Month: September 2020

The Bolton,R. Chicago journal of International Law article “Should we take global governance seriously ?” discusses the different factions within the US regarding global governance. The article states the different understandings of global governance depending on people level of education. According to the article, highly educated group better understand the meaning behind global governance and the importance  in discussing it  comparing  to everyone else.

In order to keep the international security stable, global governance should consist on different aspects such as the legitimacy and authority of the use of force through constraining and limiting the nation-states themselves. For instance, the use of military force is one of the major decisions around the world and it is crucial when it comes to the worth of global governance. Limiting the decision making of military use of force helps in the diminution of sovereignty and the advance of global governance. Generally, global governance should be taken seriously either now or in the future; as the globalism category believes in. In regards to the US, the importance of the topic will result in a reduced constitutional autonomy, impaired popular sovereignty, reduction of our international power, and limitations on our domestic and foreign policy options and solutions.

The concept of global governance has always been fundamentally a major topic for decades. It has been approached differently within the framework of international relations and considered as a response to the current globalization process.

 

Multilateralism can be defined as unbiased trade and equal footing in foreign policy as well trade policy. One example of multilateralism is the United Nations, which is a way of allowing for multiple, more democratic and even distribution in trade and foreign policy. On the other hand, unilateralism is a tendency of a country to conduct themselves on their own, without consulting others.

Nowadays, there has been more divide between China and various European countries in their trade policy. This is allowing for the divergence of the economic and trade cooperation between China and various European countries. Prior to recent events, this has been more of a multilateral relationship. However, there is a more mixed relationship economically between China and Europe, along with not just economic but social values. This is very different from the United States, which is trying to take a more unilateral approach by trying to become more self-sufficient and decrease reliance on China in its economic reliance to Chinese manufacturing and relationships.

The United States policy and approach can be viewed more as unilateral in terms of trade policy, while for the European countries that have been long trading partners with China, such as Germany, this has been more of a switch recently from multilateral towards less reliance and economic policy.

 

References:

Johnson, K. (2020, June 25). How Europe Fell Out of Love With China. Retrieved September 06, 2020, from https://foreignpolicy.com/2020/06/25/china-europe-rival-strategic-competitor-huawei/

Perhaps there is no better time for nations to act in a multilateral fashion than when tasked with tackling a global pandemic. This is the precise point that Forbes’ Christine Ro poses in her op-ed entitled “Vaccine Multilateralism is the Alternative to Vaccine Nationalism.”  The “global effort” being called for comes in the form of the Covid-19 Vaccines Global Access (COVAX) Facility, which seeks to pool together the combined resources of participating countries to help further advance solutions to selecting and advancing vaccine candidates along with production and distribution.

Over 170 countries are at some stage of talks to join the conglomerate and this includes both the European Union and China. Some of the more notable absentees from COVAX are the United States and the Russian Federation. In the case of the U.S., the rejection of global cooperation appears to be an extension of the Trump Administration’s enduring hostility towards scientific consensus as well as the World Health Organization. The WHO represents the cornerstone of multilateralism in the global public health arena and the administration’s outspoken criticism of the organization is very much on-brand.

The article raises a critical point that I feel is relatively glazed-over in the media given that vaccine candidates themselves have been the primary focus of the news cycle. Distribution methods and mass-manufacturing of vaccines – which will require a monumental mobilization of global resources – are a primary focus of COVAX. Proponents of the “vaccine nationalism” exhibited by the U.S. and Russia argue that lack of cooperation can breed the same kind of innovation seen during the Space Race of the Cold War. However, this analogy is an apples-to-oranges comparison. Here we do not have a struggle based on a competition for global hegemony between two superpowers; instead, the situation is a global health catastrophe that requires a much larger mobilization of resources.

The New York Times Article “U.S. Examines Whether Saudi Nuclear Program Could Lead to Bomb Effort” discusses the findings of spy agencies this week in Saudi’s production of nuclear fuel and the role China will play in enabling to create and build it. The report does say that the findings are much too early and that nothing would likely be built in a short amount of time. The article describes Saudi’s steer away from the U.S. post- J.C.P.O.A as Saudi believes they “can’t rely on anyone reining in the Iranians, and they are going to have to deter Iran themselves,” said Rolf Mowatt-Larssen, a former C.I.A. officer and director of intelligence and counterintelligence at the Energy Department. So now Saudi has turned to China to “begin building the multibillion-dollar infrastructure needed to produce nuclear fuel. China has traditionally not insisted on such strict nonproliferation safeguards, and is eager to lock in Saudi oil supplies.” However, the U.S. has enabled Saudi Arabia”s nuclear proliferation by remaining quiet while remaining strict and intolerant about Iran’s nuclear production ability.

This article particularly caught my interest after our last discussion in class on the levels of security and the impact of nuclear proliferation. I also think this article ties in pretty well with Burn’s question on the appropriate extent the U.S. should push its global dominance. He argues that to begin remedying the past tricky methodology, future administrations should begin with “the purpose and limits of the United States’ international engagement”.

Joseph Nye’s article, “The Rise and Fall of American Hegemony from Wilson to Trump,” calls attention to the decline of Pax America and the unipolar world order led by the U.S. since the end of the Cold War.

While the U.S. and allied partners grapple with shifts in the global power balance, the world economy and strategic interests among nation-states have become increasingly interdependent, perhaps more than any point in our collective history.  This warrants thinking on the various types of power used by regimes to influence geopolitical outcomes. In conventional terms, hard-power is the use of military force: mobilized boots on the ground and airborne B-52s. Conversely, the use of non-military means to win geopolitical objectives is defined by Nye as soft-power, which is not a euphemism for weakness or ineptitude. In fact, the profound success of Wilsonian Interventionism, the rules-based world order that immerged as a result, and strategies of game-theory, which aided the U.S. victory in the Cold War, are prime examples of effective soft-power.

Soft-power does not have a moral prerequisite; it’s neither good nor bad. The application of soft-power is what counts. Still, soft-power, as a tool of statecraft, is a mechanism in support of international democratic institutions.

On the opposite end of the spectrum, the term sharp-power, first defined by Christopher Walker and Jessica Ludwig, describes authoritarian regimes, such as China and Russia. It’s my understanding that sharp-power is inherently bad, as it strives towards illiberal ends and undermines democratic institutions.  The  Russian sponsored interference of the U.S.  presidential election in 2016, or Chinese censorship demands of the NBA and Hollywood film production studios are examples of sharp-power. 

Increasingly, it seems, free and open societies are exploited by illiberal, authoritarian regimes, who aim to reconstitute the rules-based world order to serve their ambition.  In a Foreign Affairs article, Nye further describes the features of sharp-power and the difficulty in responding to it.

The bygone era of Wilsonian Interventionism offers a rich historical context to think through the complexities of the modern world.  In addressing current challenges with China, President Trump’s zero-sum approach to leadership, which Nye describes as Hobbesian realism, is easy to dismiss as unproductive. Indeed, he has strained relations with prominent international institutions and allies. However, Trump’s response to Chinese sharp-power might demonstrate the most substantive results compared to past administrations and other world powers, considering how far China has gamed the international system since joining the WTO in 2001.

 

 

In his article “The Self Destruction of American Power: Washington Squandered the Unipolar Moment”, Fareed Zakaria describes how the United States lost its position as the world’s sole superpower after the end of the Cold War and how the Trump administration has worked to further weaken the power of the US. Zakaria argues that the US has “mishandled” it’s hegemony through breaking international norms and alienating its allies with the Trump administration being a particularly egregious offender in this regard. The issue that I have with Zakaria is that, while his analysis of the US’s foreign relations since the end of the Second World War is accurate, and his characterization of the Trump administration’s policy as isolationist and unilateral  is also mostly true, he seems to criticize the Trump Administration for making decisions that the author would seemingly be in favor of and thus undermines what would otherwise be a very strong arguement.

For example, Zakaria dismisses the Trump Administrations foreign policy initiatives in the Middle East as simply “subcontracting” American foreign policy to Saudi Arabia and Israel. Wouldn’t Zakaria want to have supporting the interests of its allies in the region? Zakaria also dismisses the Trump Administration’s efforts to engage with North Korea as him simply trying to get a Nobel prize. Once again, wouldn’t this attempt to use diplomacy and dialogue instead of force and bluster be applauded by Zakaria?

I believe that the article would be better off without the mentioning this foreign policy initiatives because in doing so, Zakaria undermines his argument about the bellicose and isolationist nature of the Trump Administration. In the article does describe how Trump has pulled out of agreements and undermined relationships with the allies of the US, he should simply leave it at that instead of trying to paint attempts at increasing American influence as something to lament.

One man’s joy is another man’s sorrow.  This old saying might prove to be right – as cynical and brutal as that may sound. At least as far as India’s pre-pandemic dreams and the post-pandemic prospects for China are concerned, and related to the consequences of Corona on the power struggle in Asia. From the pen of Jeffrey Gettleman, The New York Times headlines under “Coronavirus shatters India´s big dreams”.  Other media have already dealt extensively with the topic too. Is COVID-19 simply the last coffin nail for India’s earlier overheated and now crashed economy and the icing on the cake for China’s further rise? Or is this crisis a serious hit for the US in re-establishing itself as a global power?

On the one hand, Gettleman did a good job of collecting some facts. Although India is the world’s fifth-largest[1] economy by nominal GDP, it has suffered already in the past years the loss of momentum.[2] With the recent 24% decline,

India´s economy has shrunk faster than any other major nation’s,

according to NYT. The perspective of 200 million people in poverty and the ravaging virus with an estimated 80,000 new cases daily eats up labor and purchasing power. While government debt reaches historic highs, the churn of the market is unsettling investors. All at the same time. The article hints also correctly that China’s economy has recovered and growing again and mentions later the rise of anti-muslim feelings in India. We should go into this later.

On the other hand, the NYT article remains indebted especially to the American reader with an explanation of what this all should mean in the context of the USA. A regional great power with the world’s largest population in four years on the endless southern borders of China as a stabilizing ally and as a market would be of extreme interest to the USA. However, these seem to remain dreams not only in New Delhi but also in Washington DC. A major reason for this is logically the economic breakdown. But even if the two-third hopelessly outdated armament paired with the unbelievable Indian bureaucracy could be replaced overnight by a miracle[3], the inner instability will destroy the fruits. The Indian government has already taken the dangerous route of religious discrimination. While Christians are being persecuted more and more in the Middle East and Africa (with 245 million the most persecuted group in the world), in India the Muslims are the discriminated ones. Inciting religious impatience is in most cases profit-oriented. In the end, however, the suffering of a religious conflict is socialized (loss of human life, existence, cultural heritage) and the profits (seized property, land, political influence, etc.) privatized, while the economy shrinks. Thus, the USA will not only be weakened in the current economic struggle but will also gain another security problem in the form of an unstable regional power. Finally, I have been reminded of a Stephen M. Walt piece[4]: Once weakened and destabilized, which strategy India will choose? Balancing or bandwagoning?

On a personal note:  While India’s prime minister, Narendra Modi, and Israel’s Benjamin Netanyahu just recently confirmed their will to work closely together, the first is blamed for the too strict lockdown which led to economic catastrophe, against the latter thousands demonstrate blaming him acting far too laxly in the pandemic and a second outbreak. Other countries, other customs.

[1] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_countries_by_GDP_(nominal)

[2] A few years ago the very profitable diamond business already suffered in India. As a result of corruption and counterfeiting, some producers have shifted their focus.

[3] The blog author’s experience in his previous positions shows that a simple extension of framework agreements with the Indian government can often last 10 years. The danger that with every change of government (whichever contractual partner) everything will be rolled up again is inevitable.

[4] Walt, Stephen M. “Alliances: Balancing and Bandwagoning.” International Politics: Enduring Concepts and Contemporary Issues. 11th ed. Eds. Robert J. Art and Robert Jervis. Pearson, 2013, pp. 125-131.

Hey folks! Marcus Here! I must say that when I saw the headlines on Wednesday and after I read the article, I told myself, There you go! U.S. “Exceptionalism” at his best? Then, I remembered that our second class according to the syllabus is  on U.S. National Sovereignty and International Security: unilateralism vs multilateralism. This incident was definitely timely and most welcome. Needless to say that this is not the first time the U.S. has conducted unilateral sanctions against countries or high ranking officials of institutions, or better still taking measures without consulting those involved, and/or third parties.

So in the article, we can see that the sanctions  are primarily aimed at Fatou Bensouda, the ICC prosecutor, and the Head of the Prosecutor’s Jurisdiction, Complementary, and Cooperation Division, Phakiso Mochochoko. But the sanctions go beyond these two people. By freezing their assets, the sanctions have “a chilling effect on non-US banks and other companies outside of US jurisdiction who fear losing access themselves to the US banking system if they do not help the US to effectively export the sanctions measures.”

Given the article is from the Human rights Watch, I must warn you that it was written with “strong words”. I understand that the U.S. is not part of the ICC, and that back in 2018, when the ICC wanted to investigate the U.S. on allegedly committed crimes in Afghanistan, John Bolton who was then National Security Adviser said  that “we will not cooperate with the ICC” and that “for all intents and purposes, the ICC is already to us.” But I’m just curious to know how will the U.S. officials take the criticisms of Richard Dicker, international justice director at Human Rights Watch when he says, “The Trump administration’s perverse use of sanctions, devised for alleged terrorists and drug kingpins, against prosecutors seeking justice for grave international crimes, magnifies the failure of the US to prosecute torture,” and that, “The administration’s conjuring up a ‘national emergency’ to punish war crimes prosecutors shows utter disregard for the victims.”

I look forward to hearing you thoughts and comments!

 

Richard Haass, who currently serves as President of the Council of Foreign Relations, wrote a piece for the Brookings Institution called Five Not-So-Easy Pieces: The Debates on American Foreign Policy, which details and goes in depth into five approaches that the United States can take in its foreign policy philosophy and also outlines what the pros and cons in these approaches and what is perhaps the best option for the United States. Despite the fact that the article is a little over 20 years old, when reading this I found that what is talks about in depth is still relevant to what we see today as well as what we discussed in the first class session this past Tuesday.

Haass opens up the piece by outlining five essential question sets of US foreign policy that needs to be addressed: the proper priorities of US Foreign policy, to what extent if any should the US should add other states and enlist them pursing these priorities whatever they may be, the instruments of foreign policy and how they should be used in the policy the US is pursing, the resources required and how they should be allocated, and finally how policy itself should be constructed and implemented. Haass goes on to say that the US has many directions in its foreign policy priorities some examples include encouraging democracy and markets, maintaining American primacy, avoiding foreign policy entanglements, and other directions. In addition, more than one direction can be adopted however, the emphasis should be that priorities must be established because “trade-offs and opportunity costs are often unavoidable.”

According to Haass, all five questions that are posed when constructing policy are important, however they are all at the same time they are often obscured or uncertainty arises over specific foreign issues, which I concur with what he says because when dealing with certain issues whether it be China, North Korea, Iran, or even another less urgent issue, it can be difficult to decide what decisions should one take on a certain issue and whether that decision will work or will it come back to haunt them on basis of far overreach or not doing enough on that specific issue. Ultimately, Haass reveals that out of the five sets of questions, the first two are the most important in comparison to the other three since the first two as they “reflect the purposes of the United States and its basic approach to the world.” Haass again in my opinion, makes a very reasonable point, in that the foundation of foreign policy of the United States must be formed before going to the other topics of instrumentality, implementation, and process.

In terms of the approach and orientation of US Foreign policy approach, Haass argues that the concept of realism should be at the core of policy instead of going to approaches such as neo-isolationism or a foreign policy based on trade and promotion of exports, or even a policy of defending American primacy is most likely not going to succeed. Haass’ defense of the realism concept is what has been touched on this past class session in stressing order among rather than within states, as well as military power is sparingly used as well as as nuclear arsenals are reduced, and trade is based and conducted by the rules and not results driven. He also clarifies that these areas are the most important that the US participates in and where its feasible to implement and protect these policies, as well as stating that its okay for the US to promote democracy and markets and to assist on other humanitarian issues when its clearly atrocious,  as long as it does not put vital interests at risk and other states are contributing as well as the US isn’t doing the heavy work all the time.

Haass’ further elaborates on three major approaches that the US can take in its foreign policy: unilateralism, relying heavily on international institutions, or materialism that is less formal/universal. The unilateral approach can be beneficial by deceasing the need for compromise and maximizing speed of acting and doing more on its own, this concept is actually impractical in theory and in practice as only few tasks can the US carry alone as well as using this concept would be costly fiscally as well as the fact that universal participation is required for certain topics such as nuclear proliferation. While leaning heavily on global institutions sounds like a attractive idea on paper seeing  global organizations helping the US to bring stability to the world as well as less fiscal operations for the US, this policy according to Haass “require a strong consensus to operate effectively, and in most arenas of international life such consensus is missing.” The idea that major world powers have their own ideas and solutions for certain issues makes this approach more difficult then one thinks, and this concept would require humility from major super powers (which is essentially non existent).

Haass does not directly favor an approach in this article, but it seems that the readers would guess he would be in favor of the third approach which is the multilateral approach that is less formal/universal. Haass informs the readers while alliances do have their role in the world, as time passes, what is more common is “informal coalitions of parties able and willing to work together on behalf of a common purpose.” These types of coalitions is not ordeal but Haass takes it further by saying “but they are consistent with a world where the willingness of governments to cooperate varies from crisis to crisis and situation to situation, where great power consensus is unreliable, and where U.S. resources, however great, are still limited.” In order for US foreign policy to work and produce results, according to Haass, the US has the power on a economic, political, and military scale for sure but what it it lacks is the influence to influence others to follow its lead. This leads to the point that the US must focus on relations between states than conditions and coalitions to promote multilateral action, which Haass points out the US most be willing to take counsel from others to shape a stable international society, as well as leading home is the US and figuring out what are the national interests of the US in what consists of American foreign policy before going out to implement the policy internationally.