Unless you’re a regular reader of nuclear weapon development capabilities, the name Mohsen Fakhizadeh probably didn’t mean much before this week.
His name is making international headlines after the successful assassination mission carried out near Tehran on Friday. The details are gruesome and point to clear signs the actions were deliberately coordinated.
A failed car bomb was followed by a string of gunfire. Fakhizadeh was later pronounced dead at the hospital.
Public sources have yet to name the responsible parties involved, but it’s a safe bet that Israeli forces contributed helpful hands. Their covert boots on the ground methods produce a recognizable signature. For example, in September of this year, working in a similar fashion but more efficient manner than the hit on Fakhizadeh, Mossad operatives riding a motorcycle in the streets of Tehran shot and killed Abu Muhammad al-Masri, a member of al-qeada’s top leadership responsible for the fatal attacks on U.S. Embassies in Africa.
If the hit on Fakhizadeh had been a U.S. mission, we might have sent AMG-114 hellfires, as was the case in eliminating Iranian General Qassem Soleimani, Abu Mahdi al-Muhandis, and seven others in Iraq without incurring civilian casualties, in January of this year.
As we think about Who Makes Policy, it’s important to consider all aspects of the policy landscape, including defensive measures. In some scenarios, the most effective policy measures to curtail ambition to develop a nuclear weapons program are eliminating its brain trust, such as in the lethal strike against Fakhizadeh. It’s an eerily discomforting feeling reaching this realization; nevertheless, it’s relevant and at times necessary for the security interests of the United States and our global partners.
Riley,
I think you can pretty much count on the fact that this was the work of the Mosad–it has all the hallmarks of their methods and tactics. They have basically been doing this since the 1970s, when they began eliminating every single PLO terrorist who was involved in the Munich Olympic massacre–and they eventually got them ALL. As to whether eliminating Iran’s nuclear brain trust is (a) a good idea, and (b) achievable, is a different matter. Unfortunately, I strongly suspect that, by now, there are quite a number of other, younger nuclear experts in Iran who can take Fakhizadeh’s place. Also, this is surely going to complicate any attempt by the Biden administration to save the JCPOA and ultimately to convince Iran NOT to pursue a nuclear weapon. It is certainly no accident or coincidence that this assassination happened at this moment, when the US administrations are about to change.
–Professor Wallerstein