History 3072: History of Modern Latin America, Fall 2024

https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB416/docs/800407dos.pdf

Starting in 1945, the Cold War occurred post-World War II with conflicts between the Soviet Union and the United States. The Cold War began in 1945 with confrontations between the Soviet Union and the United States. These conflicts involved military, political, and ideological rivalry, impacting countries globally, specifically Latin America. Many Latin American countries experienced harsh authoritarian bureaucracies and military technocracies to prevent the spread of leftist ideologies. More specifically, in Argentina, there was a lot of political turmoil between the leftist and right-wing beliefs. During the 1970’s, Operation Condor came into effect, a campaign coordinated by military dictatorships to suppress leftist believers. The military dictatorship in Argentina enacted the Dirty War as they believed that the city was the issue as the “enemy is within.” Ultimately, politics were the real threats to society and committed crimes and brutal interrogation tactics such as abductions, torture, and disappearances.

The source above is called “Conversation with Argentine Intelligence Source.” A regional security officer spoke with a member of Argentine intelligence as they discussed the disappearance of two montoneros between Mexico and Rio de Janeiro. A separate montonero was captured and interrogated, as they revealed that they would meet Horacio Campiglia and Susana Binstok. Other montoneros were captured and interrogated on their plans to prevent threats and chaos. The Argentine intelligence went to great lengths to cover up their operations with false trials and manipulation tactics. It further reveals how the country’s authoritative figures went to all lengths to target Montero guerrillas. Ultimately, the Cold War is shaping Argentine internal actions as their military dictatorship wants to eliminate any threats through state violence, operations, and more to detect suspected leftists.

This relates to a conversation between the secretary of state, Henry Kissinger, and Argentine foreign minister, Admiral Cesar Guzzetti, in 1976. They spoke about Argentina being in a difficult period of political terrorist activities. These activities are causing issues over controlling the people and maintaining order. Kissinger also offered to help Argentina by involving other powerful people to stabilize the country. Some destabilization stems from foreigners or asylum seekers from different countries. This means that as people seek refuge, it also means bringing threats and terrorists. The cause of this oftentimes is anti-imperialist perspectives and other perspectives that go against Western ideals. A solution is carried out as well; to end terrorism and strengthen the country as a whole, everyone must understand the causes of issues that occur within society. 

Additionally, because of the terrorist threats and suspicions amongst the public, Argentinians were kidnapped from the street or even their homes. These people went through brutal torture methods by the military and were oftentimes killed or didn’t live to tell the stories of what they endured. However, some survivors have come forward to recount in testimonies the atrocities they went through and expose the violation of human rights and abuse that occurred. In an account by a survivor, they claimed that they were beaten down, electrocuted, burned, tied up, and so much worse. These torture methods were meant to intimidate and force answers out of people by embedding fear, as these horror stories show the aggressiveness of the military. It’s very dehumanizing to break someone down mentally and physically as the militia has.

The archive and the history of the Cold War in Argentina illustrates how the geopolitical fears intersected with the political crisis that was occurring in Argentina. This brought on brutal campaigns through military dictatorships that abused human rights to get rid of anyone who was seen or perceived to be a national threat. The conversation between Kissinger and Guzzetti reflects the United States’ support for the Argentine dictatorship, even if it means instilling fear and terror in society. The testimonies themselves show the extremes of the Cold War era in Latin America in just one region alone, as domestic fears were weaponized to justify such cruelty in Argentina.

Citation

Department of State, SECRET, “Conversation with Argentine Intelligence Source,” Buenos Aires, memorandum, April 7, 1980, Operation Condor on Trial: Legal Proceedings on Latin American Rendition and Assassination Program Open in Buenos Aires, (Washington, D.C.: The National Security Archive and Chadwyck-HeaIey, 1990), National Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book No. 416, posted March 8, 2013.

Memorandum of Conversation between Secretary of State Henry Kissinger and Argentine Foreign Minister Admiral Cesar Guzzetti, Secret, 10 June 1976,” in Latin America since Independence: A History with Primary Sources, 3rd ed.,ed. Alexander Dawson, (Routledge, 2022), p. 247-249

National Commission on the Disappearance of Persons, “Never Again,” in The Argentina Reader: History, Culture, Politics, ed. Gabriella Nouzeilles and Graciela Montaldo, (Duke University Press, 2002), p. 442-444

https://nsarchive.gwu.edu/document/27400-document-1-state-department-memorandum-decline-and-fall-castro-secret-april-6-1960

Christopher Vargas
In the document I chose to analyze it mentions about Cuba and the influence that communism had in Castro who was dictator of Cuba during a period of time during the Cold War. During his time in charge Raul Castro who was Chief pf Cuba’s Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias he took charge of Cuba in 1959 and was someone who was seen as a military leader. The United States viewed Castro’s ideology as a threat because at the time of the Cold War the U.S and the Soviet Union and thought that if Cuba and The soviet Union were working together it would influence other countries to join and eventually the Soviet Union would grow stronger through making deals with Latin American Countries.
There was a concern of the U.S government that communism would spread to other countries and seen as communism was viewed as the natural enemy of what the U.S stood for Democracy they didn’t want Cuba to Develop a Communist type of government. In the Document it mentions of how they hope that Castro would fail to bring Cuba to Economic prosperity. If Castro were to succeed in helping Cuba stabilizing its economy the first thing, they can do is hope to prevent Cuba from obtaining funds and supplies and to make the value of their money to decrease and wages to drop so that the people of Cuba would grow frustrated and angry with the way things are and overthrow Fidel Castro. In the document we see that there is mention of the support that Castro has from the Cubans.
At the time Cuba, from what we learn in class, people saw Cuba for its tourism and the people of Cuba didn’t want to be associated with anything that Castro viewed things as bad to Cuba’s national pride like Gays, gambling, white tourism, and prostitution. Like in Lillian Guerra ‘s work we learn that in Cuba Homosexuality was something that was bad and that they even made labor camp for those who were thought to be gays. “Unidades Militares de Ayuda a la Produccion (UMAP) and located in the isolated sugar lands of Camaguey province, these camps imprisoned thousands of self-acknowledge, closeted and presumed homosexuals for up to three years without charge.” The government believe that Homosexuality went against what the Cuban people should desire to be and do which is helping in the labor force to help Cuba’s economy to prosper. They believe that the young people should be their targeted audience since the young would be able to work better than any other age group. Lillian Guera also states “I argue that Cubans Officials efforts to re-engineer social attitudes in the late 1960s had less to do with the past cultural traditions or external factors and more to do with deliberate political strategies these same officials devised to solve the economic conditions of the moment and further consolidate their power.”

State Department, Memorandum, “The Decline and Fall of Castro,” Secret, April 6, 1960: the National Security Archive record group 59: general records of the department of state 1960-63 Central Decimal file: 737.00/4-660
Lillian Guerra, “Gender Policing, Homosexuality, and the New Patriarchy of the Cuban Revolution, 1965-70,” Social History 35, no. 3 (August, 2010), p.268.
Lillian Guerra, “Gender Policing, Homosexuality, and the New Patriarchy of the Cuban Revolution, 1965-70,” Social History 35, no. 3 (August, 2010), p.271.

Link to National Security Archive: https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB355/bop-vol4.pdf and https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB355/bop-vol2-part1.pdf

Link to the document within the National Security Archive: https://nsarchive.gwu.edu/document/16597-document-09-excerpt-oliver-north

After World War II, U.S. foreign policy was heavily shaped by the Cold War struggle against the Soviet Union and the spread of Communism. The U.S. viewed many Latin American countries as key battlegrounds in the ideological war against Communism. This led to intervention by the U.S. in the region, often supporting authoritarian regimes, military dictatorships, and rebel groups that aligned with U.S. interests, even when they were not democratic. The Contras were one of these rebel groups, that had been backed by U.S. support in Nicaragua fighting against the Sandinista government. The Sandinistas, who came to power in 1979 after overthrowing the Somoza dictatorship, were seen by the U.S. as being sympathetic to socialist and communist movements, and thus a threat in the Cold War context. The Reagan administration, under the banner of containing communism, sought to overthrow the Sandinistas and supported the Contras with covert military and financial assistance. However, this support was controversial, especially after Congress passed the 1984 Boland Amendment in response to reports of human rights violations and the Contras’ violent tactics. The Boland Amendment made U.S. aid to the Contras illegal since much of the funds were tied to a secret arms sale with Iran, a country that had already been designated by the U.S. as a state sponsor of terrorism. Nevertheless, illegal efforts by members of the Reagan Administration to bypass the restriction had occurred which led into the scandal known as the Iran-Contra Affair. One person in particular who was part of this scandal and eventually convicted for aiding the obstruction of Congress was Oliver North, a former member of the National Security Council under the Reagan Administration.

In the testimony of Oliver North, it reveals how U.S. officials, including those within the Reagan Administration, viewed the Nicaraguan Contras as essential in their broader strategy on containing Communism in Latin America. On Page 135, North states, “There were two sources of moneys for that operational account. One was traveler’s checks from Adolfo Calero and the other one was cash eventually from General Secord. My recollection is that the very first traveler’s checks came either very late ’84 or certainly early 1985 and that the sum total of traveler’s checks was probably in excess of $100,000 or there-abouts.”¹ North had relied on a operational account since it was one method of being able to finance these rebels especially since the money is coming from illegal arm sales with Iran. North and other U.S. officials knew that they would not get funds from Congress, especially after the Boland Amendment had passed which made the overthrowing of the Nicaraguan government by federal agencies and entities in the United States illegal. It is through this allocation of funds that shows how essential the Contras were in the plans of the U.S., since the purpose behind the checks were to finance these Latin American movements. As North continues at the bottom of the same page, “Money was mailed from this [operational] account to addresses in Caracas, San Jose, Tegucigalpa, and San Salvador, among other places, to support activities inside Managua. The Indian movement, the Atlantic Coast Indian movement was supported from this account and meetings with the Atlantic Coast Indians, both the Misurasata and the Miskito movement itself, were supported from this account.”² A little earlier within the same page in North’s testimony, he states, “The fact that I had those funds available was known to Mr. McFarlane, to Admiral Poindexter, to Director Casey, and eventually to Admiral Art Moreau over at the Pentagon. It was also-came to be known to others, some of whom you have had testify here.”³ Oliver North’s testimony underscored the willingness of many U.S. officials to bypass democratic processes and legal restrictions to achieve Cold War objectives. It also shows how North’s involvement in funding the Contras through arms sales to Iran as part of U.S. Cold War strategy was often, and at times contradictory to its own values such as democracy, by making alliances like the Contras to counter perceived Communist threats like the Sandinistas who were democratically elected to run the government in 1984.

1. Oliver L. North, Testimony of Oliver L. North (Joint Hearings before the Senate Select Committee on Secret Military Assistance to Iran and the Nicaraguan Opposition and the House Select Committee to Investigate Covert Arms Transactions with Iran, 100th Congress, First Session July 7-10, 1987), 100-7, part 1, 1987, p. 135. ↩︎
2. Ibid, 135. ↩︎
3. Ibid, 135. ↩︎

Link to National Security Archive: https://nsarchive.gwu.edu/document/18433-national-security-archive-doc-17-cia-cable

The CIA cable titled “Argentina: Interrogation and Killing of at least Nine Subversives” and the firsthand accounts in Never Again uncover the violent and strategic methods used by the Argentine regime under Jorge Rafael Videla. These documents reveal how the dictatorship systematically used violence, specifically targeting opposition groups like the Montoneros. The CIA cable illustrates how Argentine security forces operated with chilling efficiency, capturing, interrogating, and killing suspected political opponents in a calculated manner. High-ranking Montoneros like Raul Yager were not only tortured for information but later, deaths were staged as though they were accidents and not related to the detentions of people. By staging these deaths, the regime aimed to create a public illusion of legitimacy and control while concealing the extrajudicial nature of its actions.

The cable also sheds light on how military and police forces coordinated to carry out these state-sanctioned killings. In the CIA cable, the actions of the Argentine security forces are described in a detached, official way. For example, when a document says security forces would “arrange for them to die,” it’s using formal language to describe state-sanctioned executions. This type of language makes the violent acts seem routine and masks their brutality, giving the impression that these killings were just ordinary procedures within government operations. Torture was a key part of the regime’s strategy to eliminate dissent and instill terror. When prisoners under torture revealed information about others, this led to further arrests, creating a cycle of violence that dismantled opposition networks.

While the CIA document presents a detached and organized view of these repressive tactics, Retamozzo’s testimony in Never Again brings out the raw suffering endured by the detainees. He describes specific torture methods like “electrodes on the teeth” and the physical reaction of “retching and vomiting” (Nouzeilles & Montaldo, 442), showing how the regime experimented with new ways to break down detainees both physically and mentally. Prisoners were stripped of identity and reduced to numbers, as Retamozzo recounts, I “… was number 11”  (Nouzeilles & Montaldo, 443). This form of dehumanization erased any sense of self, possibly as a tactic by the regime to prevent escapees from identifying others, ensuring that survivors couldn’t share the names of fellow detainees with the outside world and further concealing the extent of the repression.

Beyond physical torture, psychological manipulation was a relentless tool. Guards forced Retamozzo to walk up and down stairs as a disorienting tactic, after which interrogators tried to make him question his memories, even suggesting that the pain he endured was less severe than he recalled. The regime’s tactic of instilling self-doubt was designed to make prisoners question their own experiences, isolating them and making it even harder to share their trauma. Although Retamozzo eventually shared his story, these psychological tactics were designed to confuse prisoners and discourage many from talking about what they endured. These forms of psychological manipulation aimed to further break the detainees on every level, ensuring any sense of opposition was thoroughly subdued.

The CIA cable shows that the U.S. was aware of these abuses, but its response was initially muted. Due to Cold War alliances, the U.S. maintained diplomatic ties with Argentina’s military regime in the early years, prioritizing anti-communist objectives over human rights concerns. It wasn’t until the late 1970s under the Carter administration that the U.S. began to take a more critical stance, reducing military aid as reports of human rights violations mounted. However, this shift was seen as slow and limited, underscoring how international silence or hesitancy enables authoritarian regimes to continue their repression unchecked.

Work Cited:

CIA, Directorate of Operations, “Argentina: Interrogation and Killing of at least Nine Subversives,” Secret/Exclusive for, Intelligence Information Cable IN 83 1260378, May 21, 1983, The National Security Archive, Argentina Declassification Project, (Washington, D.C.: The National Security Archive, George Washington University, Digital National Security Archive, 2018), accession number C06698600.

National Commission of the Disappearance of Persons, “Never Again,” in The Argentina Reader: History, Culture, Politics, ed. Gabriela Nouzeilles and Graciela Montaldo (Duke University Press, 2002), 440-47.