An article that caught my attention this week was “How Climate Change Is Fuelling the U.S. Border Crisis”. What struck me about the article was that “U.S. immigration policy has sought to be more deterrent in managing the border, but it has underestimated the impact of climate change as a root cause of regional mass migration”. It’s clear that the climate change crisis is getting worse, but the response from the U.S. and other countries is still very weak. The threat of climate change is growing so rapidly that the IEP, an international think tank, predicts that 1.2 billion people worldwide could be displaced by climate change and natural disasters by 2050. While climate change is not the only reason for refugees, it creates many social problems, including soaring food prices, and in the worst cases, conflicts that trigger refugee crises.

Therefore, it is crucial that the world recognizes the problem of climate migration now. President Biden’s call to raise awareness of climate migration is a good first step, but there is still a long way to go. It is needed sustained strategies, not just a short-term assistance plan. A holistic and collaborative approach involving governments, communities, and the international community is needed, including working with local communities to implement climate-resilient projects, working to secure climate financing from international financial institutions, and establishing a U.S. government working group on climate migration. “No policy, wall, strengthening of a frontier, of border controls is really going to address the underlying issue,” said UNICEF’s Carerra, and it’s time for a more fundamental and realistic policy on climate refugees and borders.

North Korea has always responded in a similar way when it comes to its nuclear program. North Korea’s argument is that it needs to negotiate with the United States on a phased approach to denuclearization, not nuclear abolition, and that sanctions must be lifted before that can happen. North Korea’s “denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula” is a similar story. It is not only North Korea’s nuclear program, but also the withdrawal of US troops from South Korea and the removal of the US nuclear umbrella. It sounds plausible, but in the end, it’s like saying North Korea has no intention of dismantling its nuclear arsenal. By giving the other side hope, Kim Jong-un gets what he wants and stalls for time to develop the nuclear program. It also raises fears that North Korea is actually moving closer to its goals of recognizing itself as a nuclear power and reunifying the Korean Peninsula, which it has had since Kim Il Sung.

North Korea already has about 50 nuclear weapons and is expected to have more than 100 by 2030. But the international response has been frustrating. Neither Trump’s top-down approach nor Obama’s strategic patience has been effective, and military cooperation between North Korea, China, and Russia has intensified since the war in Ukraine. In addition, North Korea’s development of methods to evade military detection and interception has raised concerns that South Korea’s three axes (Kill-chain, KAMD, KMPR) to counter North Korea’s nuclear program could be breached.

Tae Young-ho, a defector from North Korea who worked as a diplomatic minister at the North Korean Embassy in the United Kingdom and is now a member of the South Korean National Assembly, said that the best way to prevent a nuclear war and maintain peace at this point in North Korea’s nuclear arsenal is for South Korea to temporarily nuclear-armed itself. While this is unlikely, it does not appear to be many options left. A regime change seems to be the only way to dismantle North Korea without a military strike, but it’s not likely. While denuclearization through dialogue would be nice, it seems unlikely, so the next best option to stop North Korea from using nuclear weapons now seems to be solid pressure rather than relying on negotiations. North Korea has already endured economic sanctions for a long time, and more of the same will only go so far. There needs to be a real demonstration of will and capability to make North Korea feel threatened. This would include a qualitatively and quantitatively enhanced missile defense system, protection from nuclear attack, and the ability to strike first against a North Korean nuclear threat, along with high-level intelligence gathering on the North Korean leadership. Amid this complex international situation, there are fewer and fewer discussions about resolving North Korea’s nuclear program. However, this may be one of the few remaining opportunities to restrain North Korea.

Among this week’s readings, the perspective of “Biden and Mother Nature Have Reshaped the Middle East” (Thomas L. 2021) caught my attention. The author argues that the U.S. can return to engaging the Middle East, not through the current diplomacy of force, but through peaceful ecological diplomacy, such as a “Green Blue Deal” centered on the sun and fresh water. Through this ecosystem diplomacy, the U.S. would be present as a “trusted mediator that creates healthy interdependence.” It is now clear that the United States’ influence in the Middle East has diminished, and Middle Eastern countries’ trust in the United States has eroded. If the U.S. continues to intervene in the Middle East in a way that is inconsistent from administration to administration, it could have devastating consequences. The U.S. may consider reducing its involvement in the Middle East to a minimum, but this could lead to international criticism of its “America First” attitude, disruption of peace in the region, and risk to U.S. national security. This is where “soft power” diplomacy can be an attractive alternative. Fostering partnerships based on mutual interests, such as fostering economic partnerships, promoting regional development, investing in renewable energy, and supporting regional dialogue platforms, could bolster healthy U.S. diplomatic engagement. If successful, such soft power could allow the United States to contribute constructively to pursuing peace and stability in the Middle East. While this seems like an attractive option, the question is how stable and long-term these platforms can be maintained in an unstable region.

The U.S. missteps in the Middle East continue, with CNN saying the U.S. misjudged the Israeli attack because “the Middle East no longer plays a central role in U.S. foreign policy.” A muddled Middle East policy – withdrawing from Afghanistan, distancing itself from the Saudis, scrapping the nuclear deal with Iran, and then attempting to mend fences with Iran and the Saudis – has led to Iranian support for Hamas. Also, there was complacency in thinking that the Asia-Pacific region was the main place to focus on containing China. Complicating matters is the fact that the United States, once the world’s policeman, has become less involved in foreign conflicts and more focused on its domestic priorities. Former Islamist groups still exist, and Iran and Saudi Arabia are still at odds over who will be the dominant power in the Middle East. The Israeli-Palestinian divide and relations with other Middle Eastern countries remain uneasy. The tensions between the United States and Iran have yet to be resolved. The Middle East will be more likely not to turn out as the United States wants it to. The United States still has a lot of influence, but it’s not absolute. The situation in the Middle East has become more unstable and could explode at any moment.

The root cause of this situation is greed. It’s no exaggeration to say that the greed of the great powers for oil has made the Middle East what it is today. The situation in the Middle East is a complicated one. It’s not an easy problem to solve. This makes it difficult to see the Middle East as a simple matter of good versus evil. The power of oil money remains strong, but it has also brought conflict and strife. As long as there is so much oil in the region, it’s hard to keep comfortable in the Middle East.

The article talks about the urgency of reforming the United Nations, specifically highlighting the failures of the Security Council, which has failed to resolve issues like the war in Ukraine due to divisions among the veto-wielding permanent members, and explains that while all recognize the need for reform, it’s difficult to make changes because they require a two-thirds majority of the UN membership and the support of all five permanent members. Several reform proposals have been floated, including more representation from countries in other regions, more permanent seats, and more. Still, all of them are likely to be met with opposition, suggesting that the current divisions and conflicts among the great powers make it difficult for any change to be realized. 

As this article shows, most agree that the United Nations needs to be reformed, but how to do so is a question that has been unresolved for 30 years. China and Russia would oppose any expansion of the permanent members, and while Biden has made statements calling for reform of the council, it is doubtful that he actually intended to limit its privileges. Every country acts in its national interest and will inevitably come into conflict with other countries in the pursuit of that interest. So it is implausible that any reform of the Security Council will satisfy the interests of all countries, and I don’t think the addition of a few more permanent members will fundamentally solve the problem. Expanding the role of “middle power” countries is an important idea, but I think the more urgent issue is how to limit the use of vetoes by the permanent members of the Security Council and how to create an international law to prevent wars. Isn’t there a limit to changing the existing structure of the UN?

As Christopher S. Chivvis writes, the Russian-Ukrainian war has also drawn attention to “hybrid warfare”. The emergence of transnational hacktivist groups and the publication of Russian military intelligence by private satellite companies, as well as the tactical use of new weapons, all point to the future of warfare. In particular, the utility of tanks, a traditional core weapon, has been fundamentally questioned, and Ukraine’s aggressive use of drones has allowed it to deliver tactical and psychological shocks to its opponents cheaply and with minimal casualties, despite its asymmetric power compared to Russia. This is not to say that these new weapons can completely replace conventional weapons. According to the UK’s Royal United Services Institute (RUSI), 90% of Ukrainian drones were destroyed in the first five months of the war, and the average life expectancy of a fixed-wing unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) was about six flights.

However, it is clear that the face of warfare is changing. There are now multiple ways of fighting a war, and there is no one-size-fits-all weapon. Last year, China seemed to test-fire a hypersonic missile that could penetrate the U.S. Missile Defense (MD). The future of the arms race in emerging technologies and the future of warfare is becoming more complex than anyone can predict. As the pace and intensity of warfare increase, so does the rate at which equipment and supplies are consumed. Therefore, even if the United States has overwhelming military superiority, it may become difficult for other countries to sustain a large-scale all-out war on their own for an extended period of time, and the United States may not be able to rely on its own military power in the future. It’s time to rely more heavily on the cooperation of allies and friends, and isn’t it time to attach less significance to the military might of conventional weapons?

As the article “The Thucydides Trap: Are the U.S. and China Headed for War?” by Allison explains, there is growing anxiety about whether the U.S.-China conflict is falling into the “Thucydides Trap,” in which mutual checks between a superpower and an emerging nation is turning into war. Military tensions over the Taiwan Strait and economic rivalry for global hegemony over semiconductor technology and rare earths are also on the rise. As China bares its claws, the U.S. appears more impatient and self-serving than before in its efforts to ward off these challenges which make its neighbors and allies are now looking to carve out their own paths. Europe has devised a pragmatic “de-risking” strategy of reducing its dependence on China without antagonizing it, and countries like Saudi Arabia and the UAE have expressed confidence in their ability to determine their own relationship with the United States and China.

Despite China’s economic crisis thesis, significant debt from the BRI, and military power that still lags behind the U.S., its progress to date is undeniable, and it is expected to challenge or surpass the U.S. in more and more areas. In the meantime, it is unlikely that the current U.S. strategy of all-encompassing containment of China will change, and China will continue to respond with an “eye for an eye” strategy. For now, China’s economic and military gap with the U.S. will limit its options for confronting the U.S., but its options will increase.

In response, the Biden administration is trying to talk to China with a “De-risking” policy, but it is not much different from the previous Decoupling strategy in that it is unlikely that China will be receptive to dialog with the United States, given the escalation of sanctions on China and is also extremely close to Taiwan, a core Chinese interest. But Xi Jinping is using it to his advantage. By emphasizing external threats internally, he is creating an autocratic power and building an anti-Western coalition externally. Both the United States and China recognize the need for crisis management, but like a bicycle with broken brakes, they keep rolling. For the United States, concessions sound like the wrong thing to do at this critical moment, when we cannot afford to lose high-tech and military technology to China. However, political rhetoric that makes China the enemy or confuses our allies and partners could backfire in favor of China. After all, when it comes down to it, trust in the current democratic system is likely to crumble the moment the United States turns to its own self-interest.

The article ‘Russia’s Perpetual Geopolitics’ by Stephen Kotkin discusses Russia’s misleading perception of the external world. The most prominent feature of Putin’s government is the “strong state” perception, which is overly eager to have Russia’s influence recognized by the West and endangered by its ambition to lead the world order despite the country’s backward capabilities in the military and industrial sectors. Kotkin argues that what Russia needs to advance, more than military modernization, is a competent and responsible government capable of analyzing foreign relations realistically.

The failure to predict Russia’s invasion of Ukraine indicates that Russia’s perception in international politics is completely different from the way the West understands Russia. Putin’s government perceives the Eurasian region as still within its sphere of influence; it also calls for a return to great power, criticizes the U.S. hegemony, and sees China as a possible partner in a multipolar order. Therefore, it sees the current U.S.-China hegemonic rivalry not as a simple trade war, but as an all-around confrontation that will reshape the international system, which is both a challenge and an opportunity for Russia. Furthermore, as the Wall Street Journal notes, “Putin is the sole decision maker, taking all the details of defense and diplomacy into account,” making it even more difficult to analyze Russia’s movements and predict its intentions.

With the invasion of Ukraine, Russia is likely to go further downhill, eliminating itself from competition with the West in terms of military and national power. But even so, Russia’s “brinkmanship” poses a major risk to international relations. As Russia’s diplomatic ground shrinks, Putin will seek to increase cooperation with non-Western countries, most notably with China. While China seems to be trying to distance itself from Russia to some extent, it is not a country to be taken lightly, and if North Korea is added to the Sino-Russian Alliance, a neo-Cold War-style configuration would pose a major security threat. What options can Russia and North Korea consider in a situation where it is difficult to expect Russia to change its position through warnings and condemnations?

https://www.usip.org/publications/2023/07/competition-china-us-should-double-down-multilateralism

According to a United States Institute of Peace publication, “minilateralism” is the current trend in international politics. It says, minilateralism is a foreign policy strategy between bilateralism and multilateralism that reflects the growing trend of middle powers preferring a multilateral world instead of choosing between the U.S.-China rivalry. QUAD, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, the BRICS, G7, etc. are examples of minilateralism, which seeks to reduce the complexity of multilateralism and pursue practical solutions. Therefore, in the context of intensifying U.S.-China rivalry, the United States should not force other countries to choose between the United States and China. Also, the United States should carefully evaluate it and not overly rely on small blocs that may alienate non-aligned countries.

As the author says, multilateralism, which has been the mainstay of the world order, is being increasingly questioned for its effectiveness. This is because Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has revealed the lack of ability of international organizations to resolve international disputes such as maritime sovereignty and trade, and to manage global issues such as environmental protection and epidemics, while the rise of middle powers has increased the ability of regional organizations to solve practical problems. In addition, the international outlook, where the United States was the sole global leader, has changed significantly due to China’s substantial challenges, and U.S. allies are increasing their own military capabilities in response to China’s security threats, and Southeast Asian countries such as Singapore are increasing their military cooperation with China. As a result, the United States has lost some of its geopolitical weight, and the Biden administration, which declared that it would restore multilateralism, eventually adopted region-centered multilateralism and economic protectionism for national interests. 

But whether this is a failure of multilateralism and a return to unilateralism, I am skeptical. There are more and more issues that require international cooperation, and the moment the United States chooses unilateralism and isolationism, China will step into the gap and try to seize international influence. If China works with other countries to set international standards that are unfavorable to the U.S., it will pose a major threat to the U.S. in all areas, including military and economic. Therefore, at least as long as the Chinese threat persists, the U.S. will have no choice but to pursue multilateralism, and what it lacks in multilateralism it will make up for in pragmatic, informal cooperation, as large organizations are nearly impossible to reform. However, regional and issue-oriented cooperation is an alternative to multilateralism, not a comprehensive and fundamental solution.