North Korea has always responded in a similar way when it comes to its nuclear program. North Korea’s argument is that it needs to negotiate with the United States on a phased approach to denuclearization, not nuclear abolition, and that sanctions must be lifted before that can happen. North Korea’s “denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula” is a similar story. It is not only North Korea’s nuclear program, but also the withdrawal of US troops from South Korea and the removal of the US nuclear umbrella. It sounds plausible, but in the end, it’s like saying North Korea has no intention of dismantling its nuclear arsenal. By giving the other side hope, Kim Jong-un gets what he wants and stalls for time to develop the nuclear program. It also raises fears that North Korea is actually moving closer to its goals of recognizing itself as a nuclear power and reunifying the Korean Peninsula, which it has had since Kim Il Sung.
North Korea already has about 50 nuclear weapons and is expected to have more than 100 by 2030. But the international response has been frustrating. Neither Trump’s top-down approach nor Obama’s strategic patience has been effective, and military cooperation between North Korea, China, and Russia has intensified since the war in Ukraine. In addition, North Korea’s development of methods to evade military detection and interception has raised concerns that South Korea’s three axes (Kill-chain, KAMD, KMPR) to counter North Korea’s nuclear program could be breached.
Tae Young-ho, a defector from North Korea who worked as a diplomatic minister at the North Korean Embassy in the United Kingdom and is now a member of the South Korean National Assembly, said that the best way to prevent a nuclear war and maintain peace at this point in North Korea’s nuclear arsenal is for South Korea to temporarily nuclear-armed itself. While this is unlikely, it does not appear to be many options left. A regime change seems to be the only way to dismantle North Korea without a military strike, but it’s not likely. While denuclearization through dialogue would be nice, it seems unlikely, so the next best option to stop North Korea from using nuclear weapons now seems to be solid pressure rather than relying on negotiations. North Korea has already endured economic sanctions for a long time, and more of the same will only go so far. There needs to be a real demonstration of will and capability to make North Korea feel threatened. This would include a qualitatively and quantitatively enhanced missile defense system, protection from nuclear attack, and the ability to strike first against a North Korean nuclear threat, along with high-level intelligence gathering on the North Korean leadership. Amid this complex international situation, there are fewer and fewer discussions about resolving North Korea’s nuclear program. However, this may be one of the few remaining opportunities to restrain North Korea.
One reply on “week 10”
Jungmi,
As I had hoped, you have written a thoughtful and very knowledgeable blog post on North Korea. Your description of the Three Axes was important and accurate. Each of them raises a number of specific questions, including whether Kim might feel it necessary to try to launch a preemptive attack to avoid being neutralized. Given the nature of North Korean society and the fact that it is a totalitarian state, it is extremely difficult to actually know what is going on, but it remains one of the most difficult international security problems of all. –Professor Wallerstein