International Security Course–Fall  2020

Nuclear Proliferation & EU-GCC Relations

At the turn of the 21st century, The Gulf Cooperation Council began looking into nuclear power as its primary consumption of energy, attempting to diversify its power source from the region’s traditional reliance on domestically produced fossil fuels. Throughout the 2000s, both the UAE & Saudi Arabia have also taken subtle measures that, some may argue, serve as a countervailing effort against Iran’s contentious nuclear program under the guise of the peaceful acquisition of nuclear energy technology. So far, within the GCC, the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and Saudi Arabia have the most advanced nuclear power production plans; Abu Dhabi began construction of its first nuclear reactor, Barakah-1, in July 2012, and it is planned to follow this with three further reactors. Should Saudi Arabia’s plans be realized, the Kingdom could become the Middle East’s largest nuclear power producer over the next 20 years. Current plans involve the construction of 16 nuclear power plants, which would supply one-sixth of the Kingdom’s anticipated electricity needs by 2032.

Given that rapidly rising levels of domestic energy consumption have already made the GCC a regional energy consumer which rivals the combined energy demand of Latin American countries, this endeavor also holds significant potential for nuclear energy to become deeply entangled in the region’s existing geopolitical context. The significance of the GCC’s nuclear plans extends to the region’s wider regional relationships, including those with nearby Iran, whose nuclear program has been a source of tension between Tehran and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) for decades. After Iran, the UAE and Saudi Arabia will possibly be the Middle East’s only power producers, and the first Arab countries with access to nuclear technology. Although the GCC states have emphasized their exclusively civilian interest in nuclear power, the option to develop a nuclear weapons program once the technology is in the country is, of course, a possibility that can never be fully discounted. The acquisition of this technology would elicit calls from international leaders to have GCC states adopt additional protocols within existing nuclear proliferation treaties. GCC efforts to develop local uranium enrichment or plutonium reprocessing facilities could threaten multilateral cooperation with other actors within the region.

If the GCC continues in the pace of domestic nuclear production, member states would also be tempted to rely even more intensively on US protection from Iran, which could be considered a double-edged sword. Moreover, Saudi Arabia and the UAE have recently embraced closer defense ties with Russia, which would allow the GCC to balance strategic alliances in the act of confronting Iran with imminent diplomatic entreaties. Furthermore, the European Union (EU) also has vested interests in the Gulf region, remaining particularly dependent on the safe and steady access to relatively cheap energy supplies. On the other hand, Gulf countries are primarily interested in getting access to EU technology and manufactures. Moreover, they are increasingly interested in investing in diverse economic sectors within the EU.

More importantly, the EU is concerned with the rise in nuclear energy production principally due to geographical proximity and the possible consequences in terms of environmental and soft security issues. Though a risk of direct attack towards the EU is not likely, these concerns stem from the probable consequences of eventual nuclear attacks in the Middle East such as an increasing influx of migrants, the risk of energy supply disruptions, the harm to EU economic interests within the region, and the imaginable environmental consequences of a nuclear attack. As a result, the concern over the nuclear race in the region remains at the top of GCC & EU diplomatic agendas.

 

Sources:

https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/172379/Gulf_Nuclear_4008.pdf0.pdf

El-Katiri, Laura. “The GCC and the nuclear question.” Oxford Energy Comment (2012).

Perkovich, George. “Nuclear developments in the GCC: risks and trends.” the Gulf Research Center’s Gulf Yearbook 2008 (2007).

Media Shift

 

As Trump continues to Tweet his frustrations away, and blatantly lying or, according to Twitter “making disputed claims” he has turned his back on Fox. As Trump continues to claim election fraud over baseless, desperate, alleged examples, even Fox News has stopped parroting everything that comes out of Trump’s mouth. As Fox News and top Republicans, including Melania and Jared, try to encourage the President to concede to Biden, he has now turned against Fox and is encouraging his followers to instead focus on NewsMax and OANN (One American News Network). As soon as Fox stopped supporting his narrative, Trump threw the network under the bus and has now grouped them in with the rest of the “fake mainstream media”. Fox News Network’s YouTube channel is now flooded with dislikes and comments denouncing their “bias” coverage – all done by former loyal viewers.  The Wall Street Journal recently reported that the cable channel Newsmax has been highlighted as a competitor media to Fox. The article reports that the channels viewership and popularity skyrocketed after the election, further promoting Trump’s allegations. Though plans remain tentative, it does bring attention to the fact that Trump is not ready to leave the political spotlight. There are rumors that he may run again in 2024, and if he were to find an outlet set on promoting him, who is to say his popularity won’t rise? Though Biden may have won, the race was way too close for comfort bringing attention to the fact that tensions may continue all over the country. As many Trump supporters refuse to accept any mainstream sources of news, what other sensational and out-of-touch outlets will they turn to?

Saudi Arabia & Iran

This past Thursday Saudi Arabia’s King Salman bin Abdulaziz Al Saud, asked the world to put their collective foot down on any effort by Iran to continue to develop nuclear and ballistic missile programs. In a region rife with conflict, the king acknowledged Iran’s expansionism and proxy wars that they are conducting throughout the region. Saudi Arabia and Iran have been fighting in Yemen for over 5 years now. With this aggressive attitude Iran has been taking, the addition to nuclear capabilities provides a serious threat for Saudi Arabia and its allies. 

Now with the writing on the wall of the end of the Trump era, Saudi Arabia may be losing one of the biggest anti-Iran voices in the political sphere. Even though many believed Trump exiting the Iran nuclear deal negotiated by the Obama administration opened the door for Iran to acquire a nuclear warhead. A Biden administration has pledged to return to the 2015 nuclear pact made with Iran as a way to ensure we don’t allow them to create nuclear missiles. The fear of allowing a country to even create nuclear energy is because it may be difficult to ensure if they are also developing a ballistics program to eventually coincide with it.

With the new and unexpected partnerships that Saudi Arabia has been developing, such as one with Israel, the pressure to ensure Iran does not obtain nuclear capabilities has never been higher. As Saudi Arabia deals with endless human rights issues and the very public killing of Jamal Khashoggi- I would not expect many world leaders to jump at the opportunity to stand by their side and take a “decisive stance” against anyone.

 

Al Jazeera. (2020, November 12). Saudi king urges world to take ‘decisive stance’ against Iran. Retrieved November 16, 2020, from https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2020/11/12/saudi-king-urges-world-to-take-decisive-stance-against-iran

Thoughts about Pakistan’s Nonuse of Nuclear Weapons.

In their article “Nuclear Ethics? Why Pakistan Has not Used Nuclear Weapons…Yet”, the author Sanniah Abdullah lays out the argument that the reason Pakistan has not yet used nuclear weapons is not because of the presence of a nuclear taboo in the country or deterrence but because the Pakistani military has not yet faced a situation where they were able to use nuclear weapons and doing so would be useful.

I only kind of agree with the author’s argument. It is worth pointing out that the 1999 Kargill War was limited in its scope and did not nearly qualify as the type of conflict that would justify the use of nuclear weapons. Since 1999, there has not been any real military crises between India and Pakistan aside from skirmishes between irregular forces in the disputed Kashmir region. However, the lack of a nuclear taboo and the power of the military over the country leads me to believe that if such a situation would arise, there is a high chance of the Pakistani’s using their nuclear arsenal.

Nuclear Capacities in the Middle East and Saudi Arabia

Due to Iran’s continued efforts on nuclear weapons capacities, Saudi Arabia has been pushing for more nuclear weapons capabilities in the international arena. However, the new aspirations tend to focus on energy sources, and nuclear energy efforts are underway. Saudi Arabia has been trying to walk the line between both deterring Iran’s nuclear capabilities with its own, as well as making sure the international community and its trading partners are in line.

With the recent German arms ban to Saudi Arabia as well as Saudi Arabia’s boycott of Turkish products, it seems that there may be more isolation from Saudi Arabia and potential developments into developing its weapons technology, potentially via nuclear means.  With the oil price drop in 2020 causing a $27.5 billion revenue drop for Saudi Arabia, it seems that there may be more geopolitical and economic reasons for Saudi Arabia to develop more warfare capability as well.

https://oilprice.com/Energy/Energy-General/Oil-Price-Crash-Costs-Saudi-Arabia-275-Billion-In-Revenue-In-2020.html

https://www.dailysabah.com/business/economy/saudi-arabia-suspends-buying-animal-products-from-turkey

https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2020/11/15/saudi-minister-slams-german-arms-ban-kingdom-doesnt-need-them

Nuclear Proliferation and the Hydra

Secrets put people in harm’s way.

Have you ever come across The Blacklist series? Netflix´s hit is the purest treasure trove for quotes, and this one fits exactly to the topic of nuclear proliferation. If you watch season 2, you realize that it is not always just the states who can play the villain, but also people or a multinational group (“The Cabal” in the film) who can influence governments. Which makes one nervous, but later to that. So, what role relatively small states can play against world powers like the USA, China, or Russia? As Correra puts it briefly and aptly in the epilogue of his book about A.Q Khan [1] the most worrying question is

how much of the previously secret, tightly held knowledge on nuclear technology may now be circulating on the market?

The US has stated that it supports the nuclear ambitions of any state in the Middle East as long as it does not seek to develop a full fuel cycle, and the Obama administration set the treaty with the Emirates as an example to follow for other countries. But what was that with nuclear cooperation with Vietnam? (By the way a reliable ally, and as American know a formidable enemy.) The clear example of double standard means that nuclear proliferation in Asia is not as dangerous as in the Middle East? And the UAE as an example? And why should Japan and South Korea comply with IAEA regulations in the light of North Korea’s or Myanmar´s nuclear program?

Is it really about nuclear proliferation or more about the relations between the great powers and their vassal states?  “The Cabal” quoted at the beginning was a “shadowy multinational group that holds positions of influence in government”[2]  A.Q. Khan was for decades the most dangerous black-market dealer in nuclear technology. And Hydra is a multi-headed monster in Greek mythology.

 

[1] Corera, Gordon. Shopping for Bombs : Nuclear Proliferation, Global Insecurity, and the Rise and Fall of the A.Q. Khan Network. Oxford University Press, 2006. ProQuest Ebook Central.

[2] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/The_Blacklist_(season_2)

India-US Relationship Is Now Official

 

India has finally decided to bet for American led security in Asia, India’s decision was influenced due to lack of Russia’s ability to contain China, therefore, It has signed important agreements such as BECA where India has obtained valuable geospatial data, improving situational awareness for military operations and increasing the accuracy of its missile systems. COMCASA enabled Indian and US military platforms to network with each other. LEMOA allowed Indian and US militaries access to each other’s refueling facilities and military material. GSOMIA started the sharing of sensitive military intelligence data, through these four agreements will allow to implement better logistics, geospatial data sharing in place.

In October, Modi’s government has shed India’s traditional Nehruvian diffidence and embraced the US wholeheartedly. Secretary of State Michael Pompeo and Secretary of Defense Mark Esper joined Indian Defense Minister Rajnath Singh and Foreign Minister S. Jaishankar for the third annual US-India 2+2 Ministerial Dialogue in New Delhi, also relations with Washington and New Delhi have been increasingly in the last decade, now the dialogue has moved toward operationalizing the Quad, allowing major changes in political and military alliances in the region. Regarding the latest events marks a watershed in US-India relation even as Trump leaves and Biden takes over the trajectory of its relation is likely to remain the same.

“Joe Biden and Saudi Arabia relations”

The nomination of the Biden administration may mean more than it seems when it comes to US foreign relations and policies. Under the Trump administration, Saudi Arabia was President Donald Trump’s first overseas visit, which sheds the light into the strong ties president Trump built with the crown prince including the US protection and full support. Saudi Arabia received an enormous  support during the last years, such as weapons’ sales, denial of the Khashoggi murder and the involvement in the Yemen war. During the last five years 2014-2019, a quarter of US weapons’ sales went to Saudi Arabia, and up from 7.4 percent in 2010-2014. Following that, Saudi Arabia began its military involvement in the war in Yemen in March 2015. A war that carries a major humanitarian cost within it.

Luckily, the new Biden administration has made the US position in regards to Saudi Arabia and the war in Yemen very clear. The new administration is giving a needed hope around the world {…..and make sure America does not check its values at the door to sell arms or buy oil,” Biden said in October. The Biden administration may play a major role in the Yemen war, it may impact the ending of the war through enforcing a diplomatic pressure on Saudi Arabia.

The war in Yemen involves multiple external actors, which makes its ending complicated. However, the US with the lead of president Joe Biden and the support of the democratic party can reduce the gravity and make an end to the humanitarian war.

“America First” and Nonproliferation

I found this article by former U.S. Ambassador to NATO Ivo Daalder very interesting. He suggests that a consequence of the Trump Administration’s “America First” foreign policy may be further breakdown of the Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT). Trump and Pompeo’s disdain for alliances have brought America’s commitment to protecting its allies, including if Article 5 is triggered, into question. While the Biden Administration will certainly work to rebuild alliances and reassure allies of the U.S. commitments, our allies and adversaries can hardly be blamed for noticing that 70+ million Americans voted for Donald Trump’s re-election, despite everything, and draw the conclusion a future, less incompetent administration could come to power and revive Trump’s disastrous foreign policy.

Daalder argues that the greatest threat to the NPT is not from adversaries, but from allies who conclude they can’t trust in U.S. protection and pursue nuclear capabilities so they can protect themselves. While I appreciate his concerns about our allies fearing they can’t trust the U.S. to protect them, I would like to believe his concerns are slightly overblown. He opens with a suggestion that Europe worried the U.S. might not defend Poland and the Baltic States from a nuclear threat from Russia. I see no reason Russia would suddenly decide to start nuking its neighbors. If that became a genuine concern, or if any NATO member was threatened or attacked, the U.S. is not the only nuclear state in NATO. The UK and France both have nuclear arsenals that are more than capable of responding to any Russian aggression and protecting Europe.

He mentions South Korea and Turkey as two allies who might be motivated to acquire nuclear weapons. I’m sure Erdogan would love a handy excuse to break the NPT and pursue nuclear capabilities for his own ambitions, but I doubt it would be driven by any real concern about the U.S., especially as Erdogan is friendly with Russia and France and the UK are capable of protecting a NATO ally. The UK and France do not have ICBMs, however, potentially limiting their response range if a threat occurs far from Europe. Their submarines may have stepped up patrols around the world in response to uncertainty from the U.S., but it’s impossible to know.

I also find it hard to imagine South Korea seeking nuclear weapons against North Korea. The threat from North Korea appears to be directed further from home for the most part, as evidenced by their pride in showing off their new ICBMs. It would be likely to only increase the risk to South Korea if they inflamed tensions by acquiring nuclear weapons. I could see this situation pushing South Korea to forge closer ties with China in a hope China will protect the region from North Korea’s nuclear weapons and help constrain the threat.

I think the greatest threat to nonproliferation comes from the states we are already aware of, Saudi Arabia and Iran. While Iran seems interested in the U.S. re-entering the JPCOA, I fear Saudi Arabia and Iran’s power struggles and proxy wars in the region make it even more likely both will become nuclear states. I can’t see any situation where one accepts the other having nuclear weapons if they do not. The focus has been on Iran for some time, but Saudi Arabia is likely not waiting around to find out if the JPCOA will halt Iran’s nuclear ambitions. In recent weeks, both nations have thrown accusations at each other and called on the IAEA to investigate the other. Perhaps the U.S. and other signatories could use this to their advantage. Already, Riyadh knows their time of impunity from Washington is at an end. If the U.S. commits to ensuring Saudi Arabia is held to the same rules and investigations as Iran and neither will be allowed to posses nuclear arms, perhaps it could help prevent both from becoming nuclear states. Obviously, nothing is that simple, but I worry that especially during the Trump Administration, Saudi Arabia has been allowed to fly under the radar and needs to be checked before they destroy any chance of preventing Iran from obtaining nuclear weapons.

What Kamala Harris means for the South Asian diaspora in America and America’s South Asia Policy

I found this op-ed interesting in that, it shows what could be the expectations of the South Asian community in the U.S. and the U.S. policy towards South Asia. We are told that some Indian-Americans are unhappy of the way the media is describing Kamala Harris as the first South Asian to run for the office of VP. They want her her to be known as the first person of Indian heritage to hold the office. However, the Pakistani community in the US, fears that she would push the Biden administration towards a more pro-India policy. That is why some Pakistanis were prepared to vote for Trump on this ground alone (I find this very funny but it’s understandable because people always vote by affinity).

So the author relates that, democratic administrations are widely seen in India and among Indian-Americans as being less friendly to India (especially on nuclear proliferation, and human rights etc.), than Republican ones. As an example, George W. Bush was beloved in India for moving the US closer to New Delhi., and Trump became a good friend of Modi. But in the past, the U.S. has always used India and Pakistan as pawns for its best interests, that is, the US alliance with Pakistan during the Cold War was to contain the Soviets, while today the US is moving close to India to bolster its position against China.

Now, given that Harris comes from south India whereas the tension between India and Pakistan is from the north, the author is suggesting that this may allow much more leverage and possibility of playing a strong positive role in forging a new paradigm. Harris could make use of both Indians and Pakistanis that are successful in government, business and in the media to forge an united front that will transcend over their rivalries. This “could be a great focal point to create a South Asian Renaissance which can contribute significantly to the US their new home.”

https://dailytimes.com.pk/688894/what-kamala-harris-means-for-the-south-asian-diaspora-in-america-and-americas-south-asia-policy/