Category: Research project 3: Latin America in the Cold War

Cuba’s transformation into a communist state under Fidel Castro marked a significant escalation in Cold War tensions. The Cold War’s effects on Cuba were profound, fundamentally reshaping the country’s political, economic and social landscape that are still evident today. The memorandum titled, CIA Handling of the Soviet Build-up in Cuba, by Richard Lehman, touches on this subject. Written one month before the Cuban-Missile Crisis, he voiced his concerns about the U.S.’s ‘‘lack of urgency’’ about the possibility of missile deployments. 

A critical component of the Cuban-Missile Crisis was the intelligence gap during U-2 reconnaissance aircraft flights, thus creating what is referenced to as the ‘‘photo gap.’’ This gap delayed the detection of Soviet missile deployments in Cuba, allowing the USSR to make significant progress in establishing a strategic foothold in the Western Hemisphere. Lehman reports, ‘‘The establishment on Cuban soil of Soviet nuclear striking forces which would be used against the U.S. would be incompatible with Soviet policy as we presently estimate it. It would indicate a far greater willingness to increase the level of risk in U.S.-Soviet relations than the USSR has displayed thus far…However, Soviet military planners have almost certainly considered the contribution which Cuban bases might make to the Soviet strategic posture and, in that connection, the feasibility and utility of deploying nuclear delivery systems to Cuba. Therefore, this contingency must be examined carefully, even though it would run counter to current Soviet policy’’ (14). By the time U-2 imagery confirmed the presence of missile sites, the installations were nearly operational, compressing the decision making timeline for the U.S.. This gap not only heightened the crisis, but also revealed the limitations of U.S. intelligence strategies.

The everlasting effects the Cold War left on Latin America as a whole can never be denied. The U.S. viewed Latin America as a critical battleground to prevent the spread of communism. Efforts such as the Law of the Permanent Defense of Democracy in Chile, banned the Communist party, and further pushed back from the spread of the red. On the other hand, the Soviet Union and Cuba supported these communist movements, prolonging conflict. The lasting impacts of this period are evident in weakened democratic institutions, socioeconomic inequality, and a legacy of skepticality towards foreign intervention in Latin America.

The Cold War profoundly shaped Cuba’s political, social and economic landscape, placing it in a key position between the U.S. and Soviet Union. The photo gap caused by restrictions on U-2 flights and the U.S.’s ‘‘lack of urgency’’, as stated by Lehman, showcased the dangers of miscalculations, intelligence failures and underestimations. These events not only defined Cuba’s place in Cold War history, but Latin America as a whole. Cuba’s experience reflects the broader struggles of Latin America during this period of foreign interference, that is still seen today.

Lehman, Richard. “CIA, Richard Lehman to Director of Central Intelligence, ‘CIA Handling of the Soviet Build-up in Cuba, 1 July – 16 October 1962,’ 14 November 1962, Top Secret, Excised Copy, with Cover Memoranda Attached.” National Security Archive, 31 May 2012, nsarchive.gwu.edu/document/15740-document-5-cia-richard-lehman-director. 

The State Department cable highlights several key aspects of the Cold War era, particularly the U.S involvement in Latin America to counteract communist influences. During the Cold War, the United States was deeply concerned about the spread of communism and supported various regimes and military efforts to suppress leftist movements.

It seems like there was quite a stir in the region with reports of bearded armed men spotted by locals during a visit. Even though they weren’t believed to be organized guerrillas, the army was still ordered to investigate by Barrientos. The Estado Mayor and the local commander were skeptical about the reports, but patrols were carried out, only to find a group of smugglers at most.

In this case, General Williams Tope’s assessment of the guerilla situation in Bolivia reflects the broader U.S strategy of providing military aid and training to allied governments. President Barrientos’ concern about the guerrillas being we;;-organized and connected to other countries like Argentina, Venezuela, and Cuba underscores the fear of a regional spread of communism, which was a significant concern for the U.S. during this period. The emphasis on using individuals with counterinsurgency training from the U.S and the support of the Bolivian Army highlights the American strategy of building local capacities to fight insurgencies. This approach aimed to prevent the waste of resources and ensure that U.S assistance was effectively utilized to achieve anti-communist objectives. 

The Memorandum of conversation between Secretary of State Henry Kissinger and Argentine Foreign Minister Admiral Cesar Guzzetti and State Department Cable both highlight the U.S focus on addressing communist insurgencies in Latin America during the Cold War. In the 1967 cable, the U.S State Department is already concerned about guerilla activities in Bolivia, emphasizing the need for effective counterinsurgency measures and the involvement of U.- trained personnel to handle the situation. This document illustrates the early stages of U.S intervention and the challenges faced by local forces in dealing with well-organized guerrilla groups.By 1976, the conversation between Kissinger and Guzzetti reflects a continued and expanded concern about communist influences, not just in Bolivia but across the region. The memorandum likely discusses broader strategies and the necessity of cooperation between the U.S. and Latin American governments to counteract these threats. This includes sharing intelligence, providing military aid, and ensuring that local forces are adequately trained and equipped to handle insurgencies.Both documents underscore the persistent U.S. strategy of supporting Latin American governments in their efforts to combat communist guerrillas, highlighting the ongoing nature of these efforts and the interconnectedness of U.S. foreign policy objectives in the region.

Lyndon Baines Johnson Library: Lyndon B. Johnson Papers: National Security File (hereafter LBJL: LBJP: NSF) : Country File: Latin America, b. 8, f.: “Bolivia v. 4 (1/66-12/68).

By: Christian Figueroa

Link to National Security Archive: https://nsarchive.gwu.edu/document/32169-document-12-us-senate-subcommittee-international-operations-foreign-relations.

The Latin American Gestapo Is what I describe DINA (Dirección de Inteligencia Nacional) of Chile as well as other countries conducting their Operation Condor. These tactics were inherently familiar to tactics in which the Nazi gestapo used during World War II. in the report it demonstrates how Dina operated Within crossword as well as multinational level of 1984 surveillance of suspected terrorists and distance against the Pinochet as in military governments of Latin America. as well as Dina has some Direct relationship with former Nazi Affiliated figures. in which the evidence according to the report in which Nazi former members have colluded or participated in the Chilean dictatorship on exerting repression.

The reasons in which this was significant to Dina as well as the dictatorship of Chile was in an agreement with most South American countries who are colluded to conduct “Operation Condor” to conduct anti-communist repression within these countries and on the behalf of the United States and themselfs especially with the secretary of state Henry Kissinger to turn a blind eye to this state gestapo operation.

With Operation Condor many Latin American countries had International and interconnected networks established under the operation of each other’s intelligence agencies were ordered to find located assassins and make disappear High political and anti-government especially co Report on Activities of Certain Intelligence Agencies in the United Statesmmunist figures. The report remarks and highlights this “the exchange of intelligence and operational coordination allowed participating governments to achieve unprecedented reach and effectiveness in targeting opposition figures,” (Staff report” Top Secret/Sensitive, January 18, 1979) Which means it made it easier for Government intelligence agencies all have their own interconnected web of gestapo’s to the even International level as the report highlights they had several bases in “France and Madrid”. But focusing on DINA the amount of human rights violations in which the US turned a blind eye can also be highlighted for the fact that they are making this reports. However, it’s keeps in tops secrets and some of the reports black as to keep identity of people secrets still. This report was released as recent as the Obama administration. This imply that US didn’t want the public to hear or know about these incidents which suspicious because one fact the report is make light is former Nazi colonies in which DINA and Chilean government used for torture and repressing dissidence.

Nazi colonies or what is report on is “Certain colonies, such as Colonia Dignidad, acted as self-contained units of repressive support” (Staff report” Top Secret/Sensitive, January 18, 1979) this Nazi connection show far DINA and Chilean government to go into repressing dissidence to the point in which used former high ranking Nazi colonies which the report states “DINA has maintained a detention center· inside the Colony, and there are allegations that torture has taken place there. Allegations also have been made that German personnel, who are described as ex~Gestapo or ex-SS officers.” (Staff report” Top Secret/Sensitive, January 18, 1979) This highlights how far DINA and Chilean government are willing to go to repressing dissidence and to become the Latin American equivalent to the Gestapo and the seek support from the former Nazi themselves. This is important as by the end of the reports its talked about how DINA become more harmful then good to US. This by the end US see it as more to keep underground Nazi exile in work. However, DINA view necessary to to keeping these operations going and the US government turned eye as in the report many part crucial parts of the report talking about nazi redacted in blacked out.

What I view this as how extreme governments will take to prevent one sort of ideology from growing. The will resort to put measures the inhumane and even use inhumane methods in history to maintain control. This report shows how far DINA is willing to go to repressing. And because of this they will even use former Nazi oppressors to repress.

U.S. Senate, Subcommittee on International Operations, Foreign Relations Committee. Staff Report on Activities of Certain Intelligence Agencies in the United States. Top Secret/Sensitive, January 18, 1979.

https://nsarchive.gwu.edu/document/30302-document-16-white-house-kissinger-memorandum-president-subject-nsc-meeting-november

The documents above titled, White House, Kissinger, Memorandum for the President, “Subject: NSC Meeting, November 6-Chile,” SECRET, November 5, 1970, details the rise to power of Chiles leftist President Salvador Allende in 1970 and his goals. Salvador Allende is coming into power at a time when the US is heavily involved in the Vietnam War and Cuba’s crackdown on political dissidents and ideology is at an all time high. Issued on November 5, 1970 to the President, Henry Kissinger stresses that “what happens in Chile over the next six to twelve months will have ramifications that will go far beyond just US-Chilean relations” (1970, p.1). The following 7 pages details what is happening, how the US could respond and what those actions might produce. The United States is attempting to maintain its control and influence over the hemisphere, however, Latin American nations are attempting to nationalize industries working against capitalist means of economic development. According to the memorandum from the National Security Archive, Allende is said to “purposely seek: to establish a socialist, Marxist state in Chile; to eliminate US influence from Chile and the hemisphere; to establish close relations and linkages with the USSR, Cuba and other Socialist countries”(1970, p.1). 

Three years after the memorandum is issued, Salvador Allende is overthrown by a coup led by Augusto Pinochet. This coup would destabilize the Southern portion of the hemisphere. Six years after the first memorandum announcing Allendes victory is issued and three tears after the coup, “Memorandum of Conversation between Secretary of State Henry Kissinger and Argentine Foreign Minister Admiral Cesar Guzzetti, Secret, 10 June 1976” takes place. This conversation between Henry Kissinger and Cesar Guzzeti of Argentina highlights the issues created at the fall of the Allende term. A new government focused on privatizing industries and services for the open market prosecuted members and sympathizers of the previous administration. Ultimately this causes a immigration crisis for Argentina who has also experienced a coup of their own. Overthrowing the Peron administration just months prior, the nation was riddled with insurgency, terrorism was their highest concern. Leftist fleeing the fall of the Chilean government under Allende found refuge in Argentina under Peron, the coup in Argentina changed that. Leftist asylum seekers from Chile but also from other countries became entangled with terrorist organizations and guerillas groups. According to the Argentine Foreign minister, “internal subversion is linked up to other countries […] the problem is soluble so long as domestic conditions hold” (1976, p.248). In the memorandum of November 5,1970, Kissinger emphasized that “the dangers of doing nothing are greater than the risks we run in trying to do something” (1970, p.7). However, the option to do something worked against their own interest. Argentina and surrounding countries felt the ripples of the US intervention, and state of affairs of other nations is at risk without further intervention.  

Works Cited

1. Memorandum of Conversation between Secretary of State Henry Kissinger and Argentine Foreign Minister Admiral Cesar Guzzetti, Secret, 10 June 1976,” in Latin America since Independence: A History with Primary Sources, 3rd ed.,ed. Alexander Dawson, (Routledge, 2022), p. #245-447
2. “White House, Kissinger, Memorandum for the President, ‘Subject: NSC Meeting, November 6-Chile,’ Secret, November 5, 1970.” National Security Archive, nsarchive.gwu.edu/document/30302-document-16-white-house-kissinger-memorandum-president-subject-nsc-meeting-november. 

Link to National Security Archive: https://nsarchive.gwu.edu/document/29165-oct-16-first-cia-memo-soviet-missiles-cuba-1962

On October 16, 1962 reports have came in detailing recent photographic evidence of Soviet missiles being detected on the island of Cuba from the CIA to the White House. Over on these reports details exact sites of the missile location and trailer information detailing that these are ballistic missles, either SS-3s or SS-4s that have range capabilities that could reach Washington D.C. (CIA, 1962, p.140-141). This was the start of the Cuban Missle Crisis and tension rose greatly for the Unites States as the threat of both nuclear and communism was near it’s doorstep. This can all be traced back to when the Cuban revolution happened back in 1953 all the way to 1959. Led by Fidel Castro, he led the revolution in Cuba and forced Fulgencio Batista out of power to end his dictatorship in the island. While Cuba was free of Batista rule, Castro was in power and turn Cuba into a communist state led by the authoritarian government of Castro. With the development of communism in Cuba, the US feared that the spread of communism would enter the United States. This “Red Scare” would develop even more throughout the “Cold War” and would intiate the failed invasion by the US called the Bay of Pigs Invasion. This attempt by the CIA and their group of Cuban exiles would try to overthrow Castro’s regime and get rid of communism in Cuba. However, this invasion would lead into a complete disaster and would cause the opposite effect the US would hope for. Rather than weakening Castro’s reign the failure of this invasion would only solidify his power in Cuba and cause him to be popular among his people. This would also lead into relations between Cuba and the USSR to increase which would then lead into what we see in these documents the Cuban Missile Crisis. As we read into the document, reports from the CIA state that the missiles being delievered into Cuba was their way of detering any US intervention to weaken or overthrow Castro’s regime just like they try to during the Bay of Pigs invasion (CIA, 1962, p.141-142). This act made by the Soviets and Cuba was a growing sign of communism being spread towards the West and the detering relationship the US had with their Latin American neighbor Cuba.

Citations:

CIA. (1962). CIA Memorandum. “Probable Soviet MRBM Sites in Cuba.” 16 October, 1962

https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB416/docs/800407dos.pdf

Starting in 1945, the Cold War occurred post-World War II with conflicts between the Soviet Union and the United States. The Cold War began in 1945 with confrontations between the Soviet Union and the United States. These conflicts involved military, political, and ideological rivalry, impacting countries globally, specifically Latin America. Many Latin American countries experienced harsh authoritarian bureaucracies and military technocracies to prevent the spread of leftist ideologies. More specifically, in Argentina, there was a lot of political turmoil between the leftist and right-wing beliefs. During the 1970’s, Operation Condor came into effect, a campaign coordinated by military dictatorships to suppress leftist believers. The military dictatorship in Argentina enacted the Dirty War as they believed that the city was the issue as the “enemy is within.” Ultimately, politics were the real threats to society and committed crimes and brutal interrogation tactics such as abductions, torture, and disappearances.

The source above is called “Conversation with Argentine Intelligence Source.” A regional security officer spoke with a member of Argentine intelligence as they discussed the disappearance of two montoneros between Mexico and Rio de Janeiro. A separate montonero was captured and interrogated, as they revealed that they would meet Horacio Campiglia and Susana Binstok. Other montoneros were captured and interrogated on their plans to prevent threats and chaos. The Argentine intelligence went to great lengths to cover up their operations with false trials and manipulation tactics. It further reveals how the country’s authoritative figures went to all lengths to target Montero guerrillas. Ultimately, the Cold War is shaping Argentine internal actions as their military dictatorship wants to eliminate any threats through state violence, operations, and more to detect suspected leftists.

This relates to a conversation between the secretary of state, Henry Kissinger, and Argentine foreign minister, Admiral Cesar Guzzetti, in 1976. They spoke about Argentina being in a difficult period of political terrorist activities. These activities are causing issues over controlling the people and maintaining order. Kissinger also offered to help Argentina by involving other powerful people to stabilize the country. Some destabilization stems from foreigners or asylum seekers from different countries. This means that as people seek refuge, it also means bringing threats and terrorists. The cause of this oftentimes is anti-imperialist perspectives and other perspectives that go against Western ideals. A solution is carried out as well; to end terrorism and strengthen the country as a whole, everyone must understand the causes of issues that occur within society. 

Additionally, because of the terrorist threats and suspicions amongst the public, Argentinians were kidnapped from the street or even their homes. These people went through brutal torture methods by the military and were oftentimes killed or didn’t live to tell the stories of what they endured. However, some survivors have come forward to recount in testimonies the atrocities they went through and expose the violation of human rights and abuse that occurred. In an account by a survivor, they claimed that they were beaten down, electrocuted, burned, tied up, and so much worse. These torture methods were meant to intimidate and force answers out of people by embedding fear, as these horror stories show the aggressiveness of the military. It’s very dehumanizing to break someone down mentally and physically as the militia has.

The archive and the history of the Cold War in Argentina illustrates how the geopolitical fears intersected with the political crisis that was occurring in Argentina. This brought on brutal campaigns through military dictatorships that abused human rights to get rid of anyone who was seen or perceived to be a national threat. The conversation between Kissinger and Guzzetti reflects the United States’ support for the Argentine dictatorship, even if it means instilling fear and terror in society. The testimonies themselves show the extremes of the Cold War era in Latin America in just one region alone, as domestic fears were weaponized to justify such cruelty in Argentina.

Citation

Department of State, SECRET, “Conversation with Argentine Intelligence Source,” Buenos Aires, memorandum, April 7, 1980, Operation Condor on Trial: Legal Proceedings on Latin American Rendition and Assassination Program Open in Buenos Aires, (Washington, D.C.: The National Security Archive and Chadwyck-HeaIey, 1990), National Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book No. 416, posted March 8, 2013.

Memorandum of Conversation between Secretary of State Henry Kissinger and Argentine Foreign Minister Admiral Cesar Guzzetti, Secret, 10 June 1976,” in Latin America since Independence: A History with Primary Sources, 3rd ed.,ed. Alexander Dawson, (Routledge, 2022), p. 247-249

National Commission on the Disappearance of Persons, “Never Again,” in The Argentina Reader: History, Culture, Politics, ed. Gabriella Nouzeilles and Graciela Montaldo, (Duke University Press, 2002), p. 442-444