Module 3 Sergio Aguilar

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The National Security Archive at George Washington University, Outlook for the Lopez Portillo Administration Bureau of Intelligence and Research, secret intelligence report.

The report I chose is titled Outlook for the Lopez Portillo Administration Bureau of Intelligence and Research, secret intelligence report which was published by the State Department on January 6th of 1977. In it the State Department assesses the presidency of Portillo’s predecessor Echeverría and what impacts this will have on Portillos presidency and what they should be on the lookout for. This is important because it shows that the United States is very closely watching  what is going on in Latin America, and making sure that everything is under control and going as they want it to go; Meaning the United States is fulfilling the role of the puppet master and all the nations of Latin America are their puppets. It can be argued that this policy of US intervention in Latin America began in 1823, when the Monroe Doctrine was issued and ever since then the United States has maintained some level of interest and interventionism in Latin America. This is clear to see in the assessment written by the State Department because it goes into deep and specific detail onto what Echeverría accomplished and did not accomplish, it then goes on to theorize how this would affect Portillo’s presidency and in turn affect the United States as well. The key takeaway from this report is that during the Echeverría presidency, US and Mexico relations were strained as a result of Echeverría’s actions as a result of this Mexico suffered economically due to the fact that US tourism to Mexico greatly decreased during this time as well as US investment into the country. This is something the US did not approve of and were very wary of; this however would change when Portillo came into presidency because he saw the harm of Echeverría’s actions and saw it as his priority to fix US-Mexico relations which is what he did, the report acknowledges this and is in favor of this. This report is important because it shows us how the United States kept track of what was going on in all these Latin American countries because they wanted to avoid what had happened in a country like Cuba; they don’t want to repeat the same mistake. This can be seen in chapter X of the textbook Problems in Modern Latin American History: Sources and Interpretations when it states, “Fidel Castro (Cuba)—United States Government personnel plotted to kill Castro from 1960 to 1965. American underworld figures and Cubans hostile to Castro were used in these plots and were provided encouragement and material support by the United States” (252). This quote shows us that following the Cuban Revolution and the emergence of Castro, in which the United States failed to stop this from happening; the United States did not want this to repeat itself in the rest of Latin America, and therefore increased their surveillance and enforcement of the rest of Latin America in order to maintain their interests. 

 Wood, James A., and Anna Rose Alexander. “Chapter X The Cold War .” Essay. In Problems in Modern Latin American History: Sources and Interpretations, 5Th ed., 252. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2019.

Che Guevera in Bolivia: Module 3 Assignment by Megan Russo

The United States and Argentine-born Cuban revolutionary Che Guevara had a tense relationship of mistrust. Guevara’s hope was to create a focal point to unite Latin America’s countries through politics in a confrontation against the United States. After a clash in the wilderness at a guerilla camp in Bolivia, Guevara was identified as their leader, and soon Lyndon B. Johnson caught word Guevara was, in fact, alive, and attempting insurgence.

The document I chose is a very historically important one that talks about a historic event-the Bolivian government’s decision to kill Cuban revolutionary Che Guevera. On June 14th, the CIA issued a report which stated events in Bolivia must have been Cuban-inspired. Eventually, Bolivian troops found Che’s camp and he was ordered to be killed. The document titled CIA Memorandum, Richard Helms to Dean Rusk et al., “Capture and Execution of ‘Che’ Guevara,” October 11, 1967 (declassified January 10, 2011) states that Guevara was captured on the ninth of October, 1967, and was questioned, but refused to give information. Two other guerillas from Bolivia were also captured.

The Second Ranger Batallion was given orders from Bolivia Army Headquarters in La Pas to kill Guevara and were carried out two hours later. The US did not want Guevara to be killed because they sought information, but Bolivian leaders feared a trial and more publication of Guevara would garner the sympathy of Latin Americans and people across the world. Bolivia’s leaders were very wary of the man who had managed to “[Start Latin America’s] most successful social revolution in the remote Sierra Maestra mountain range on the southern coast of Cuba, an island with one main city and hundreds of villages” (Dawson, p. 210). Bolivia hoped that the death of Guevara would signal a potential end to revolutions in Latin America, particularly communist, and violent ones. As Castro’s most important diplomat, and someone who had traveled to Russia to hope to forge Cuban and Soviet relationship, Guevara’s death during a time of political tension during the Cold War between Cuba and the United States and the Soviet Union was shocking, especially to his supporters.

https://nsarchive.gwu.edu/document/24603-document-24-cia-memorandum-richard-helms-dean-rusk-et-al-capture-and-execution-che

Wood, James A. and Anna Rose Alexander, editors. Problems in Modern Latin American History: Sources and Interpretations. 5th ed. Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 2019.

The Cold War in Chile: Radios vs. Communism

https://nsarchive.gwu.edu/document/15596-09-armed-forces-statement-closing-radio

Throughout the Cold War, the U.S., as a self-imposed advocate of capitalism, made countless attempts to prevent the spread of socialism and communism in Latin America, using the radio as one of its main instruments. In the Chilean presidential election of 1964, the U.S. government informally endorsed the Chilean Christian Democrat politician, Eduardo Frei, by promoting what Margaret Powers calls the “Scare Campaign,” against Frei’s opponent and the socialist candidate, Salvador Allende. Using radio programs, Frei and the CIA, convinced Chilean voters that if his political opponent was elected, Allende would descend Chile into a communist dictatorship. These radio ads invoked the peasants’ nationalism and encouraged them to save Chile from totalitarianism. Frei told Chilean men that Allende’s Marxism threatened their wives, and their daughters, and as men, they must save them. The radio campaigns heavily targeted women, arguing that a vote for communism was a vote towards the “loss of their children, the destruction of their homes, and the end of motherhood” (Powers 249). Communism threatened women and their livelihood, stripping them of their femininity. The use of the radio and the exploitation of the people’s fears of the loss of their pride, their families, and their identities by Frei and the U.S. government led to Frei’s victory over Allende as the new president of Chile. (247-250).

Although he authorized land reform and bought majority stakes in copper, Frei and his government lost popular support as Chile faced overwhelming debt and inflation. The socialist Salvador Allende returned to the political scene, posing himself as Chile’s savior. Calling for the legal and peaceful means towards a socialist revolution, the full nationalization of copper, appealing to the middle class (Allende 224-228), Allende won the presidential election of 1970, becoming “the first committed socialist to be democratically elected in Latin America” (Dawson 236). As president, Allende continued the nationalization of copper, the redistribution of land, while increasing wages and supporting workers’ efforts to take over factories. Allende’s Chilean right-wing political opponents called for his impeachment as the U.S. enforced a blockade, another common tool to prevent socialism, but their efforts failed, impelling his opponents towards a violent military coup. The U.S. Secretary of State, Henry Kissinger, pushed Chilean General Augusto Pinochet to enact a coup d’état against Allende and his government, overthrowing and killing him on September 11, 1973 (236, 239).

As displayed in the document from the National Security Archive at George Washington University, “Armed Forces Statement on Closing Radio Stations,” by the DIA on September 12, 1973, the military instructed for the complete shutdown of radio and TV stations and “only armed forces network reports will be transmitted.” The military threatened anyone who disobeyed the military’s commands with the “military laws enforced.” The new military government ceased all radio and TV stations to cement their rule over the masses and against the left parties. The removal of free press left people in a state of hysteria, and provided the military government control over information, expanding their rule. As seen by Frei’s and the U.S. Scare Campaign, the radio was a highly effective tool to defeat the spread of communism by spreading misleading information about the dangers of communism, pushing the masses away from socialists such as Allende. However, when socialism did succeed, the U.S. depended on and backed the rise of military governments and their efforts to manipulate radio, impose censorship, and infringe on the people’s right to access information. Ironically, while Frei warned Chileans of a communist dictatorship, Allende’s victory did lead to a totalitarian rule, but of the military.

Dawson, Alexander. Latin America since Independence: A History with Primary Sources. 3rd ed. New York: Routledge, 2022.

Wood, James A. and Anna Rose Alexander, editors. Problems in Modern Latin American History: Sources and Interpretations. 5th ed. Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 2019.