to pick up that Rodriquez is not Bolivian. Suspecting that Rodriquez is either Puerto Rican or Cuban, Rodriquez responded by affirming that he is, in fact, Cuban and part of the CIA-trained anti-Castro 2506 Brigade, to which Che responds with a simple “ha” (Anderson 706). Perhaps Che recalled all those Castro speeches in which he condemned “gusanos,” pro-American anti-revolutionaries who fled on the eve of the revolution, or he found it painfully ironic. Che was able to repeal the Bay of Pig invaders, only to be snared by one six years later. In these exchanges, Rodriguez’s hatred for the man seemed to dissipate; it is impossible to say if Che’s feelings were mutual. Orders had come from the Bolivian High Command to have Che executed, and orders were orders. Rodriguez asked if Che had any final messages for his family; Che exclaimed, “tell Fidel that he will soon see a triumphant revolution in America.” Whether he believed it or not mattered very little; it was principles that drove Che, and it was principles that he would die with. Rodriquez embraced Che and let destiny take its course.

Among the captured documents from Che in La Higuera were two volumes of his Bolivian Campaign diaries, from which the CIA took extensive notes. A notable aspect of Che’s campaign in Bolivia was the limited amount of resources they began with. Similar to that of the Cuban revolution, they gambled on recruiting more rebels as they made their way into the countryside as per Che’s doctrine of guerilla warfare (Che 212). Many of these original rebels and later recruited rebels were not of Bolivian origins. Two Cubans and one Bolivian accompanied his arrival to the country; eventually, he amassed an army of 40, of which half were Cubans who entered the country via Porto Alegre. A notable figure among these revolutionaries was Juan Pablo Chang Navarro, a Peruvian of Chinese origins, who offered 20 other Peruvians to join the fight; however, he was only able to bring two. In keeping with the ideals of people like Augusto Sandino and Simon Bolivar, Che “internationalized” his band of guerillas (Rostow 3). Being accused of invasion rather than revolution by Lieutenant Colonel Andres Selich, Che, with his principle of Pan-Americanism, claims that he is Argentinian, Cuban, Bolivian, Peruvian, Ecuadorian, etc. To Che, these borders were arbitrary, borders carved out by former colonizers. For the revolutionaries, they were headed toward success; however, the conditions in Bolivia were not suitable for such a violent swing toward upheaval. The government was able to tame the revolution in the 1950s through the nationalization of the tin mines and enacting land reforms. This, coupled with Che’s break from the Bolivian Communists, made the situation volatile and uncertain, eventually leading to his capture.

Mario Terán entered the rooms, stumbling, eager to avenge the death of his friends at the hands of the guerillas. Hesitant, Che’s last words to him and the world were, “Shoot, coward, you are only going to kill a man.” Terán pulls the trigger, remembering his orders to make it seem as if Che died in a firefight. Blood fills his lungs; Che bites down on one of his wrists to prevent himself from crying out. On October 9, 1967, Ernesto “Che” Guevara passed away.

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Documents:

CIA Memorandum, Richard Helms to Dean Rusk et al., “Statements by Ernesto ‘Che’ Guevara Prior to his Execution in Bolivia,” October 13, 1967 (declassified August 26, 2007)

NSC Note, Walt Rostow to President Johnson, [attaching CIA Intelligence Information Cable, subject: “highlights of ‘Che’ Guevara’s Diary”], October 21, 1967 (declassified January 10, 2011)

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Works Cited:

Anderson, Jon Lee. Che Guevara: A Revolutionary Life. Grove Press, 2010.

Dawson, Alexander. Latin America since Independence a History with Primary Sources. Vol. 3, ROUTLEDGE, 2022.

Guevara, Che. “Essence of Guerilla Warfare” In, Problems in Modern Latin American History: Sources and Interpretations, edited by James A. Wood and Anna Rose Alexander, 16-21. 5th ed. Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 2019.  

Wood, James A. and Anna Rose Alexander, editors. Problems in Modern Latin American History: Sources and Interpretations. 5^th ed. Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 2019.