Broadly, the role of a non-profit board is to set the framework within which the organization operates. This includes determining and ensuring adherence to the mission, making sure the organization has the resources it needs to carry out its mission, and providing financial and ethical oversight.

The question of whether or not the sector has outgrown the need for traditional governance structures is a complicated one to answer. In the reading this week, Jeffrey Sonnenfeld and Fisman, Khurana and Martenson discuss how boards can exercise more effective governance. Primarily, these authors look at governance from a behavioral perspective as opposed to a structural perspective. I found their arguments to be persuasive, particularly as they relate to building high-functioning board teams that seize opportunities, challenge themselves and hold themselves accountable. Neither of these pieces though goes into much detail about how structural change might drive behavioral change or if structural change can drive behavioral change at all.

I’m not sure of the answer, but I wonder the extent to which new governance structures could help create a set of conditions that foster the “virtuous cycle” that Sonnenfeld talks about in his piece. The recent debate around the formation of the 82nd Street Partnership, a business improvement district (BID) in Jackson-Heights Queens, might provide some insight into this question. Here’s an article from the Times Ledger that provides some background. What is noteworthy about the 82nd Street Partnership is that it is an experiment in a new governance model for BIDs, whose boards are traditionally controlled predominantly by local property owners. In the case of the 82nd Street Partnership, the BID’s board includes 8 out of 25 seats for community members, including street vendors, youth, commercial and residential tenants. The Times Ledger article also mentions that “large decisions affecting the direction and vision…will require 18 of 25 board members’ support.” This experiment is fairly new, so it’s probably hard to draw any solid conclusions from it yet. But the question is: can structural changes aimed at creating a diversity of interests and opinions lead to the type of better governance that Sonnenfeld describes?

It seems possible that new governance models could influence board behavior in positive ways. At the same time, it also seems possible that even boards that are more structurally diverse could still become dysfunctional.