Author: RONALD PASHEN

On November 17th, President-elect Joe Biden announced that former Secretary of State John Kerry will join his administration as Climate Change Envoy, or “climate czar.” Former Secretary Kerry has advocated for government action to address climate change – at both the state and federal level – for decades. Nor is Kerry a stranger to tackling diplomatic tasks relating to climate change; after all, it was his job to lock down commitments to reverse the trend towards a runaway climate reaction from nearly two hundred countries at the Paris Climate Change Conference in 2015.

The United States has its work cut out vis a vis re-gaining international trust in its climate commitments. The Trump Administration has done much to erode this trust through actions it has taken that even go beyond its decision to unilaterally withdraw from the agreement in August 2017. A slew of deregulation initiatives and executive orders have scaled back many climate-friendly Obama-era precedents and regulations.

Former Secretary Kerry’s appointment has been hailed universally as a positive step in the right direction and a strong indicator of intent. The fact that the climate czar will have a seat at the National Security Council gives the issue of climate change the largest degree of deference it has ever enjoyed in the United States government. However, Kerry’s diplomatic overtures can only do so much. It should be noted that the effect that the new climate czar position may have are stringent on the incoming administration’s ability to introduce climate-friendly domestic policies.

The definition of Cyberterrorism is not limited to the use of the internet to commit violent acts of terrorism. It also includes the use of the internet to communicate with other terrorist elements and recruit new members. The Islamic State of Iraq and Syria created the modern-day template of how to augment a terrorist apparatus using social media. ISIS was not the first terrorist organization to use social media to recruit; Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) had used social media in this vein for over a decade. However, the proof of ISIS’ effectiveness is shown in the estimated 40,000 volunteers which joined their ranks since 2014.

Another way in which ISIS saw success in its online recruitment was its concerted effort to target groups most susceptible to radicalization. As a result, ISIS specifically targeted male Muslim twenty-somethings. Aside from media showing combat and executions, ISIS Twitter accounts as well as its digital magazines included content suggesting that potential recruits would also find comradeship and a place where they would fit in. The terrorist organization distributed this content in multiple versions in languages to reach out to a truly global audience In addition, ISIS was able to embark on these marketing and recruitment initiatives for little to no cost.

One of the scariest potential fallouts of a nuclear-armed Iran is the ultimatum it would issue to Iran’s geopolitical rival Saudi Arabia. It ostensibly leads to a Saudi Arabia which would see no other alternative than to acquire the bomb themselves. There is reason to believe that the refractory period between a hypothetical first Iranian nuclear test and a successful test for their Saudi counterparts may be shorter than commonly believed.

Perhaps the closest case-study which most resembles the nuclear proliferation issue between Saudi Arabia and Iran is the situation that arose between geopolitical foes Pakistan and India. India successfully tested its first nuclear test – codenamed “Smiling Buddha” – in May 1974. The test coincided with talks with the Pakistanis aimed at normalizing the relations between the two countries. The nuclear revelations quickly led to Pakistan withdrawing from the talks and resolving to commit to a nuclear program of its own. However, it took Pakistan twenty-four years to get its hands on the bomb.

Saudi Arabia and Pakistan have always enjoyed a close relationship, with some policy analysts going as far as characterizing it as a “special relationship.” It has been reported that Saudi Arabia even played the role of a financial backer in Pakistan’s nuclear program. There are legitimate fears that Pakistan may export a nuclear device to the Saudis in the event that Iran gets the bomb. MBS made several state visits to Pakistan immediately following the ratification of the JCPOA agreement which drew the ire of the Saudis. In addition, an unspecified military cooperation agreement was signed between the two countries in early 2016.

Aside from the obvious allure that nuclear weapons possess to dictators such as Saddam Hussein and the Kim dynasty in North Korea, they can serve as a mandate and a bargaining chip. In the case of Saddam Hussein in Iraq, even the slightest notion that a re-start of the Iraqi nuclear weapons program played into the strongman image that he cultivated throughout his time in power. It was so important that he continued to leave the question unanswered as the United States and its allies threatened invasion in the leadup to the Iraq War for non-compliance with international observers. By refusing to provide the proof that would save Iraq from invasion, he continued to act as if he had something to hide and feed into his strongman persona.

Similarly, it is not entirely the possession of nuclear weapons outright that drives the Kim dynasty to continue to foster a nuclear program. Having nuclear weapons gives North Korea a better negotiating position with the international community. Claiming to scale back (but not completely dismantle) its nuclear program can be exchanged for sorely-needed sanctions relief.

President Donald Trump has taken a “personalized” approach to North Korea and its leader Kim Jong-un. His emphasis on establishing a personal, businessman-esque relationship with the North Korean leadership parallels his policy towards a number of other strongmen around the world such as MBS, Vladimir Putin, and Recep Tayyip Erdogan. Presidential administrations of yore have distanced themselves from such behavior as so to avoid legitimizing one of the most brutally repressive regimes on the planet.

A critical pitfall of this approach is the appearance that the United States is treating North Korea as an equal negotiating partner. All the administration has received in return for its efforts are empty promises that North Korea will put the breaks on its nuclear program. Meanwhile, the Trump Administration has labeled these moving-framworks-to-a-potential-deal-in-concept as major foreign policy achievements. In exchange, the United States has alienated key regional ally South Korea by canceling joint military exercises and insisting that South Korea “pay up” for the presence of the 30,000 U.S. servicemen on the Korean Peninsula. Trump has even floated the idea of reducing U.S. troop numbers entirely. The move mirrors the diminishing U.S. commitment to its regional allies across the globe that has been observed under the current administration.

Most military experts agree that the result of the Syrian Civil War is a foregone conclusion; the Assad Regime will remain in power. Nonetheless, Syria fits the definition of a Failed State. Foreign actors are likely to be able to operate in Syrian territory with impunity for the foreseeable future. One such actor is Hezbollah. The Lebanese Shiite, Iranian-backed paramilitary organization played a crucial role in propping up the Assad government just as it seemed to be in its death-rows in 2012 and has gained significant fighting experience in its military involvement.

Hezbollah is one of Israel’s most formidable and immediate military foes. Many analysts, including Foreign Affairs’ Mara Karlin, believe that a significant clash between Israel in Hezbollah is inevitable and on the immediate horizon. The fallout from the Syrian Civil War may dictate what this future conflict might look like. In addition to gaining battle experience, Hezbollah is more heavily armed than the last time they came to blows with the IDF in 2006. Specifically, their rocket arsenal has been augmented through their military operations in Syria. Hezbollah’s presence in Syria also presents the scenario in which the Israelis have to fight Hezbollah not only in Southern Lebanon but also in the Golan Heights region.

A scenario in which a foe gains a foothold in a neighboring country destabilized by civil war is not new to the IDF. Following their ejection from Jordan in 1970,  the Palestine Liberation Organization relocated to Lebanon and used Southern Lebanon as a base to attack Israeli targets. The IDF invaded Southern Lebanon in 1978 to push the PLO out of range. Cross-border incidents and terrorist attacks continued and a full-scale invasion of Lebanon began in June 1982. This was larger than the 1978 operation with IDF forces laying siege to Beirut itself.

The argument can be made that Hezbollah has proven to be a more formidable enemy than the PLO. For starters, they are a single paramilitary organization as opposed to a confederation of political factions. They are better armed and backed by a more powerful benefactor: Iran. Hezbollah is also heavily entrenched in the local population of Southern Lebanon and has been cultivating its “human shield” approach since their last conflict with Israel. The confluence of these issues and circumstances have the propensity to precipitate a conflict even more dealy than the 2006 war between Hezbollah and Israel. 

The killing of Saudi journalist and dissident Jamal Khashoggi at the Saudi Arabian consulate in Istanbul in October 2018 has conjured renewed scrutiny towards the U.S.-Saudi partnership. Since the 1938 discovery of petroleum in Saudi Arabia, the relationship evolved from a business and economic relationship into a mutually beneficial strategic alliance. It has remained as such despite the changing global and regional geopolitical climate over the last half-century. Khashoggi’s killing is the latest development in a slew of events that have placed the United States in the hot seat over its collaboration with the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia.

The U.S.-Saudi relationship, while strategically and economically beneficial to both nations, is a complicated one. Saudi Arabia’s championing of religious fundamentalism and the history of human rights abuses is a topic of concern among consciously-minded Americans at home. It is clear that multiple precedents involving the partnership have not died out. The tradition of a strong personal connection between the leaders of the two countries lives on. Media outlets have suggested that President Donald Trump’s unwillingness to resort to outright condemnation of the Saudis over the killing stems from his desire to maintain his personal relationship with Crown Prince Mohammad bin Salman. It is evident that so long as the United States has interests in the Middle East, this partnership – albeit flawed – will endure.

Thanks to the news coverage on Trump and NATO, it is easy to formulate the belief that NATO is facing a novel challenge to its legitimacy and its current form as we know it. While this is true in some respects, Kaufman presents the argument that President Trump represents just the latest in a series of political upheavals which appeared to pose a threat to the institution that has played a key role in snuffing out the centuries-old cycle of intermittent armed conflict among the big players on the European continent.

It can be argued that while the Trumpian problem vis a vis NATO is cause for concern, the alliance has weathered worse than the bandying of bombastic language. For example, prolonged U.S. geopolitical focus on Southeast Asia during Vietnam caused a shutter among NATO members in fears that the Americans may be neglecting the Russian bear looming in Eastern Europe. It was only several decades ago that another con-man in the Oval Office attempted to coax our NATO allies into “paying up” (looking at you, Tricky Dicky). U.S. democracy also has the ability to correct itself every four years; it just so happens that the day of reckoning is only a few weeks away. Perhaps a change in administrations will result in a Harmel Report-moment for NATO and reaffirm the military partnership designed to “keep the Russians out, the Americans in and the Germans down.”

 

Since the fall of the Soviet Union, one of the most critical issues in American foreign policy has been the emergence of China as a global power. Graham T. Allison of The Atlantic and Susan Shirk of ForeignAffairs.com both seek to explain where U.S.-China relations are heading. Allison presents an argument that due to a phenomenon known as “The Thucydides Trap,” the U.S. and China may be on a collision course that will end in armed conflict. The Thucydides Trap – named after the Ancient Greek historian that was a primary account for the Peloponnesian War between Athens and Sparta during antiquity – describes the instances in which a rising power (Athens) challenges an established ruling power (Sparta) for geopolitical dominance. The outcome is a war whose victor achieves a costly Pyrrhic victory. By analyzing cases in the past five centuries that fit the profile for the Thucydides Trap, Allison makes the argument that – more often than not – the struggle ends in armed conflict. Allison also notes that avoiding the trap takes tremendous effort on the behalf of both the ruling and the rising power involved.

Allison, through his explanation and application of the Thucydides Trap, makes the argument that conflict between the United States and China may be inevitable, and that the avoidance of conflict will take a large degree of effort from both countries. Shirk, on the other hand, stresses that both parties know that any form of conflict would bring about grave consequences. Shirk instead gives policy advice for the Trump Administration on how to deal with China. The United States can take steps to ensure Chinese cooperation. Shirk also points out that China’s cooperation is necessary for dealing with North Korea, as China – in many ways – is North Korea’s only international benefactor.

Under previous Paramount Leader Hu Jintao, China had a “peaceful rise” policy that stressed to other countries that their rise would not be a threat to peace or security. Historically speaking, China has not been an aggressive state outside of the confines of its traditional sphere of influence from a foreign policy standpoint. The application of the Thucydides Trap may not be entirely accurate in China’s case. China does not represent a rising power that is hell-bent on deposing the established dominance of the United States.

The combination of the two articles provides us with several important takeaways. First off, relations with China must remain a priority for U.S. foreign policy. The United States must tread carefully in the way in which it deals with a China that continues to gain global influence. This is a lesson that has gone largely unheeded by a Trump Administration that has pursued an economically-nationalist policy towards China. While conflict beyond the trade and cyberspace fronts appears unlikely at this juncture, history still provides us with examples of the slippery slope that exists when a rising power clashes with that of an established power.

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1. Allison, Graham. 2015. “The Thucydides Trap: Are the U.S. and China Headed for War?” The Atlantic. September 24, 2015.
2. Shirk, Susan. “Trump and China.” Foreign Affairs. 1 May 2017. Web.

Russian President Vladimir Putin has moved to silence political dissonance with impunity throughout his time in power. The attempted assassination of opposition leader Alexei Navalny in a Novichok attack is the most recent and perhaps most dramatic instance of this. Described by the Wall Street Journal as “the man Vladimir Putin fears most,” Navalny plans to return to Russia from Germany once his recovery is complete. This comes as new reports suggest that Putin will again attempt to assassinate him upon his return.

The revelations – which reportedly come from three NATO intelligence sources – claim that Navalny may believe that his back will be shielded by German threats to end its gas pipeline deal with Russia if Navalny’s safety is not guaranteed. However, this judgment may be naive. NATO members have a history of responding in an underwhelming manner to Russian security threats. This trend will likely be exacerbated in the face of Trump’s ever-heightening desire to maintain amicable relations with Putin and the Kremlin.