As a student of international affairs, I think about why events occurring in one country affect outcomes in another country or region. Sometimes, at first appearance, the significance of events unfolding in one region seem obscure or unrelated to the developments in a different region, but in the hyper-interconnected global economy of the 21st century; what happens in country (A) impacts country (B) at a greater magnitude than at any other point in modern history. Edward Lorenz’s theory might even hold up to scientific scrutiny in the decades ahead, as further advances in AI and the Internet of Things come online.
Recent events across Eurasia has me wondering how Moscow and St. Petersberg might respond. For example, the independent states of Serbia and Kosovo recently normalized economic relations. They formally agreed to a one-year suspension over recognition claims – Serbia agreeing to stop claims that Kosovo does not exist as a sovereign state.
Although measuring the outcomes of normalization requires time, the ability of Serbia and Kosovo to engage in open cross-border commerce will likely have immediate positive economic benefits for both states. For example, removing Kosovo’s 100 percent tax on Serbian goods will likely benefit the Serbian economy. Moreover, Serbia and Kosovo have mutually agreed to recognize professional licenses and educational certificates from doctors, lawyers, and engineers. Before normalization, academic certificates from Kosovo were not recognized in Serbia and visa versa. The removal of this restriction is likely to have immediate benefits. Moreover, economic normalization might encourage further discussions between the European Union, Kosovar leadership, and Serbian officials regarding the EU accession process, which both states have sought after for years. Finally, Kosovo has agreed to formally recognize Israel and move its embassy to the capital, Jelersiurm, becoming the first Mulsim majority state to do so.
So what does this mean for Russia, and how are the Russians likely to respond? Provided Serbia’s strong affinity for Russian culture, what impact will this agreement have on Russia – Serbia relations?
What impact, if any, does this have on Israeli – Russian relations?
This week’s reading by Gerard Toal offers a useful framework to approach these questions. Toal’s Geopolitical culture construct provides an interpretative analysis of Russian geopolitical motivations by addressing three distinct fronteers— who are the Russian people, how does this narrative survive, and what does prosperity look like in the Russian context.
Developing these constructs further, Toal describes three Ideological networks, resulting from economic drivers towards modernization, collective national identity narratives that centralize authoritative power, and state-level security capabilities. Held together, Toal’s geopolitical assessment appears to suggest that Russian state actions are driven by the preservation of their national identity coupled with an ambition towards economic modernization.
Assuming Toal’s Geopolitical culture assessment of Russia is accurate, we can begin to build a forward-looking analysis that as the Kosovar and Serbian economies normalize, Russia will likely attempt to pull their economic activity closer towards its orbit.
We can observe a similar occurrence happening in Belarus, where Russia’s little green men have arrived. Putin’s commitment of military support for Lukashenko has been widely reported in the last few weeks. It’s reasonable to conclude that backing Lukashenko serves the strategic geopolitical objective of Putin, or what Stephen Kotkin refers to as Russain exceptionalism and the sense of a special mission to correct perceived historical wrongs. As Kotkin points out, as a result of Russian defeats in the Russo-Japanese War, WWI, and the Cold War, the Soviet Union lost approximately 2 million miles of territory. This history continues to impact the Russian psyche and what Kotkin calls a sense of perennial vulnerability, humiliation, and a feeling of betrayal at an international scale.
This historical perspective might also give credence to O’Hanlon’s argument that under Putin’s leadership, Moscow and St. Petersberg will likely pursue a geopolitical strategy to recapture post-Soviet space. For example, Russia’s invitation of George and annexation of Crimea might inspire the future playbook whereby the Kremlin attempts to expand territorially inside Baltic states on the assumption that NATO partners will not respond militarily from fear of risking military escalation to a nuclear conflict. And what about the Balkans? Is Russia preparing to reclaim post-Soviet space with an eye on Moldovia, Romania, or even Serbia?
Answers are uncertain, however as international events and new power balances continue to unfold across Eurasia, gauging Russia’s response will remain a key priority to U.S. national security interests.