At the turn of the 21st century, The Gulf Cooperation Council began looking into nuclear power as its primary consumption of energy, attempting to diversify its power source from the region’s traditional reliance on domestically produced fossil fuels. Throughout the 2000s, both the UAE & Saudi Arabia have also taken subtle measures that, some may argue, serve as a countervailing effort against Iran’s contentious nuclear program under the guise of the peaceful acquisition of nuclear energy technology. So far, within the GCC, the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and Saudi Arabia have the most advanced nuclear power production plans; Abu Dhabi began construction of its first nuclear reactor, Barakah-1, in July 2012, and it is planned to follow this with three further reactors. Should Saudi Arabia’s plans be realized, the Kingdom could become the Middle East’s largest nuclear power producer over the next 20 years. Current plans involve the construction of 16 nuclear power plants, which would supply one-sixth of the Kingdom’s anticipated electricity needs by 2032.
Given that rapidly rising levels of domestic energy consumption have already made the GCC a regional energy consumer which rivals the combined energy demand of Latin American countries, this endeavor also holds significant potential for nuclear energy to become deeply entangled in the region’s existing geopolitical context. The significance of the GCC’s nuclear plans extends to the region’s wider regional relationships, including those with nearby Iran, whose nuclear program has been a source of tension between Tehran and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) for decades. After Iran, the UAE and Saudi Arabia will possibly be the Middle East’s only power producers, and the first Arab countries with access to nuclear technology. Although the GCC states have emphasized their exclusively civilian interest in nuclear power, the option to develop a nuclear weapons program once the technology is in the country is, of course, a possibility that can never be fully discounted. The acquisition of this technology would elicit calls from international leaders to have GCC states adopt additional protocols within existing nuclear proliferation treaties. GCC efforts to develop local uranium enrichment or plutonium reprocessing facilities could threaten multilateral cooperation with other actors within the region.
If the GCC continues in the pace of domestic nuclear production, member states would also be tempted to rely even more intensively on US protection from Iran, which could be considered a double-edged sword. Moreover, Saudi Arabia and the UAE have recently embraced closer defense ties with Russia, which would allow the GCC to balance strategic alliances in the act of confronting Iran with imminent diplomatic entreaties. Furthermore, the European Union (EU) also has vested interests in the Gulf region, remaining particularly dependent on the safe and steady access to relatively cheap energy supplies. On the other hand, Gulf countries are primarily interested in getting access to EU technology and manufactures. Moreover, they are increasingly interested in investing in diverse economic sectors within the EU.
More importantly, the EU is concerned with the rise in nuclear energy production principally due to geographical proximity and the possible consequences in terms of environmental and soft security issues. Though a risk of direct attack towards the EU is not likely, these concerns stem from the probable consequences of eventual nuclear attacks in the Middle East such as an increasing influx of migrants, the risk of energy supply disruptions, the harm to EU economic interests within the region, and the imaginable environmental consequences of a nuclear attack. As a result, the concern over the nuclear race in the region remains at the top of GCC & EU diplomatic agendas.
Sources:
https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/172379/Gulf_Nuclear_4008.pdf0.pdf
El-Katiri, Laura. “The GCC and the nuclear question.” Oxford Energy Comment (2012).
Perkovich, George. “Nuclear developments in the GCC: risks and trends.” the Gulf Research Center’s Gulf Yearbook 2008 (2007).
Tim,
This is an interesting angle on the current push for nuclear technology in the Middle East region. I actually had not focused on the views and actions of the GCC states, other than Saudi Arabia. So you filled in some pieces of the puzzle in your post. Barring some extreme change in regimes in places like the UAE or Bahrain, it seems highly unlikely that any of these states would actively seek to acquire nuclear weapons and any civilian nuclear technology that is sold to them will be under strict safeguards and IAEA inspection protocols.
–Professor Wallerstein