You have learned a lot about the heuristics, biases, and cognitive shortcuts that can lead any of us to wrong conclusions. And you have now watched a substantial portion of Colin Powell’s speech to the United Nations, presenting evidence of weapon of mass destruction in Iraq prior to the Iraq War. As we know, there turned out not to be any weapons of mass destruction in Iraq. Which of the heuristics, biases, and cognitive shortcuts you have learned about might have lead Powell and others to believe so strongly that the weapons were there?
28 thoughts on “Colin Powell’s Speech to the UN”
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Iraq’s non-compliance with Resolution 14-41 and inspection requirements have played a substantial part in there being suspicions of there being Weapons of Mass Destruction hidden by terrorists. Due to the 9-11 attacks which heightened the U.S. government’s fears and security measures, lead our government officials and international officers to feasibly believe in the idea of Iraqi terrorists having these weapons of mass destruction. The heuristic factor of representativeness heavily influenced this heightened level of fear to believe there were weapons. If the Iraqi terrorists that attacked the U.S. had an elaborate strategy to override security measures here in our own country, then surely they have an elaborate scheme and weapons within their own country to do much more damage.
Colin Powell also used human sources, which were forms of confirmation bias, that reported that there was use of chemicals that contributed to bio-warfare which were being “evacuated” and not destroyed. The Iraqi terrorists were using technology to hide there Weapons of Mass Destruction, as there were diagrams and footage of trucks seen at sites that removed equipment out of facilities prior to inspection dates. This pays into the Peripheral Route Processing which Colin Powell presented his assumptions based off his disposition to prove of there being weapons of mass destruction. Intelligence reports that were given by weapons experts are an example of the cognitive dissonance that took place, as Hussein participated in the effort to threaten his scientists if they revealed any information within their interviews. If they revealed any information to the inspectors or experts, harm would come to themselves and their families, and they would be persecuted as spies of their countries.
A heuristic characteristic Colin Powell and other world leaders may have been exhibiting is availably. As the 9/11 tragedy was recent and easy to recall; any explanation or blame for the event could be done effortlessly. Another heuristic characteristic Colin Powell and the other world leaders may have been exhibiting is representativeness. Saddam Hussein had negative associations and characteristics in the West. Those associations and characteristics of Saddam Hussein projected a negative light on the nation of Iraq and its citizens. It created a simple argument to influence to wage war on that nation and its leader. In addition, Colin Powell and other world leaders were practicing peripheral route processing. There was a very short time between 9/11 and the declaration of war in Iraq. For such a major decision, not enough critical time was spent deciphering evidence, which would be central route processing. Although it appeared to be a conference on expert intelligence and evidence, it was a showcase of irrelevant information that lead to an major misinformed decision.
Colin Powell and the United States were using an influence of authority while speaking to the UN committee. The UN committee made up of several nations that look up to the US for guidance in making decisions. The other nations want to follow the consensus and be like the US and want to find weapons of mass destruction. Most of the countries represented in the UN are there because they wish to see good in the world and protection from evil regimes. Therefore some influence of consistency is being used as the US knows the nations in the UN believe that Iraq should not have WMD therefore by supporting this resolution we see that there is a connect between their values and their actions. This also brings in the premise that people want their beliefs, attitudes and behaviors to reflect each other. It also can be said that the US after having a terror attack on its own soil they are more affected by availability heretic because is may see more terror related conditions then there actually are.
The following heuristics, biases, and cognitive shortcuts might have lead Colin Powell and others to believe that weapons of mass destruction were in Iraq:
Heuristic factor: As my classmate mentioned Iraq’s lack of compliance with the inspection requirements in Resolution 14-41. Since this was right after September 11th the U.S. government feared that terrorist were plotting in Iraq.
Influence of Authority: Colin Powel represents the U.S., the most powerful country in the world. Many of the countries in the UN will follow the United States lead on global decisions.
Intelligence and other sources: Were used as proof that weapons of mass destruction existed by the footage of trucks moving in and out of various facilities.
Taken together, the above points led the U.S. to enter Iraq based on inaccurate assumptions. Consequently many nations follows the United States decisions given their influence in world affairs.
Colin Powell presented what seemed at the time to be compelling evidence that there were weapons of mass destruction (WMD) in Iraq. Powell uses representativeness, availability and confirmation bias to prove his theory that there are hidden weapons.
Resolution 14-41 refers to a regime, not a person. It was “One last chance to come to compliance or face serious consequences.” Powell uses information out of context, including conversations and satellite images to bolster his belief there are hidden weapons. He uses representativeness when he concludes that all groups in Iraq work and think like Saddam Hussein. Those who are in areas where inspections are going to take place must be secretly hiding the weapons. He believes that that since Saddam would lie and hide things, everyone in Iraq is doing likewise. Since the recorded conversation says “evacuated” and not destroyed, or ready for inspectors to remove, Powell automatically associates this with hiding something bigger. Saddam is hiding, his weapons must be too. We can also see how Powell was using representativeness to ignore the present facts and base his assumptions on the previous experiences with Iraq.
Powell uses the theory of availability when discussing the actions of the past, primarily Iraq’s involvement with weapons and terrorism. If Iraq used these methods in the past they must be doing the same now. They have lied to us before, they must be lying to us again. Powell is basing his claims on a “Policy of evasion and deception that goes back 12 years” yet Iraq had pledged “to work unconditionally with inspectors.” Knowing how this turned out, we can see where Powell was convinced that the past was influencing the present.
Lastly, Powell is using confirmation bias to his advantage in that he does, at this time, believe there are WMD in Iraq. He is ignoring all evidence that may point to the contrary and only focusing on a select amount of information. He keeps saying that what he says is based on fact and not opinion, but perhaps he is trying to just convince himself? He had witnesses and testimonies that fit his line of thought and only brought that evidence to light. He never brought up the possibility that there may be no weapons. Rather, he used satellite images and witness testimonies to further his agenda. Powell also says that the information he has gathered is solid and good intelligence, yet he also says that Iraq continues to lie and was not going to be compliant in weapons inspections. Rather, Iraq was going to bury the council in paperwork to make it impossible for anyone to find anything. Powell does not think that perhaps there is misleading information being leaked to his informants. Instead, his confirmation bias makes him believe all that he is told is true, and therefore can be justified by the presented evidence. Powell has convinced not only himself, but his audience that all the evidence is showing that Iraq is only trying “To deceive, to hide, to keep [evidence] from the inspectors.”
While watching (and listening) to Colin Powell’s speech I was reminded of several of the heuristics, biases, and cognitive shortcuts I had read about. I recognized availability, consensus, authority, and liking. I found availability interesting. You see at the time there were many reports about Iraq not complying with requirements to disarm. It was like an echo chamber, repeating back the same story over and over from different sources. Colin Powell told a story in his speech about a modified vehicle that was no permitted yet obviously present. All of this leads to availability. The ability to relate to other events. The weapons of mass destruction became more of a “well of course they have them” look at all these other things they do.
One of Cialdini’s seven principles of cognitive shorthands is authority. Authority can be a powerful tool and even if not used intentionally can lead to persuasion. Colin Powell was a person of authority. He was the Secretary of State, a retired four-star general in the United States Army, was National Security Advisor as Commander of the U.S. Army Forces Command and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, during the Persian Gulf War.
Early on in his speech, he spoke about “core assessments made by Dr Blix and Dr El-Baradei. As Dr Blix reported to this council. Iraq appears not to have come to a genuine acceptance, not even today, of the disarmament which was demanded of it.” He also stated that they had intercepted telephone conversations from Iraq’s elite and photos taken by satellites which were reviewed by experts . To me all of these are examples of authority. Colin Powell is an authority figure, he used authority figures to explain his position and tangible “evidence” such as pictures and a taped conversation.
We all know now that there were no real weapons of mass destruction in Iraq. We also know that there was an overwhelming support to move forward in a military action against Iraq. We have learned about heuristics, biases, and cognitive shortcuts that can lead any of us to the wrong conclusions. So how could it have appeared so obvious that weapons of mass destruction were present that we had to act on?
During Colin Powell’s speech to the United Nations he mentioned Resolution 14-41 even though there were another sixteen (16) resolutions over the previous twelve (12) years. Resolution 14-41 was seen as one last chance for Saddam Hussein “to come clean.” Hussein really wanted the world to think he had nuclear weapons or weapons of mass destruction while also coming across as a tough guy.
In reality, US leaders, including Colin Powell, as well as other Heads of State were feeling a 9/11 paranoia and relied on a house of cards of circumstantial information that led to a wrong conclusion. It is true that Saddam Hussein stalled inspections and attempted to hid correspondence. Hussein wouldn’t allow planes to fly low for a close visual surveillance and insisted that satellite imagery be used to make assumptions of what trucks were doing on the ground.
The main principle of cognitive shorthand that I noticed in his speech was authority. Bottom line is that the United States stood before the United Nations and said we have enough proof and Hussein has been given enough chances. Leaders did not want to have another 9/11 and the world agreed.
After watching Colin Powell’s speech to the United Nations, presenting evidence of weapon of mass destruction in Iraq prior to the Iraq War and after learning more about human reason and its limitations it is safe to say that availability heuristic, cognitive dissonance, reciprocity, social proof and liking lead Powell and others to believe the weapons were there. As we now know there turned out not to be any weapons of mass destruction in Iraq. It is important to remember that after 9/11 there was a significant increase in concern and distrust as to what they were up to. It was easier to make sense of the evidence that pointed towards them having weapons of mass destruction than to make sense of the evidence that was in their favor. In addition it is important to remember that Powell was speaking for the U.S. and being such a powerful country other nations in the UN look up to the U.S.. Also, after listening to how sure Powell was of the weapons of mass destruction being there, other nations in the UN didn’t want to be the ones disagreeing if it were to be true and another terrorist attack took place.
The heightened fear as a result of the aftermaths of 9/11, in concordance with Iraq’s unwillingness to comply under the 14-41 Resolution created a basis for the misconception at hand. These instances paved the way for conformation bias, availability heuristics, and representative heuristics to fall into play.
Due to this heightened security; Colin Powell took many controversial items into evidence, used his heuristics to fill in the gaps, and adopted them as undeniable truth. An example of such heuristics used are demonstrated in the provided recordings and satellite images. It is unclear what these items are in fact proving; however, Powell uses representative heuristics of what these pieces of evidence could have meant in the past along with availability heuristics of what evidence is available to him, along with a hint of confirmation bias and uses these tactics to fill in the gaps. It is in fact unclear in the images and recordings whether or not Iraq is withholding weapons of mass destruction; however, Collin still proceeds to make these false accusations due to presumption of the past. The heuristics associated with media coverage of such instances also played a role into factoring Powell’s decisions and ability to gain further support. Although heuristics can be an essential and useful tool, they can many times create room for error and deem to be quite faulty in many instances.
The “others”, that would be me, somewhat believed Colin Powell’s story that Iraq had weapons of mass destruction when he presented the proof before the UN. One of the reason’s i believed his story, was that I “liked” Colin Powell. I’m no fan of Bush or Cheney, but I really liked Colin Powell. I trusted him and really thought highly of him. Of course that’s why Bush/Cheney made Powell present the speech to the UN. They knew what they were doing. People “liked” Colin Powell. Cialdini’s “Six Principles of Influence” discusses “liking” by saying “that we’re more likely to be influenced by people we like.”
I’m sure many in the international community fell for Colin Powell’s speech because he was a man of “Authority.” I know I did. This also falls under Cialdini’s “Six Principles of Influence.” Colin Powell was not only a top general in the Army, he was a top general in the worlds only super power, the United States. He was the be all, end all in “Authority.” As Cialdini say’s, “We feel a sense of duty or obligation to people in positions of authority.”
Confirmation bias also played a part in Colin Powell’s presentation. When Powell presented the pictures of the bunkers, where apparently the weapons were being kept or could of been kept, there was never any actual pictures of the “weapons of mass destruction.” So this is an example of looking for information that supports your bias. The facts were being dismissed to support the story you want told.
Powell’s multi-media presentation was a rag-bag of old allegations, which the United States has been making for years, some of them based on information Iraq has itself provided to UN inspectors. Other claims were based on audio recordings and satellite images, and still more were based on unverifiable claims from unidentified human witnesses and “defectors.” Powell all but admitted the weakness of his case by continually saying “these are facts, not assertions,” at moments when he was providing the most sensational yet least supported claims. He also resorted to the comic book tactic of calling Saddam Hussein an “evil genius” for having succeeded in hiding what the US says is a vast arsenal, not only from UN inspectors, but from the world’s only super power.
Let’s look more closely at some of the elements in the American case for an immediate attack on Iraq:
PUBLIC CERTAINTY, PRIVATE DOUBT
On that February 5 in front of the UN Security Council, was Colin Powell certain what he was saying was accurate? He certainly was:
POWELL: My colleagues, every statement I make today is backed up by sources, solid sources. These are not assertions. What we’re giving you are facts and conclusions based on solid intelligence.
Later, regarding whether Iraq had reconstituted a nuclear weapons program, he said:
POWELL: [T]here is no doubt in my mind…
The Audio Tapes or Fabricated Evidences
Powell played what he said were intercepted conversations between Iraqi officers who were discussing ways to conceal prohibited materials from UN inspectors. None of the three recordings, if real, amounted to a “smoking gun.” If they were real, they could be incriminating in a certain context, but they could also have been taken out of a context in which they were entirely innocent.
Powell played an intercept of a conversation between Iraqi army officers about the UN inspections. However, when he translated what they were saying, he knowingly embellished it, turning it from evidence Iraq was complying with U.N. resolutions to evidence Iraq was violating them. This appears in Bob Woodward’s book, Plan of Attack:
[Powell] had decided to add his personal interpretation of the intercepts to the rehearsed script, taking them substantially further and casting them in the most negative light…Concerning the intercept about inspecting for the possibility of “forbidden ammo,” Powell took the interpretation further: “Clean out all of the areas… Make sure there is nothing there.” None of this was in the intercept.
I believe, there was no excuse for the American and British governments to mislead themselves and the world, as they did, by giving credit to fake evidence or assuming that if weapons items were “unaccounted for” that they must exist. They did not exist.
The Bush administration certainly wanted to go to war, and it advanced eradication of weapons of mass destruction as the main reason. As Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz has since explained, it was the only rationale that was acceptable to all parts of the U.S. administration.
The WMDs argument also carried weight with the public and with the U.S. Congress. Indeed, in the autumn of 2002 the threat seemed credible. While I never believed Saddam could have concealed a continued nuclear program, I too thought there could still be some biological and chemical weapons left from Iraq’s war with Iran. If not, why had Iraq stopped U.N. inspections at many places around the country throughout the 1990s?
However, suspicions are one thing and reality is quite another. U.N. inspectors were asked to search for, report and destroy real weapons. As they found no weapons and no evidence supporting the suspicions, they reported this. But U.S. Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfield dismissed the reports with one of his wittier retorts: “The absence of evidence is not evidence of absence.”
Conclusion:
The war aimed to eliminate weapons of mass destruction, but there weren’t any.
The war aimed to eliminate al Qaeda in Iraq, but the terrorist group didn’t exist in the country until after the invasion.
The war aimed to make Iraq a model democracy based on law, but it replaced tyranny with anarchy and led America to practices that violated the laws of war.
After reading about heuristics, basis and cognitive shortcuts, I believe that a few of these were used to come to the conclusions that Colin Powell described in his speech to the UN.
In the area of heuristics, I believe that all three mental shortcuts were used. There were a lot of representative heuristics in the speech. He used specific examples of phone conversations, which were screened to convey the message he was intending. The point that the Iraqi government was concealing weapons, instead of destroying them in accordance to Proposition 1441. The use of availability was also largely used, especially in the 3rd section of the speech. There had been a recent Anthrax attack in the weeks following this speech; Powel drew on this experience to justify the concealment of weapons by the Iraqi government, stating that if they had access to a teaspoon of the weapon, they must be holding more.
There was in my opinion a certain level of confirmation bias in this speech. Time and time again Powell stated that based on past experiences there was a certain level of “deception” like he put, that the Iraqi government had displayed in the area of what weapons they were concealing or had in their possession.
I also believe that Cialdini’s principles were also used, especially the commitment and consistency principle. The whole government was sending the message that weapons were being concealed. Powel had to stay consistent to the message that the government as sending, especially after the attacks that the country had faced.
In all we know that weapons were not being concealed, but because of what had happened in months prior there was a sense of urgency the country felt to bring justice to those lost in pervious attacks and ultimately justify the Iraqi war.
Through the speech, we can see a variety ways of persuasion. To begin with, a tape conversation between two senior officers was revealed, regarding to clean up areas to leave no evidence. This reflects the bias of imaginability that evidence was imagined to be related with weapon of mass destruction (WMD).
It suggests that Iraq’s records with weapons are replete with lies, since it took years for Iraq to admit four tons of deadly nerve agent. Saddam admitted producing Anthrax in 1995,Powell claimed that they had amassed much intelligence indicating that Iraq is continuing to make these weapons. Due to “belief consistency”, Powell concluded WMD must exist even though Iraq denied.
Additionally, Powell mentioned Iraq had taken the activity of concealing weapons and people in response to the resumption of inspections; also experts related to weapons of mass destruction had been ordered to stay home from work to avoid the inspectors. The “illusion of validity” limits the accuracy of predictions.
Then the method of anchoring and adjustment can be found by a series of evidence as follows: in 1991 and 1995, defectors revealed that Saddam had clandestine nuclear weapons program and bomb designs; in 1998, Saddam tried to acquire the last component which is used to produce nuclear explosion; in 2000, Iraq negotiated to purchase magnate production plant; over the past 18 months, Saddam paid increasing attention to nuclear scientists. Once initial value was set up, a general tendency can be formed to overestimate the probability of conjunctive events
“Illusory correlation” was used to depict the sinister relationship between Iraq and Al-Qaida terrorist network.
Finally, Powell used the method of “social proof” to call on Americans to take the obligation. “Us will and can’t run that risk to American people, leaving Saddam in possession of weapons of mass destruction is not an option”. Writing resolution 1441 is to preserve the peace. Given this situation, everyone assumes that it’s correct and patriotic behavior to participate into the war to protect the homeland.
I remember watching a lot this in 2003 when the mood in the country – and new york – was a lot different. It was compelling and scary at the time.
Looking back at it now, with the benefit of hindsight (and, with the benefit of becoming a parent) what struck me immediately is that Colin Powell sounds like one parent describing to another parent what the kid did wrong that day. “I told the kid that the rule was xxy and he continued to do…. and then he did…. and I told him that I would check under his bed for electronics and he still… and then he hid it…..”
There was a scolding, self-righteous tone to Colin Powell’s remarks hidden behind the rationality.
The most striking thing, however, were the hidden assumptions behind the speech – and they were numerous. Without them, the speech and the future actions made no sense. And if they were articulated, perhaps we would have done things differently.
(Let me just add that I am not one of those people who thought the war was wrong – I think it was probably necessary. I am not a dove and I find myself becoming more hawkish as I get older.)
Colin Powell assumes (in no order):
1. Iraq should listen to the US/UN
2. The US/UN has a reasonable expectation that Iraq should listen
3. Iraq wants to be part of the international community and all it implies
4. The international community can and should dictate norms of behavior to other countries
5. The paradigm of sending inspectors is a useful and productive way to “check up” on people/countries
I think that these unstated assumptions were part of the way that the administration allowed lawmakers to justify their outrage at Iraq – to perhaps shift the blame in public discourse to Iraq and change the narrative. It begins to sound like the excuse “he made me do it.” Iraq made us go to war with them.
I think there is an equally — or even more compelling — reason why we had to go to war with Iraq but it would have involved articulating our world view incorporating the (old) view of the US as enforcer/imperlialists (depending on your point of view.)
Colin Powell’s speech to the UN was one giant exercise in heuristics, biases, and cognitive shortcuts. Such techniques were being used not only by Colin Powell himself, but also the American people. Unfortunately, the recent memory of 9/11 and terrorist attacks around the globe created an atmosphere of fear that led to the usage of such techniques.
First and foremost, I think its important to note that the whole of Colin Powell’s speech is a perfect example of confirmation bias and an attempt at cognitive consistency. Years later, we know there were no WMDs in Iraq. At the time, however, Powell and the rest of the Bush administration truly believed there were. As a result, any form of evidence – no matter how minuscule or interpretative – would be construed to match their ways of thinking. The administration would take anything to confirm what they believed.
All individuals need cognitive consistency, and Colin Powell is no different. He believed that Iraq had WMDs, and believed that he was doing a good job listening to experts and various interpretations of evidence. Any form of flimsy data or pictures would be construed in a manner that made it at least seem fitting to his objective (invading Iraq).
Further, Colin Powell was able to successfully persuade the American people and the UN to enter Iraq through the use of representativeness. For almost a decade, Saddam Hussein had been painted as an oppressive and brutal dictator by both American government and international media sources. As a result, it was much easier to accept the idea that he was indeed holding such weapons – only adding further to his deviousness.
Finally, and perhaps most unfortunate, was the cause of sway in the American people and their belief that there were WMDs. Colin Powell, a powerful authority figure, presented numerous pieces of evidence calling out Iraq for WMDs in front of the United Nations. Such important symbolism matched with his position made it very difficult for any American to call his accusations lies – especially in the context of the War on Terror at the time.
I would say Colin Powell’s speech was smart and deceptive by using heuristics and bias perspective of people fearing weapons of mass destruction and using the term terrorists, especially when using the name Saddam Hussein, who infects fear in people when hearing his name.
He is purposely pressuring the UN representatives of if we do not do anything, more destruction and fear will occurs to their countries. Especially, towards the phone call conversation, since it doesn’t exactly specific anything, but he just took a same part of the conversation and made it sound like they are planning something destructive. He is basically “fallacy of quoting out of context,” but in this case is the phone call conversation.
After the 9/11 attacks, Americans were in an uproar and deeply angered. This anger and quest for answers to why someone will harm so many I think made us more susceptible to heuristics, biases and cognitive shortcuts. The recent occurrence of the 9/11 and the pictures of the falling twin towers still so vivid in our minds, we were more likely to believe loosely associated evidence as facts. I was still in high school when the september eleventh attacks and had little knowledge of the political world but even I knew the sentiment of the Nation was; we must find those who did this and make them pay. Availability played a large part in making Collin’s speech so powerful. America was just attacked and America must protect itself.
Another cognitive shortcut used in this speech is cognitive consistency and confirmation bias. After the attacks, Iraq was seen as the enemy and it was only right that the people of the United States protect themselves from the enemy. The general tone of America was to destroy them before they destroyed us; it was very easy to believe that Iraq had weapons of mass destruction because after all they did bomb the twin towers and Iraq is an evil country so how much of a stretch would it be to think that an evil country has weapons of mass destruction? We have all at one point been guilty of using peripheral routing and the war on Iraq was one of those things that it was so easy to use peripheral routing for because we as a nation had found an enemy and the enemy needed to be destroyed
Colin Powell relies on his listener using many mental shortcuts to analyze his arguments.
– He relies on Consistency. He points out the long history of sanctions on Iraq and the finality of the most recent sanctions, implying that we must remain consistent in our approach.
– He relies on Representativeness. He plays two phone calls and specifically says they are not isolated incidents but part of a systemic policy of evasion. He uses many other anecdotes and says that they represent larger issues.
– He relies on Authority. He mentions the expertise of his specialists repeatedly to increase the credibility of their evidence.
– He relies on Availability. He mentions Iraq’s use of chemical weapons, which would lead a listener to think Iraq is more likely to also have WMDs.
– He relies on Cognitive Dissonance. He outlines evidence of Iraq’s possession of chemical weapons. Then he says that the weapons were not found. To explain this dissonance, he suggests the weapons were moved.
Colin Powell utilized many of the heuristics, biases, and cognitive shortcuts that we have discussed in his speech to the UN. Below are a few examples.
Representativeness Heuristic: Powell uses two phone calls as examples of the types of transactions that were happening under Hussain’s influence. These phone calls, in which the parties discussed moving or hiding traces of equipment, were supposed to be representative of the larger covert operations undertaken by the regime to hide their WMDs.
Authority Influence: The influence of Authority was apparent in a few instances. In addition to his role as Secretary of State, Powell had a long career in various positions involving the Army and national security. This leads the audience to trust his judgment on these affairs, especially when he is so adamant about his opinion. In addition, Powell refers to other experts on his team – the image consultants who analyzed the satellite photos. Even Powell admitted to not being able to decipher the images, but considering his stature, the fact that he trusted these experts makes us feel as if we should too.
Consistency Influence: Powell brings up several times the consistency of Iraq’s failure to comply with the Resolution. This highlights to the audience that their refusal to comply is not a one-time only accident, but a calculated action.
In Colin Powell’s speech, there is a presence of availability when he uses the phone conversations to show systematic cover-ups. He also connects them with the al-Kindi company, known for prohibited weapons activity, to further support a possible cover-up and un-trustworthiness. He also references past lies and satellite images to support his case.
There is also a presence of authority. Other nations were inclined to believe in the United States because they were a powerful nation with more information on Iraq than any other country. None of the other nations had anything to refute what Powell was saying. In some way there can also be some reciprocity. The U.S. provides aid to many countries and they may be more prompt to listen and agree with us. Additionally, guilt over the tragic events may have played a part in support for the U.S. The recent events also played a part in confirmation bias. Many were looking for someone to blame or take revenge on and they just followed Powell’s lead.
Colin Powell’s speech to the UN relied heavily on authority. Powell was a not only the Secretary of State but also a highly regarded four star general. He also stated he relied on his experts which most people value as an authority. He mentioned how highly skilled the experts were especially when he was discussing the satellite photos. This speech demonstrates that you are only as good as your experts.
I also noticed when Colin Powell recapped the intercepted speeches he without a doubt did so with some embellishment as to spin the conversation and persuade people to believe the conversation was absolutely about moving weapons of mass destruction.
Colin Powell is a respected man in the international political arena. He also represents one of the most powerful countries in the world, the US. We all know that the big 5 or otherwise known as the Security Council : US, UK, China, Russia and France have a great power over the UN and are the only countries with a right to veto any decisions.They are also the only countries that can initiate a conflict like Iraq, Ukraine etc and get away with it almost completely.
United States is seen in most of the world as a promoter of democracy and intervention in Iraq was often twisted around between “getting rid of weapons of mass destruction” and “bringing democracy to a tyrant country” factors.
There are many heuristic, bias, cognitive shortcuts behind the reasons given to invade Iraq. One of them is reciprocity: 9/11 was a fresh wound and the US population and its government needed a reason, needed an explanation and most importantly needed someone to hold responsible. Another one is lack of compliance by the Iraqi, supposedly, to destroy all their weapons of massive destruction, even though why they should destroy their weapons and the security council shouldn’t destroy theirs for example, remains an unsolved mystery. Another is authority. As mentioned above US is a powerful country and not only is the US a member of the security council and doesn’t need a reason really to intervene somewhere, they also have authority and are thus often followed unquestionably by other countries, especially since the formation of NATO where US is also a leader.
There were several heuristics used by Colin Powell and the United Nations which led them to wrongly conclude that Iraq had weapons of mass destruction. For one, Powell and the other UN leaders used the familiarity heuristic. The familiarity heuristic applies to instances in which people assume that since circumstances that applied to past behavior are still present, that past behavior is presently occurring as well. In the case of Iraq, Powell assumed that since Iraq defied Resolution 14-41 by being involved in terrorism, they must currently be defying other aspects of the Resolution, including acquisition of weapons of mass destruction. As Powell said, “We are well aware of Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction, as well as their involvement in terrorism, which is also part of Resolution 14-41.” Powell also pointed toward Hussein’s past behavior, in which he refused to disarm his regime, and assumed that that past behavior indicated similar present behavior on the part of Iraq.
It is also likely that Powell and the UN used the representativeness heuristic in their reasoning. Since Saddam Hussein and his regime fit the prototype of a tyranny and a terrorist country, it was assumed that Iraq would have weapons of mass destruction as well. However, this was not the case.
Collin Powell used Trevrsky and Kahnemanics theory of Heuristics. We exhibit judgement under uncertainty when we know nothing about a situation and we reply on others to inform us. Some of us use cognitive consistency when we are taught as children to listen to authority at all times. Representativeness availability Heuristics are used to reduce mental effort in decision making, and many times lead to systematic biases or errors in judgment. WE tend to be insensitivity towards others due to prior experiences which leads us to biases which are harmful to ourselves and others. Small groups of individuals fall prey to these circumstances which is why it is very important to rely on our own research. Collin Powell relied on cognitive dissonance when he delivered this speech. America had suffered through the 9/11 incident. We witnessed an event and developed an attitude towards a group which changed our behavior. This was a bed well made for his deliverance. We used pherical processing and looked at the circumstances superficially. We should have used central processing and paid closer attention by challenging the authority. Unfortunately we have been condition not to challegene authority but to accept everything that they say and follow command. The Psychology of Persuasion was also another method used with his photographs and illustrations of the “supposed” location of the “Weapons of Mass Destruction”. Reciprocity, Authority, Social Proof, Scarcity and consistency were all elements exhibited in his UN Speech. This is the psychology seed in the fundamentals of racism done in an academic form. This is my course of study. This is the process that we all need to study closely in order to better understand each other and live in harmony for the sake of our future generations.
PS. I really like this course of study. Understanding is power.
In Colin Powell’s speech to the United Nations, he uses various techniques to mislead the country. While speaking, he shows no humility and his demeanor does not suggest any hesitation, thereby strengthening the resolve of whoever is listening. Furthermore, Powell’s credibility is strengthened by his authoritative position and his mention of expertise of his specialists Powell misleads and confuses the American people by using the word “disarmed” repeatedly throughout the speech. He never makes it an option that there aren’t any weapons of mass destruction. He gives off the assumption that the weapons are there and it is our job to find them. Powell is specific in his speech yet in some moments he generalizes to other countries. The listeners are left wondering who are the other countries, what is he referring to, and indicating that he must know something that he cannot share.
Powell speaks about the Iraqis disturbing behavior – but what disturbing behavior – he sets up the dynamic as one of hiding and deception. He continues that the Iraqis are always hiding and deceiving yet suggests that the Americans never had a chance of a working relationship with them. Iraq was always the enemy and he uses many examples to stress that point – not letting the Americans come and take a look, not giving documents that they promised, people that Americans have been looking for go missing….he paints a picture such that the listeners envision a total lack of structure in the Iraqis government. While the American government is so strong, he almost creates chaos in the Iraqi government for the Americans. We have no understanding of how the Iraqi government works and he uses that lack of understanding to drive the point that if we can’t understand them, we can’t trust them. There is no way that we would have been able to trust and work with the Iraqi government.
Powell uses evidence such as phone conversations, maps, and eye witness accounts to make his point. At the end of the speech, you basically feel stupid if you don’t believe in what he says. His speech is one that draws many obvious conclusions and speaks in such a way that you can’t help but agree with him.
Powell is justifying the need to go to war and he sets up images that make the listeners think that the Iraqis are not trustworthy and everything they say is not valid.
Colin Powell’s speech and the entire dilemma of declaring Iraq’s having weapons of mass destruction was a textbook example of heuristics, biases, and cognitive shortcuts. However, hindsight is 20/20. With the traumatic after effects of the terrorist attacks of 9/11, it was easy for the public to “go along with it”, because what if the alternative was true? The american people did not have the means to gain intelligence of Iraq’s WMD possession, and they were certainly not ready for another threat/attack against the US. Colin Powells used influence of authority and cognitive shortcuts to gain UN authorization for an invasion.
Colin Powell exercised the influence of authority and to argue his points, insisting the evidence of WMD were “hard facts and truth.” Colin Powell was a four-star general in the US army,and Secretary of State Under GWB from 2001-05, among other reputable positions. His high reputation and prestige provided a persuasive power and trustworthiness.
Cognitive consistence and dissonance was also present in his speech– Convinced that Iraq held WMD, he tried to find evidence that they moved it through vague telephone conversations and before and after images of facilities where he believed housed the WMD. There was never any hard evidence, just speculation. Powell was determined, however, to convince the UN to gain their support in favor of the US invading Iraq and overthrowing Hussein.
Collin Powell’s speech is a great example of political propaganda. George Bush was very smart in choosing Powell to deliver this speech. Powell’s political reputation and military background gave him a sense of influence and authority.
Evidence Powell presented seemed like valid evidence to anyone who is not an expert on nuclear sites and reactors. Grainy photos, videos and images could be interpreted many ways, but it was Powell’s account that made us think it is nuclear sites we are witnessing.
Another major accomplishment of the propaganda piece was creating an emotional link between September 11th tragic events and Sadam hussein’s regime. Unfortunatley many people today still believe in a connection between Iraq and terrorist attacks.