Marco Perez Jr. Week Three Post // US and NATO Response to Russian Aggression

One of the most critical explanations behind a State’s foreign policy strategy is based on the models known as the “Security Model”, the “Domestic Model”, and the“Norms Model” introduced by Scott Sagan. In short, the “Security Model” describes a State’s behavior to enhance defenses or perform preemptive/preventive strikes based on how its military capabilities measure up to its neighboring nations. The “Domestic Model” refers to how a nation’s domestic political, economic, and social-cultural trends influence a country’s interactions with other nations. Lastly, the “Norms Model” is the idea of a country’s desire to be accepted by the world as a great power.

In the article, “Russia’s Perpetual Geopolitics: Putin Returns to a Historically Pattern”, Stephen Kotkin explains Russia’s international behavior past and present by prefacing such models. Mr. Kotin explains Russia’s geopolitics has been rooted in its geographical location, regime cognitive bias, and resentment of the West.

The article highlights historically Russia has traditionally performed aggressive expansionism as a form of foreign policy demonstrated by the rules of Peter the Great, Alexander I, Joseph Stalin, and most recently Vladimir Putin. These overly aggressive campaigns underscore that Russia’s idea of robust security has been and currently is external expansion conquests.
Russia’s distinct terrain is another element that has molded its place in the globe. Russia contains the Pacific and Arctic Oceans as natural borders, however, the Arctic Ocean is currently under dispute. The country is surrounded by states former under its regime such as Ukraine and the Baltic States. It faces the rising power of China and is surrounded by NATO member States. This geographical landscape has forced Russia to suffer a Security Dilemma by viewing its neighbors as enemies instead of allies. This is evident as Putin has repeatedly indicated the United States is using Ukraine as a tool to contain Russia.

Moving forward, Russia’s domestic regime has also contributed to international behavior toward Ukraine as it has always worked to be a strong state. Its authoritarian rule has constructed a State-dependent polis full of nationalism. Such behavior stems from the forced implementation of the cognitive biases implanted by Russia’s past and present rulers. Putin has routinely compared himself to Peter the Great who Mr. Kotkin’s article described as the first powerful state forger who oppressed individual initiative, fostered official mistrust, and strengthened patron-client inclinations. This is an example of how domestic policies affect Russian foreign policy with Ukraine because its current leader idolizes a dictator in a country that has historically and systematically been assimilated to agree with the ambitious cognitive biases of its rulers.

Lastly, Russia’s resentment of the West has contributed to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. Russia has always taken pride in being unique as its historical leaders never conformed to conventionality. Russia has exhibited an imbalance of its ambitions vs. its capabilities. This imbalance causes Russia to act overly ambitious, miscalculated, and irate in its skirmish with Ukraine. The country refuses to accept they have lost the Cold War and is engaging in an undefeatable battle with Western Powers. Russia has done this to be viewed by world powers as different sort of in its own class. Its desire to be accepted by the world as a superpower capable of acting as it pleases has led to the Ukrainian conflict.

Finding a peaceful end to the war in Ukraine is growing increasingly difficult because both sides cannot fathom a defeat in this war, that includes the NATO and its allies. The Kotin reading points to Russian exceptionalism plaguing the Russian leadership since the sixteenth century as a major factor. This “great power pride” is the reason why Russia has been seen as the diplomatic black sheep of the international community to this day. The Mearsheimer reading, though slightly outdated, examens an opposing viewpoint, stating that the countries of NATO are partly to blame for the slim odds of peaceful resolution. In this piece, the author explains that the invasion of Ukraine is the direct result of aggressive NATO expansion policies. This is evident by the known involvement of the United States in the Orange Revolution, a coup d’état that usurped the democratically elected president and installed a pro-NATO government hand-picked by the Unites States.

Putin cannot tolerate a defeat in Ukraine by Russia’s historic enemy, yet NATO will not Tolerate a Russian victory in Ukraine so what is the solution? I agree with Mearsheimer’s idea to make Ukraine a Neutral territory, unable to commit to either Russia or NATO, in order to at least bring a cease fire to the area. Besides, I believe the United States should consider thwarting China’s economic and military pursuits as the main priority in foreign relations. Such a priority would involve collaborating with Russia, as we have done when dealing with the chemical weapons crisis in Syria. Finally, cooperation with Russia will be essential when developing lasting solutions to the climate crisis in the artic ocean. This issue should be high on Russia’s list since they share the largest land mass in/bordering the artic circle and are considering the possible national security risks developing in the region.

Traditional security threats: US and NATO Response to Russian Aggression
CLASS #3
When regarding the title of the next class. “Traditional Security Threats… US and NATO Respond to Russian Aggression. The Russian Crimean War would be at the forefront of the mind. A war alarming neighboring countries and people across Europe was a costly, grizzly conflict that displaced thousands, unearthing and harvesting the roots of many families; countless lives were affected. Within this entry, this blog post will describe speculations about the response of NATO and the US concerning the prevention (lack of) of Russian provocation and environmental disregard of the policies that maintain the fragile liberal world order to gain economic advantages.
The Russian war in Crimea is not the first time Russia has tried to redraw the world over other political entities’ heads. They have bullied and harassed neighboring countries such as Hungry, Georgia, and Czechoslovakia in the reading of Toel, Gerard. Robert Kagan stated an older analogy: “The details of who did what to precipitate Russia’s war against Georgia are not very important…Of course not, because that morally ambiguous dispute is rightly remembered as a minor part of a much bigger drama.” Robert Kagan inferred that making a conflict morally ambiguous could mask the perpetrators. Western powers do not have much power when it comes to moral disputes. Ambiguity allows for details regarding a situation or a belief to be held by the populous of a country to be personally biased. Within Crimea, Russian forces manifested an insurgency that seemed like a revolution of the people, then the influence of Russia. Allows Russia to pardon themselves, giving the appearance of a freedom fighter. It is for the separation and annexation of Crimea if the “people” desire it. The “people” can have very dubious interests. NATO believed in a Passive approach not to stir conflict. Still, their adherence to Russia’s consistent breaches of trust allowed Russia to spread its influence throughout the competition and let its seeds sow more conflict over time.
Source Kramer, Andrew E’s
The second article I will be looking at will be Andrew E. Kramer’s “In the Russian Artic, A Frosty Military Campaign.” a New York Times article discussing the Melting of the Last frontiers of the world. The Arctic Ocean teaming with resources uncovered from the melting polar ice caps has induced a frenzy in which claims to territories and maritime borders are being discussed. Russia is devoted to holding the strongman persona during Climate change. Russia has increased its military effort in defending its northern border—the melting ice caps, once deterring invaders, now to a lovely stretching cost line. In order to benefit from the polar ice caps, Russia has taken to strengthening their borders from access. Their hope is supposedly to strengthen their border and maintain their limited resources. The article discusses the march of clunky military trucks, a renovated runway, and the introduction of 13 new ships to the already four dozen in service. Russia plans to take advantage of these northern tides.
These two articles discuss two different methods to strengthen the Russian sphere of influence. Russia’s desire to stir the pot will affect the political climate, and the US’s declining power will allow for more speakers in current world affairs. The US and NATO are hesitant to discuss sanctions to cripple Russia. It seems this will be one of many talking points as Climate change affects the current trajectory of World power. The conflict of resources will always be a debate in which there will be no victor.
In Conclusion, both Articles give an exciting insight into world affairs—Russia’s fear of losing relevance and NATO and the US’s hesitancy to take on more problems.
Sources:
-Toal, Gerard. “Why Does Russia Invade Its Neighbors? Near Abroad.: Putin, the West, the Contest Over Ukraine, and the Caucasus. Oxford UP, 2017,pp17-54.

• Kramer, Andrew E. “In the Russian Artic, A Frosty Military Campaign.” New York Time, 23 May 2021, p A9(L) Gale General OneFile

This week’s reading selection analyzes the Russian invasion of Ukraine from the geopolitical and historical focus but also explores some of the aspects of why the invasion has shown limitations of the military power of the Kremlin and the complex relationship between the US and Russia. In particular, something that caught my attention was Freedamn’s discussion on how the military power of one nation would be as good as its supreme and operational commanders. In addition, the effectiveness of the takeover would depend on how well the command is prepared to navigate the nation’s resistance. 

Freedman’s article underscores the immense responsibility placed upon military commanders. They are entrusted with the fate and reputation of their nations, requiring unwavering determination, the ability to make critical decisions under pressure, and the capacity to assess situations and allocate resources on the spot. Moreover, commanders must be willing to adapt and consider alternative strategies, even if it means deviating from established plans. As highlighted by Freedman, this latter point serves as a critical point, where the contrasting commanding approaches used by Russia and Ukraine (modern vs. hierarchical) have significantly influenced the war’s course. 

The contrasting command structures employed by Russia and Ukraine have emerged as a particularly compelling aspect of this conflict. Since the beginning of the invasion, Russia’s frequent changes in its military leadership have raised questions about Russia’s preparedness for the war and highlighted the tension between Putin’s ambitious objectives and his rigid hierarchical command approach. In this system, commanders often require approval for their actions, risking charges of insubordination if they act independently. On the other hand, Ukraine has adopted a flexible modern command structure to allow commanders to respond swiftly to changing circumstances and adopt strategies to counter Russian advances. As a result, Ukraine has been avalible to bolster Ukraine’s resilience but also expose Russia’s command structure vulnerabilities. 

A recent development that illustrated the challenges faced by the Kremlin’s leadership was the rebellion of the Wagere Group leader, which showed the internal contradictions and power struggles within the Russian leadership. It raises questions about the unity and cohesiveness of the Kremlin’s decision-making process and the extent to which commanders are willing to challenge the “status” to pursue their objectives. 

As this conflict evolves, it would be interesting to continue to see how both countries’ different commanding and leadership dynamics play out. Such insight would provide an analysis of how military campaigns and leadership affect the dynamics of warfare.

The article ‘Russia’s Perpetual Geopolitics’ by Stephen Kotkin discusses Russia’s misleading perception of the external world. The most prominent feature of Putin’s government is the “strong state” perception, which is overly eager to have Russia’s influence recognized by the West and endangered by its ambition to lead the world order despite the country’s backward capabilities in the military and industrial sectors. Kotkin argues that what Russia needs to advance, more than military modernization, is a competent and responsible government capable of analyzing foreign relations realistically.

The failure to predict Russia’s invasion of Ukraine indicates that Russia’s perception in international politics is completely different from the way the West understands Russia. Putin’s government perceives the Eurasian region as still within its sphere of influence; it also calls for a return to great power, criticizes the U.S. hegemony, and sees China as a possible partner in a multipolar order. Therefore, it sees the current U.S.-China hegemonic rivalry not as a simple trade war, but as an all-around confrontation that will reshape the international system, which is both a challenge and an opportunity for Russia. Furthermore, as the Wall Street Journal notes, “Putin is the sole decision maker, taking all the details of defense and diplomacy into account,” making it even more difficult to analyze Russia’s movements and predict its intentions.

With the invasion of Ukraine, Russia is likely to go further downhill, eliminating itself from competition with the West in terms of military and national power. But even so, Russia’s “brinkmanship” poses a major risk to international relations. As Russia’s diplomatic ground shrinks, Putin will seek to increase cooperation with non-Western countries, most notably with China. While China seems to be trying to distance itself from Russia to some extent, it is not a country to be taken lightly, and if North Korea is added to the Sino-Russian Alliance, a neo-Cold War-style configuration would pose a major security threat. What options can Russia and North Korea consider in a situation where it is difficult to expect Russia to change its position through warnings and condemnations?

When we look at the Russian invasion of Ukraine, many would argue that it was inevitable. Russia has been looking to expand their power into former USSR countries, and as we see with war, proximity is always prioritized. Following the annexation of Crimea in 2014, it proved that Russia was ready to expand its power in neighboring countries. We saw their involvement in Georgia and Ukraine, in 2008 and 2014, respectively, allying themselves with separatists movements to then uphold their power in these countries. However, in “Why the Ukraine Crisis is the West’s Fault,” by John. J Mearsheimer, the blame is placed on the United States and the EU. I agree with this analysis, that the U.S  and the EU’s lack of intervention in the annexation of Crimea, allowed Putin to believe he could also take Ukraine.

  The EU failed to bring Georgia and Ukraine into NATO, to weaken the Russian influence in the separatist movements. This was crucial in the current ongoing war, as Russian troops entered from Donetsk and Luhansk, and said they recognized these regions as independent from Ukraine. They then used this to continue to invade Ukraine, and attempt to take Kyiv. If the EU allowed Ukraine to join NATO, while we cannot deny that Russia would interfere to stop this like it did with Georgia, it would’ve brought more protection than if Russia invaded Ukraine without their ever being even an attempt. All they did was provoke Russia by talking about Ukraine joining NATO. They also provoked Russia by its constant expansion into neighboring countries in the region. We know that in war, proximity is prioritized and when NATO began to expand, it was a threat to Russia and its former Soviet empire which they were desperate to rebuild. 

Mearsheimer also points out that Russia would never standby as the US interfered in Ukraine with its National Endowment for Democracy. The government began pumping money to Ukraine to prompt democracy which angered the Russians. It’s not illogical to be angry that countries that oppose you are expanding their power in nations that surround you. However, I believe that the US should’ve finished what they started and when Russia took Crimea, took steps to militarily intervene when it came to Russia’s expansion. They interfered, along with the EU and NATO, but never took real steps to protect Ukraine, leading to Russia’s inevitable devastating carnage of Ukraine. They talked a big storm but never took steps to weaken Russia’s hold in that country, in the separatist movements, and in their military presence. 

History repeats itself, Hitler took Czechoslovakia and then began to invade the rest of Europe. You cannot allow a country to exceed its power into another sovereign nation and then think that will be it. We allowed Russia to annex Crimea and therefore should’ve expected the war in Ukraine. Historians have said Putins’ attempt to take Ukraine would happen again sooner or later, and it happened 8 years after their annexation of Crimea.